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ABSTRACT
The objective of this study is to analyse the possible economic 
development in the countries working together for the Regional 
Cooperation for Development (RCD)# It embodies the study of the 
resource pattern, which would further the economic development of the 
participating countries.
The investigation has been mainly directed towards the possible 
ways of exploiting to a maximum the various resources of the region, 
on a joint basis. It has for example been found during the course of 
study that the deficiencies of certain resources in one country could 
be made up by the other member countries. This possibility of mutual 
exchange makes the region as a whole appear much richer in resources 
than the individual countries.
In order to comprehend the magnitude of the task involved, and to 
visualise ways and means of implementing further development of the 
countries and the region consistent with the geographical and economic 
factors which affect such development, the main features of the 
geography and economy of the regions have been examined. The first 
four chapters treat the geography of the three countries regarding 
their area, climate and cultural affinities as well as the stages of 
economic development reached by the participants, their industrial 
set up and the historical and political setting. All these aspects 
have been analytically studied in the following pages, by using 
secondary sources.
The remaining chapters deal with the degree of cooperation 
achieved in the first seven years of the Regional Cooperation for 
Development, outlining the projects implemented and approved and their
<J p<iH
impression^to the respective participants. The study also treats the 
function of the R,G.D. countries with respect to military alliances to 
which the member countries were party and which is an assessment of the 
future role and significance of the Regional Cooperation for Development,
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CHAPTER 1
GEOGRAPHICAL DESCRIPTION OP THE THREE 
COUNTRIES
1.1 Introduction
The idea of cooperation among the Muslim
countries dates hack to Jamalud-Din-AIghani (1839“
1897," A.D.) who was the modern messenger of Pan- 
1Islamism. Ahdul Hamid II, the sultan of Turkey in 
1882 welcomed the idea of cooperation among the 
Middle East countries. Nationalism had become a 
powerful doctrine In Egypt and there was a growing 
conflict within the Muslim community on the issue of 
whether prior loyalty should be given to one particular 
section of the Islamic world or to the whole. Gener­
ally, however, the link of religion proved its 
ineffectiveness whenever the interests of individual 
states were in conflict with it or with each other. 
Besides, there was no great Muslim power to govern 
the nucleus of any United Muslim state. Nevertheless, 
the ideal of an integrated Muslim brotherhood persists. 
It does not conflict with nationalism in theory, but 
on the level of political and social theory there 
was some reconciliation brought about by Ibn Khaldun 
(1332“lU0 6) and in recent times by writers and pol­
iticians like Zia Gokalp in Turkey, Sheikh Mohammad 
Abdu in Egypt and Iqbal in Pakistan.
1. Hussain (Arif), Pakistan, its Ideology and 
Foreign Policy, Prank Cass, London, i9 60, 
p.131.
The formation of Regional Cooperation for Develop­
ment on 24th July 1964 was not a surprise, for the 
three countries - Iran, Pakistan and Turkey - have 
had previous ties which were conducive to a regional 
arrangement of this kind. ,Iran, Pakistan and Turkey 
may he identified as belonging to a distinct cultural 
area. Although many diversities exist in their cultural 
patterns and there is no linguistic unity amongst them, 
essentially these three states are non-Arab and the 
Turko-Persian culture dominates the lives of their 
people. The earlier Empires, such as the Ottoman, 
the Safavid and the Mongol, which united a large part 
of this area, gave it a common culture.
However, it was primarily due to their national
interest and strategic needs that the three countries
came together. As early as 1937 Iran, Turkey, Iraq
1and Afghanistan concluded the Sadabad Pact, which was 
fundamentally an assertion of regional cohesion* The 
pact is important in the sense that it was for the first 
time the Muslim countries in the Middle East had attempted 
some form of regional cooperation. The pact made no 
mention of any form of cooperation in the economic and 
cultural sphere. Although this pact never proved to be
1. Ramazaiii (R.K.), The Foreign Policy of Iran -
1500-1941, University Press of Virginia, Charlotte- 
ivflTe, 1966, p.272. On July 8th 1937 Iran signed 
a treaty of non-aggression with Afghanistan, Iraq 
and Turkey, at the King Riza Shah}s Sadabad Palace 
in ShtyuVban, a northern suburb of Tehran. The 
draft of the treaty had been signed at Geneva by 
Iran, Iraq and Turkey on 2nd October 1935 and 
had been accepted at a later date by Afghanistan.
an effective link between the participating countries, 
it was important for it was the first regional arrange- 
ment embracing any part of the Middle East since the 
break-up of the Ottoman Empire,
The new concept of Regional Cooperation among 
countries of the Middle East lying close to the Soviet 
Union was initiated in 1964- National and strategic 
interests played the most important roles in bringing 
Iran, Turkey and Pakistan together, as proved by the 
fact that, despite cultural and religious ties between 
these countries, cooperation among them was at first 
confined mainly to defence. In the year 1955 the 
Baghdad Pact had been signed between Iran, Turkey,
Iraq, Pakistan and Britain, with the United States as 
an observer.'*' Thus, when these three countries first 
came together, it was primarily for their own mutual 
defence and security. Immediately after the Second 
World War both Turkey and Iran feared that the Soviet 
Union would try to extend its influence southwards as 
Tsarist Russia had already attempted to do in the 19th 
century. In the post-1945 period when Turkey was again 
subjected to Soviet pressures and Iran was faced with 
the Asarbaijan crisis, in which the Communists were 
included, the two countries turned towards the West for 
aid. In Pakistan, on the other hand, the main sotirce of 
anxiety was India and not the U.S.S.R., and it was for
1. United Nations Treaty Series, 233, 1956, No.3264.
this reason that Pakistan joined the Baghdad Pact*
The Baghdad Pact, which was Western sponsored, 
followed NATO 1949 and SEATO 1954, and closed the 
gap between them. From the Western point of view 
this was containment of Communist power, i.e. U.S.S.R. 
and China. From the point of view of Pakistan it 
was defence against India. The attraction to the 
Turks of some defensive system which would safe­
guard their northern flank was obvious, and the 
same was the case with Iran, but much less so with 
Fakistah. In 1958 Iraq withdrew from the Pact after 
the overthrow of the pro-Western Hashimite dynasty, 
the headquarters of the Baghdad Pact were shifted
from Baghdad to Ankara said so the Baghdad Pact was
1renamed as CENTO. These were the factors which 
brought into being the CENTO Pact.
Those factors do not exist any more, howeverf 
To the Turks and Iranians the fears of the Soviet 
Union are also rece^ding. Since the Bhah's last 
visit to Moscow in 1956, Russian and Iranian 
relations have changed from sharp antagonism to 
superficial concordance. The U.S.S.R. concluded an
1. For a detailed account of the Pact's genesis 
structure and development, see "The Baghdad 
Pact", The Hound Table, 215-224, June 1957.
2. • - - “ ' , (E.I.U.), Iran,
agreement with Iran by which it would undertake to
finance and construct an industrial complex ground
Esfahan based on a steel mill and other plants to
produce machine tools, tractors and agricultural
machinery. In exchange Iran would export natural
gas to the Soviet Union, possibly from the N.I.O.C.
fields at Sarajen and Gorgan. Agreements were
signed for the import of 3 0 0 ,0 0 0 tons of sugar
during the year 1968 of which 75,000 tons was
obtained from the Soviet Union under the established
1bilateral agreement between the two countries.
Hie Soviet Union is giving economic assistance 
to Turkey in the form of investment loans and tech­
nical assistance to develop the country's industries. 
Pakistan went even further than its other two partners 
in establishing good relations with the U.S.S.R. Up 
to 1969 Pakistan had received four Credits from the 
U.S.S.R. - 30 million dollars for oil exploration,
11 million dollars for import of agricultural machinery, 
50 million dollars for import of other machinery and 
84 million dollars for two electrical complexes, 
mineral survey and power station at Mari. Of this,
13 million dollars have been made available during 
the period 1967-1969.2
1• Quarterly Economic Review, (E.I.U.), Sep tember
19S7, pp.5-7."
2. Pakistan Journal of Industry, Commerce and 
Investment, cFinance and Industry', Vol.4,
No.11, 1969.
If the activities of CENTO had remained con­
fined to coopei^ ation for security and defence, 
which it had originally been designed for, RCD 
would have hardly evoked any speculation. It 
would seem quite natural for the three countries 
to extend the area of their cooperation from defence 
to economics. The reason why RCD has assumed a 
significance of its own is that it has been super­
ficially described as an organisation outside CENTO 
and, within CENTO itself, the emphasis has shifted 
to economics. A study of the economic activities of 
CENTO shows that they correspond with the declared 
aims of the RCD, that is the Istanbul Pact. The 
difference between RCD and CENTO is that the 
former is not an offshoot of a military alliance with 
outside powers. Since under RCD regional, economic 
and cultural cooperation has been agreed upon volunt­
arily and it does not have as its basis a military 
Pact, it may prove to be more effective in the long 
run. It is hoped that Afghanistan might, in the 
near future, join RCD and if it did, that would
I
not jeopardise the Afghan policy of non-alignment.
Although RCD was more an economic agreement 
than political, still it was hoped that it would lead 
the three parties to support each other more firmly 
on political matters. In the outside world, RCD
1. Dawn, Karachi, 18th September 1964.
has generally been accepted as a progressive move
similar to the European Gommon Market, Although
its political implications are apparent, yet there
has been no hostile criticism of the pact from any
power. The Times editorial described RCD as "A
1natural process, not directed against anybody".
The Economist, though critical of the political 
implications of RCD wrote, "it may direct its 
energies more toward the real needs of the three
2countries than CENTO's economic planners have done,"
The rapidly changing pattern of economic and 
social life in all the countries has led to the 
growth of regional economic groups. Usually the 
original impulse for the formation of such groups 
comes from geographical closeness and deep-rooted 
historical, political and cultural ties. Attempts 
have been made recently to develop regional areas 
of free trade. The idea has gradually emerged, and 
in post-war Europe, economic cooperation involved a 
series of bilateral arrangements through the organ­
isation of European Economic Community. The Treaty 
of Rome and the emergence of the European Economic 
Community were the natural development of this 
trend. Shortly afterwards a second regional area 
of free trade was established in Europe known as 
the European Free Trade Area.
1, The Times, London, 21st August 1964.
The Economist, London, 15th August 1964, pp.620-21.
The increased emphasis which COMECON has 
recently acquired is proof that on whatever pattern 
the economy is organised the need for getting to­
gether and cooperating on a regional basis is felt.
As years have gone by and events have followed, 
the regional groupings for the economic development 
have become more and more important. Efforts to 
develop export promotion and import substitution 
have brought many countries face to face with the
needs for harmonising their actions particularly
1
on a regional basis.
Just as the economic groupings of other countries, 
the regional groupings in the development of the 
countries of Iran, Turkey and Pakistan is a decision 
of great importance, and the economic survival of 
these countries may very much depend upon such a 
cooperation. One of the first vital steps to 
achieve economic integration between the tripartite 
countries is the cooperation in trade. The economics 
of Iran, Pakistan and Turkey are such that pooling of 
markets will not deliver the goods. The stage of 
economic and social development, level of financial 
resources, and in the short term the problem of
peconomic growth are very similar. Each country of 
the region has its special commodities which are not
1. Hanson (J.L.), A textbook of Hconomics, Macdonald 
& Evans, Ltd., 19&1, p.75”£I
2. Journal of Industry, 'Table of the Trade of the 
Regional 19£37S3T, Vol.4, No. 11, 1964, pp.10-12.
shared hy other countries and on which they depend 
for most of their foreign exchange earnings. In 
the case of Iran it is oil and for Pakistan it is 
jute and jute manufactures and in the case of 
Turkey it is tobacco. Each country depends on one 
or two commodities for the major part of its export 
earnings which do not compete with each other in 
the foreign market.
Currently not much can be done to supply the 
needs of these countries from the production within 
the regions except in the case of oil and minerals 
from Iran and jute manufactures from Pakistan. The 
RCD countries are trying to develop in the shortest 
possible time, hence they are embarking on an indust­
rialisation programme which is based on import sub­
stitution. Industrial progress based on raw materials 
produced domestically has to be harmonised with a 
common policy of imports,otherwise industrial progress 
may suffer a set back. The substitution of intra- 
regional trade for extra-regional trade can only be 
meaningful if it helps in the economic development 
of the region as a whole. The objectives should not 
be to expand trade for trade's sake but to expand in 
the interest of development of the region.
The prospects for expanding intra-regional trade 
in agricultural commodities particularly rice from 
Pakistan, tobacco from Turkey, spices from Iran, are 
bright. The combined effort of the tripartite countries 
in the field of agricultural production and marketing
is going on. At present most of these products are 
exported to countries outside the region. As climatic 
conditions are not very different, the tendency is 
now to produce similar primary products for their 
own industries. Intra-regional trade of the commod­
ities produced by these industries needed by other 
countries of the region will definitely help the 
regional trade.
Another important aspect is that each of these 
countries is in relatively similar state of self- 
realisation, believing that their future will be the 
result of social and economic progress, unaccompanied 
by violent upheavals and attempts to improve their 
own position at the expense of neighbours. The 
growth of projects based upon participation would 
tend to end the isolation of any one country. Afghan­
istan must take into account the landlocked position 
of the country and the fact that it must always rely 
upon the goodwill of its neighbours for outlets to 
seas or to any markets beyond its own frontier. 
Afghanistan could use routes of access to the Indian 
Ocean through Iran. On the other hand closer ties 
between the RCD countries would lead to a friendly 
resolution of the question of outlets and the integration 
of a part of the Afghan economy with that of this area.
It is possible that Pakistan may give special facilities 
to Afghanistan at the port of Karachi, and that Iran 
would move ahead to develop the natural harbour of
Chahbahr as a free port, situated just inside the 
eastern frontier of Iran, It would give economic 
development to Afghanistan and he of enormous 
benefit to Iran by opening up the eastern reaches 
of the country from Meshed down to the Persian Gulf. 
Industrial development and the creation of facilities 
are much further advanced in Iran than in Afghanistan, 
and with trained and skilled engineers as well as 
with funds Iran has the capability of aiding Afghanistan# 
Pakistan has its own reasons for favouring 
regional ties. The area of West Pakistan has 
ancient historical ties with Iran and Afghanistan 
and, on the ethnic grounds, with the Turks. These 
ties were strongest during the 12th century which 
began with the invasion of India by way of Afghan­
istan, continued with the conversion of millions of 
Hindus to Islam, and had a brilliant climax at the 
height of the Moghul period. Pakistan is the heir 
of Moghul power, with its renaissance of Muslim 
culture. With Afghanistan's cooperation, the RCD 
pact could be strengthened. It was in 1962 that 
Pakistan invited Afghanistan to join a federation.
An agreement in 1964 was signed between Rawalpindi and 
Kabul. It is true to say that such efforts for the 
confederation of the Non-Arab Muslim countries bore
1* Dupree (Louis), "A suggested Pakistan, Iran,
Afghanistan Federation". The Middle Bast.
Journal, Washington, 1963?"p.3*94*
some fruit in July 1964 in the shape of the Istanbul 
Pact. Pakistan's relations with Afghanistan have 
improved since 1963 as the trade, which was once 
stopped between the two countries due to strained 
relations,has been resumed and there is the poss­
ibility of a joint steel mill to be set up in 
Afghanistan. So all this augurs well for future 
Pakistan-Afghanistan relations and may make it 
easier for Afghanistan to become a member of the 
Istanbul Pact - which would form an even bigger 
Muslim Block.
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1.2 The Region
The contiguous land-mass extending from Istanbul 
to Karachi '• . has the attributes of a
natural region. It has been the cradle of several 
ancient rulers - the Achaemenians, the Greeks, the 
Parthians, the Sassarians, the Abbasids, the Mongols 
and others. Physically the rulers were anchored in 
Iran which is a great natural rampart, but it has 
links with the farthest ends of Turkey and Pakistan.
The Pleateau has the Persian Gulf in the south, the 
Indus valley in the east, the Tigris in the. west and 
the Caspian Sea and Central Asian deserts in the 
north. It is a huge fortress, a well placed unit, 
and by reason of its location and natural resources 
it is a potential "Centre of Political Gravity" as 
Sir Olaf Caroe observes in "The Wells of Power".1
The region encompassed by the RCD has a total 
area of sq. Km. (Turkey 77) \ Iran
Pakistan 9 ^ 3 7,5£) and a total population 
of nearly 160 million. There are the physical 
resources of the region in food grains, agricultural 
crops and minerals, especially ore, petroleum and 
natural gas. They can best be tapped through joint 
planning on a regional basis.
The three countries, Pakistan, Iran and Turkey, 
can be considered as a physical or economic region.
1. Caroe (Sir Olaf K.), The '.Veils of Power; the 
oilfields of South Western Asia, London, 1951,
The tripartite countries share many features* They 
enjoy a degree of basic geographic unity, evidenced 
hy their physical separation from the rest of the 
Middle East^ , by their common geographic proximity to 
the Soviet Union, with which they share many physical 
features. The area of ROD stretches from the borders 
of Bulgaria and Greece in Europe to those of Pakistan 
in Asia*
This region of the tripartite countries is 
considered as part of the Middle East. There are 
different opinions of different geographers about 
the extent of the Middle East region. None would 
include Pakistan in the Middle East region, although 
for the most part in its dry climatic conditions and 
environment it bears a close resemblance to the arid 
countries of the Middle East, with which it also has 
strong cultural ties. Scenically, the area is varied 
with an assortment of rugged mountain ranges, high 
plateaux and level planes. The first chain of 
mountain system traverses northern Turkey, northern 
Iran and northern Pakistan* These mountains, part 
of the Alpine^Himalayan Tertiary fold system are 
known in Turkey as the Northern Anatolian or Pontic 
mountains, in Iran as the Elburz, and in Pakistan as 
the Sulaiman Range; there is one offshoot which lies 
towards Afghanistan and is known as Koh-i-Baba and 
Hindu Kush mountains. In all the three couhtries are 
found high active volcano cones, for example Mount 
Ararat.
The second chain of mountains in this region 
is also the continuation of the arc entering the 
area from Europe, In Turkey the system continues 
as the Taurus, and Anti Taurds mountains, and in 
Western and Southern parts of Iran as the Zagros 
mountains, which continue to the south along the 
Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean to Pakistan. Along 
the south west of the Iranian Plateau are a series 
of high parallel ranges and longitudinal valleys 
which are the continuation of the Kurdistan mountains 
of upper Iraq. One elevation reaches 3>917 m, hut 
2,439 m. is the general height of the ridge crests. 
These mountains are a succession of anticlines and 
synclines, somewhat in Appalachian style. The 
slightly more humid Zagros are suceeded south­
eastward by the drier Pars and equally arid Makran 
next to Pakistan.
The topography of the tripartite countries has 
common featxires. All tbs three countries are 
surrounded by mountains with barren lands over much 
of the area. The conditions are quite similar 
surrounding the arid pleateau.. of Iran and Turkey.
Away from the seaboard and coast lands, most of 
Turkey is at the best semi-steppe country suitable 
only for pastoral nomads. Much of the plateau is 
marked by volcanic caves, salt lakes, mud flats and 
marshes. It is not a single plain but broken by many 
mountains, hills and gorges. A number of rivers are 
found and these make life possible. As compared with 
the complete barrenness of mu da of the central part
of Iran, Turkey has some cultivation in the central 
plateau. (Sea 1J.
The physical characteristics of the Central 
plateau of Iran is quite similar to that of Turkey.
It is also ringed hy mountains which range in altitude 
from 305 m. to 6,000 m. Unlike the central plateau 
of Turkey it is thinly inhabited and undrained. In 
about the centre of Iran are the two deserts - 
Dasht-i-Kavir and Dasht-i-lut.
Like Iran, Pakistan too has arid lands. In the 
south-east of the plain there is the Thar desert, 
which extends into West Pakistan from India. In 
Bahawalpur the desert is known as the ChoiIstan and 
in Khairpur as the Nora. To the west of Jhelum 
there is the Thai desert which is being reclaimed by 
the construction of canals. The Plateau of Baluchistan 
in West Pakistan which is 305 m. high, lies to the 
west of the Sulaiman and Kirthar mountains. Dry 
hills run over the plateau from the north-east to 
the south-west. A large area in the north-west is 
desert. Besides the arid land, the green and fertile 
area is also found in the three countries. Pakistan 
was once covered with natural forests, but for gener­
ations they have been cut down or burned to make way 
for crops and animals. In West Pakistan forests cover 
about 2.5 per cent of the prairie* while in East 
Pakistan it is 16 per cent of the area. Some of
the important plantations are at Changamanga and
1
Chichowatni and Wan Bachran.
1. Ahmed. (Kazi S.), A Geography of Pakistan, Oxford
University Press, Pakistan, 196m-, p.U-3*
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In Turkey the fertile lands are located in the
region around the Black Bea, the Aegean Sea and the
Sea of* Marmara, It is here that the^density of*
population is found. The strip around the Black
Sea coast includes some of the "best forest areas
of the region^
In Iran the most cultivated area is found on
the Iranian coast of the Caspian Sea, the coastline
is about Gkh Km. long and its borderlands roughly
coincide with the provinces of Gilan, Mazandaran 
1
and Gorgan. This area that is the Caspian coast is 
one of the most densely populated areas of the region. 
Extremes of climate are characteristic. In 
winter the temperature falls extremely low whereas 
in summer it rises very high. In Iran the temperature 
falls to - .8°G at Tabriz, -1.1°C in Turkey at Kara 
in the extreme north-east of the region, - ,5°C in 
Pakistan at Murree• In summer in Iran the temper­
ature reaches to 51*6°C at the Persian Gulf, U8.8®C 
in Turkey, and 43*3°C in Pakistan.
The rainfall also varies greatly. It can reach 
as much as 25^ ** 00 mm annually in the eastern end 
of the Black Sea and the Caspian Sea coasts. In 
Turkey it may drop to almost zero, in the deserts 
of Iran and West Pakistan it is generally arid : ; f.
&>f~k low rainfall whereas Bast Pakistan has generally 
heavy rainfall. (
So taking the above mentioned physical points 
into consideration, it can be seen how these three
countries, Iran, Pakistan and Turkey, are to some 
£. See- Pfl. 1,
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extent linked together. Not only the countries 
are contiguous, hut the region has a topographic 
unity and enjoys similar climatic conditions. 
Besides these, the historical, cultural, political 
(which are dealt with in the following Chapters) 
and socio-economic factors are also important*
1.3 Climate
1.3 - 1* Iran
Iran is a land-bridge Between the Mediterranean 
climate of parts of Asia Minor and the monsoon climate 
of India* In winter and spring, atmospheric depress­
ions travelling eastwards from the Mediterranean 
cause the bulk of the rainfall that Iran receives; 
in summer the influence of the south-west monsoon 
is felt on the shores of the Gulf of Oman, but the 
effects are so weak that no rainfall occurs* Apart 
from the changes in wind direction accompanying the 
passage of depressions, the surface winds of Iran are 
mainly controlled by the pressure system over Central - 
Asia, which is high in the winter and low in summer.
In winter winds from a northerly quarter prevail 
almost throughout Persia. In summer a low-pressure 
belt extends from Sind to the Persian Gulf and Arabia. 
Since these winds come from over the land mass of 
Asia they are relatively dry and condemn the greater 
part of Iran to intense aridity.
Iran lies in sub-tropical latitudes where the 
summer should be hot and the winter delightfully warm. 
But because of the sise and relief of the country, 
the climate is extreme with winters being abnormally 
cold for the latitude. The- northern and western 
mountains derive much moisture in winter and spring 
from easterly moving depressions, but the country to 
the south and east of these highlands is rainless and 
arid. This area which covers about two-thirds of the 
whole kingdom, is a series of vast silt-filled basins 
lying for the most part at 915 m. to 1,525 nn above
sea level. The temperature drops rapidly after 
sundown all the year, and in winter the nights are 
bitterly cold. In the same way the hot summer 
conditions change suddenly to cold winter weather. 
Rains are low and erratic, and evaporation occurs 
at a high rate through the prevailing high temper­
atures and strong winds, which blow unchecked over 
the flatter areas. These strong winds also emphasise 
the extreme seasonal temperatures. These climatic 
features are sufficiently distinctive to give the 
name * Iranian type* to the climate of other interior 
plateaux in sub-tropical latitudes.
Climatically Iran consists of two contrasting 
areas, ther ainy mountain fringes of die north, and 
west, and the arid lands of the interior and south.
a) The coastlands of the Caspian Sea
b) The Elburg Mountains
c) The Zagros Mountains
d) The basins and ranges of interior Iran
e) The lowlands of the Persian and Oman Gulf.
The first three belong to * rainy’ Persia and the
last two to *arid? Persia. The coastlands of the
Caspian Sea have a very humid and uncomfortable 
1
climate. The winters are cloudy and wet, temperature 
U.U°C; the summers hot and steamy, temperature 36*6°C. 
The rainfall is abundant, about 5080 mm, for six 
months of the year, and showery, cloudy periods occur 
occasionally even in the hot season.
1. Geographical Handbook series, Persia, Naval 
Intelligence Division, p.156. ~
The Elburz Mountains forai the greatest climatic 
divide In Iran. To the north is the winter warmth 
and feverish summer heat of a green tropical land­
scape. To the south, the frigid winters and dry 
torrid summers of the arid plateau. The air on the 
northern side contains much moisture, and precipit­
ation is heavy on the lower and middle slopes of the 
range. The temperature decreases with increasing 
altitude, but even on Demavend snow usually remains 
all the year only in sheltered hollows. The influence 
of the moisture laden winds decreases mostly rapidly 
eastwards, so that the Khurasan mountain summits are 
not snow covered in summer and autumn.
The Zagros mountains throughout their length of 
1,288 Km. maintain altitudes of over 1,829 m, and in 
many parts exceed 3,658 m. In summer the temperatures 
are high - Shiraz, mean temperature is 29*4°C in July. 
In winter the temperature drops more rapidly with 
the ascent, and has a mean of U*U°C. or less for 
January. IRywever the climate of the Zagros range is 
distinguished mainly by its precipitation. The most 
northerly of the exposed slopes have 508 mm to 
1016 mm in a year, and rain or snow may fall almost 
every day for two or three weeks in winter. In 
southern Pars the Zagros mountains begin to lose most 
of their climatic affinities with wetter Iran. 
Throughout the range the snowfalls of winter and 
spring may be heavy, and snow-cover may continue for 
some weeks or months in the colder wetter parts.
The basins of interior Iran cover about 906,497 
sq. Km* of territoiy that is distinguished climatically 
by its aridity and extreme of temperature. In summer 
the skies are practically cloudless and the sun’s 
rays so powerful that despite the altitude temperatures 
are little lower than those on the plains of the 
Persian Gulf. The July means increase from between 
26.6°C and 29*4°C in the north to about 32.2°C in 
the south and east* Winters are cold, the January 
means being scarcely above freezing point. On most 
of the northern half of the area, the temperature 
falls below zero and frosts may occur in October and 
April. The annual total rainfalls average about 
2540 mm in the north and less than 1270 mm in most of 
the south and south-east.
The lowlands of the Persian Gulf and the Gulf of 
Oman are distinguished from the interior by the intense 
heat and oppressiveness of their hot season, and mild­
ness of their winters. The plains of Khuzistan are the 
hottest in Iran, mean temperature exceeding 32.2°C.
Away from the coast discomfort is alleviated by a strong 
north-westerly wind movement. The winters are mild, 
although slight frosts occur in most places, while In 
summer the wind over the coastlands of the Persian Gulf 
is relatively humid (relative humidity 70%) • Similar 
hot weather prevails over the Gulf of Oman. At Bushire 
the temperature never drops below freezing point; the 
Makran Coast has the warmest winters in Iran, night 
temperatures below 9*9°C being rare. Absolute drought 
prevails from at least May to September and occasionally 
extends into December.
1*3 * 2. Pakistan
The whole of West Pakistan and almost the whole 
of East Pakistan lie in a warm temperate zone. Only 
a small south-eastern part of East Pakistan is situated 
in the torrid zone or within the tropics.
There is a great contrast in the climate of the 
two parts. Much of West Pakistan is at a great distance 
from the sea and to the north and west there are high 
mountainous regions. The climate is on the whole arid 
and extreme or continental. The rainfall is generally 
low. The summers are hot and the winters are cold.
As East Pakistan is a much smaller area, no part of 
it lies at any great distance from the sea and there 
are no high mountains. It M s for the most part a wet 
and moderate (and mild.) climate. The rainfall is 
generally heavy and while summers are hot, winters are 
by no means cold.
Prom the point of view of temperature, the year 
in both regions can be divided into two seasons:
1, A summer that lasts from April to September
2. A winter that lasts from October to March
In summer monsoon rains are general throughout
both wings of the country. The main rainy seasons 
being from July to September in West Pakistan and from 
June to September in East Pakistan.
1West Pakistan has four temperature regions •
. if  &
1. Qureshi (Ahmed K.), Climatic Regions of Pakistan, 
Pakistan Geographical Review, Vol.2, No.2, 1965, 
■p727':--------------------
The first in the northern and north western mountains
of Pakistan experiences very cold winters with heavy
falls of snow, and mild summers. The range between
othe hottest and coldest months is 1.1 C.
Second, the plains to the south of the region 
have a continental type of climate. The temperatures 
in summer are very high. At this time of the year 
the dry winds, called *loo*, blow during the day*- 
The heavy rainfall brought by thunderstorms produces 
a slight decrease in temperature. June is the hottest 
month in this region - 23-8°C to 26.6°C is the lowest. 
The highest recorded temperature in Jacobabad is 
52.2°C.
Third, in the south and near the sea, there are 
not such extremes of temperature. The proximity of 
the sea makes the atmosphere humid. In winter, 
temperatures are about 6.6° lower than they are in 
the summer.
Fourth, on the Baluchistan plateau conditions 
are similar to those in the northern region, but the 
temperatures are high in summer and not so low in 
winter.
Both wings of Pakistan are dominated by monsoon 
winds and most of their rainfall comes during the 
summer monsoons. The Arabian Sea branch of the 
monsoon blows over West Pakistan, and the Bay of 
Bengal branch over Bast Pakistan. The climate of 
Pakistan can be divided into the following climatic 
regions•
3°6
West Pakistan is divided into fbur climatic 
1
regions
1. Sub-tropical coastlands. It includes the southern 
coastal strip. The annual rainfall is less than
1778 mm but the humidity is high. Under the influence 
of the sea, the temperatures are moderate, and there 
is a steady inflow of sea-breezes throughout the summer.
2. Bub-tropical continental lowlands. This includes 
the whole of the plain of West Pakistan except the 
coastlands. Arid and extreme climate, with high 
summer temperatures and mainly late summer monsoon
ra ins. Rainfall is less than 25U0 mm and falls in 
summer. In the northern part the rainfall is adequate 
for cultivation.
3. Sub-tropical continental highlands. Cold, snowy 
winters, mostly arid with mainly winter and spring rains. 
This region includes mountains to the north and west
of the Indus plain. It has cold snowy winters and spring 
rains. The central part of the belt (Kohat-Waziristan) 
has about 25^ -0 mm of rainfall a year, but precipitation 
diminishes towards the north in Gilgit and the south 
in Makran.
h. Sub-tropical continental Plateau,(extreme climate, 
very arid). This includes the north western part of 
Baluchistan, which is a very arid desert. The rainfall 
averages less than 1270 mm a year. Summer temperatures 
are very high and dust storms are numerous. The 
winters are cold.
2, Se.e . 3.
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East Pakistan is divided into three climatic
iregions
1. Tropical wet region. Southern and south eastern 
parts. It has high humidity* a long hot summer
with heavy rainfall, generally above 2032 mm* Winters 
are dry and mild, and the range of temperature is 
low. In the southern part of Chittagong District 
the rainfall exceeds 30b80 mm. The climate is 
modified, to a certain extent, by relief and the 
hills are cool and pleasant,
2. Subtropical wet region. This region includes 
the northern and north eastern parts. It has high 
humidity and the rainfall is heavy. The summers 
are hotter and the winters cooler because it is 
farther from the sea. The sub montane tract in 
the north east has the highest rainfall in East 
Pakistan and therefore the summers are not so hot.
3. Bub-tropical moderately wet region. This 
includes the central and western parts broadening 
out towards the west. The humidity is almost as 
high as in the rest of Bast Pakistan and the rain­
fall is moderately heavy (12700 - 152bO mm).
Summers are hotter and winters are cooler than in 
regions 1 and 2. The climatie is to a small extent 
continental, and the temperatures range increases 
towards the west.
1. Se-e- f i Q . Lf,
1.3 3 Turkey
The climate of Turkey presents a wide range of 
extremes. Turkey touches the warm temperate Medit­
erranean, the cold rainy Caucasus and the belt of 
desert and steppe which runs from the Sahara to 
Central Asia. The rugged topography inundated plains, 
steep depressions and high relief of the mountains 
are all very important from the climatic point of 
view* If we look at the map of both the relief and 
climate of a country we can see clearly that relief 
plays an important part in climatic variations.
The country is throughout subject to the influences 
of the surrounding land and water masses, the sub­
tropical high pressure area over the northern 
Atlantic, and the cyclonic disturbances coming 
from this ocean, especially during the winter period.
According to the prevailing influences the four 
following chief climatic types can be distinguished.1 
1. The Mediterranean (in the south and west) with 
hot dry summers and mild, wet winters.
2* The Pontic (in the south) with warm summers, 
mild winters and sufficient precipitation at all 
seasons.
3* The Sub-Continental (in the north east) with 
fairly warm summers, but very cold winters and suffic­
ient precipitation at all seasons.
tc
1. Brine (Siri), The Climates of Turkey according 
to Thornthwaites Annals of the Association of 
American Geographers, Vol.XXXIxT 19%, p.2£T. 'TMr ■*in‘-*TT. m it— • i nr n.-T-i.Ti-nfti-nr-rt r-tW') i*'iV.«Ti~Tiwn~.|mT(~;irT FT in vm
U. The semi-arid (in the interior and south east) 
with cold winters and hot, dry summers*
Various climatic types are present because of 
the country’s transitional situation between the 
areas of temperate and sub-tropical climates and its 
irregular relief. Three classes of cold climate, 
together with superhumid, humid, sub-humid and semi- 
arid climates are found. The greater part of Turkey 
has the climate of the sub-humid group. In Thrace 
are only sub-humid and humid mesothermal types, 
whereas in Anatolia, i.e. in the Asiatic part of 
Turkey, great variety may be seen. The centre of 
Anatolia has a semi-arid climate. Surrounding 
this is a belt of various sub-humid climates, 
round west and east, extending to the shores of the 
Aegean Sea and the Sea of Marmora on the one hand 
and to Lake Van on the other. The main area of cold 
climates is confined to the northeastern highlands 
between'Erzerum and Kars, Frost and snow occur 
throughout the year in Pontic mountainous region.
The distribution of moisture regions reflects 
largely the influence of relief. The interior plateaux 
and basins suffer from moisture deficiency, whereas 
the external slopes of the marginal mountainous ranges 
are humid. The areas of humid climates are more ex­
tensive than those of perhumid climates. Two belts 
of humid climates fringe central Anatolia on the 
north and south. The northern belt occupies the 
Black Sea coast and the southern belt increases in 
elevation from west to east.
1*4 Mineral Resources of R.C.P* Countries’*’
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1*4 1- Iran
Iran is rich, not only in Petroleum but also 
in a wide range of other minerals, though serious 
commercial exploration has only just begun and 
other minerals have not yet been developed to the 
extent of oil exploration*
Lead and Zincs - Iran until recently was the 
25th lead-zinc exporting country in the world. By 
1964 Iran had become the 12th leading exporter of 
lead In the world. Lead and zinc are mined at Bafq 
near Yazd, at Khomein west of Ssfahan and at Ravanj 
near Qum, with a combined potential of 600 tons of 
concentrates daily*
Chrome - Although discovered in Iran in 19*4*0, 
commercial export did not begin until 1952* Chromite 
is the second largest foreign exchange earner of the 
exported minerals after lead. It is found mostly 
from the Elburz mountains and near Bandar Abbas.
Iron - It is produced from the deposits in the 
Elburz, in Yazd, Kerman and at Esfahan. Known iron 
ore deposits were at Shamsabad and Bafq, believed 
to hold 120 million tons. A recent discovery is the 
Chograd mine which will be the source of the first ore 
to be supplied to Ssfahan steel mill, scheduled to 
go into production in 1971* Chograd is said to be 
rich enough to supply the mill's requirements for
r— tn~n 1 rTTgTTi mi uni ■im mil iii • i ram inm m m mi t  rinvi n n f i i i .ii n hnM^ ii mu mii*.i nmmw1 u pur. mwi | i *  ■mi* m^ n w ■■■■■ui i ji i  mir. r -t—~ r~-~.-T'~irnir rr~rr ~~~i i ~rn~<riim3m  r^TrtitrnTlTTTiT nt
1. See Pig* . 5*
44
vo
CO
Q-
Eo •<
LU
- J  CNJ
25 to 50 years and estimated to have iron deposits
of about lhO million tons.1 Some more deposits of
iron ore have been discovered in Kerman Province
2of about 112 million tons.
Goal - Goal deposits have been produced near 
Tehran and in Eastern Mazanderan (total production 
was 300,000 tons). About 67 million tons of coal 
has also been discovered in Kerman province.
Sulphur and Salt are produced on the coast of 
the Gulf, near Bandar Abbas. Deposits of copper ore
y*
have been found in Azerbaijan, Kerman and in Yazd and 
Anarak areas. About 8,000 tons of copper ore is 
mined annually in Azerbaijan. A very important 
deppdit of copper has been found at Sas Chesmeh 
near Kerman; some deposits have also been discovered 
at Mazraeh Ahar, northeast of Tabriz.
Petroleum - The major industry of Iran is the 
oil industry, to which the second largest town of 
Abadan owes 3ts entire existence. The Abadan refinery 
is one of the largest in the world. Its output in 1968 
averaged some *+10,000 barrels per day. Iran’s second 
refinery at Karmanshah produces an average of 8,000 
barrels per day for regional economic consumption.
In 1968 a third refineiy was completed at Tehran. The 
largest field is Agha Jari which has produced 2,000 
million barrels of crude oil. The second largest
1. Echo of Iran, Iran Almanac, 1970, Tehran, i.301.
9 — ^ 1 1 HirUPM.umili ln. * *
2. Ibid.
field is Gach Saran where production averaged over 
665*000 barrels per day in 1967* Since I960 a 
number of new fields have been brought into production, 
including Ahwaz (i960) and Pazanun (1963), Kharg,
Karaj and Bibi Hakimeh (196U), Marum (1965),
Ramshir, Raje Safid and Paris (1966). Both Bibi 
Hakimeh and Marum are now included among the four 
largest producing fields in Iran. Total production 
from fifteen fields amounted to 132*9 million tons 
in 1968. Iran is now the largest producer in the 
Middle East and the fourth largest in the world.
l.i|2. Pakistan
Pakistan possesses varied assortment of potential 
mineral wealth which has hardly been tapped as yet. 
Concerted search has revealed an impressive reserve 
of natural wealth. Natural gas, coal, iron ore, 
chromite, barytes, gypsum and other minerals have 
been found in both wings of Pakistan.
Coal - Coal is one of the principal minerals 
produced in Pakistan and consumed on an extensive 
scale. The production is not; sufficient for the 
country^s needs. In 1965 it was li million tons 
and the rest had to be imported. It is expected 
that the production will reach to h.8 million tons 
by 1975* The main coal mines are at Dandot and Pidh
I L U » . *  m >  J I W m t U M l I l — W * B * « | 1 P ' i I'P H WI I'll!) I H M U m - M n t m H u B  n il I I ' II ■. *«.* ' "m
1. Europe*, Publications Ltd,, The Middle East and
North Africa, 1970-71* Seventeenth Edition, p.271.
in the eastern salt range and at Makarwal in the 
western, or trans Indus salt range. Other fields 
include Nakus and Zardalu in Khost Shahrig - 
Harnai region, the Singidi-Les coilfields near 
Quetta, and the Jhimpir field near district of Tatta.
In East Pakistan coal is of good quality and 
has been found at Sunamganj in Sylhet and Sibganj 
in Rajshahi, and some deposits in the Khulna District.
Iron Ores - The known iron ore resources in 
Pakistan are estimated at over hOO million tons.
The largest known iron ore deposits, of more than 
300 million tons, are located in Kalabo^h-Makerwal 
area and may become the principal source of iron ore 
for a national iron and steel industry. Total avail­
able resources of iron deposits in Hazara regions are 
about 60 million tons. Recently discovered iron 
deposits near Langrial Hazara district are estimated 
to be about 27 million tons. Some deposits are in 
Chitral at Dammer Nissar, at Ziarat in Quetta and at 
Dalbandin and Chagai.
Chromite - This ore Is mined in the Hindubagh 
(Zhob District). The production, which is still 
increasing was li+,000 tons in 1965* New deposits 
have been found in Kharan Waziristan (near Tangi, 
thirty miles from Peshawar).
1. Ahmed (Kazi S.), A Geography of Pakistan, Oxford
# • ----- j i  1—  r T n m n r  - in i fT iin     -n  —  *
University Press, 196q., p.103. Also got inform­
ation from the Pakistan High Commission in 
London.
Salt - There are deposits of excellent quality 
of rock salt in the western part of Pakistan near 
the sea coasts. There are six salt mines and quarries 
in the western wing at Khewra (Jhelum), Wareha 
(Sargodha), Kalabagh (Mianwali) and at Jatta,
Bahadurkhel and Karak (Kohat).
Gypsum - is found in large deposits in the salt 
range and the western mountains of West Pakistan, the 
most important being Khewra, Dandot and Daud Khel 
in the former, and Spintangi, Kohat and Rohi in the 
latter.
Lead ore ~ has been found in Hazara, Chitral,
Las Bela and Chagai.
Marble - of very good quality and in a wide 
range of colours is found at Nulla Ghosi, Maneri 
and the Ghundai Tarko hill in Mardan District; also 
in the State of Swat and at Chagai in the Quetta 
Division. Some of these marbles are among the best 
in the world. In Campbellpur District near Patehjang 
is the Kala-Chitta range (black and white marble), 
and near Nazampur village is the Kawagar hill which 
yields absi (pink marble).
Asbestos - has been mined in small quantities 
north of Hindubagh, and sulphur is to be extracted 
from the extinct volcano, Kolp'-i-Sultan (Chagai 
District).
Petroleum. Before independence Pakistan had 
only one small refinery at Rawalpindi processing 
local production. The first refinery to he set 
up after independence was at Korangi, Karachi and 
it went into production in October 1962* The next 
venture started in i960 was also located in the 
Korangi industrial area, has a capacity of half a 
million tons and is mainly producing diesel oil, 
kerosene oil and jet fueled. The third refinery based 
on imported crude oil is under installation at 
Chittagong, and is to have a capacity of one million 
tons. While the refinery at Rawalpindi meets the 
need for motor gasoline, fuel oil and a part of 
kerosene oil, those at Karachi meet the demand of 
ships for fuel and of foreign airlines calling at 
Karachi*
^Natural Gas - In all there are 14 gas fields 
in Pakistan - six in the Eastern wing and eight in 
the Western. Their total reserves have been estim­
ated at over 21*80 billion cubic feet. The gas 
fields are at Giri, Zin, Uch, Khairpur, Mari,
Dhulian Mazarani and Khand Kol in West Pakistan, and 
in East Pakistan at Sylhet, Chattak, Rashidpur, 
Kailash Tila, Titas and Habiganj.
The country’s oil and gas industry has recently 
located two new promising gas-fields, one at :%aldi,
Twenty Years of Pakistan, 1947-1967, Pakistan 
Publications, Karachi, August 1967, p.245*
near Chittagong, and the other at Sari, about 
81 Km, from Karachi*
1*4 3* Turkey
The three countries represent a market with a 
population of about 160 million people, which 
represents a huge potential for economic growth*
Turkey possesses rich mineral reserves and has 
copper, chrome and borax in abundance* In fact so 
far as the first two ores were concerned, Turkey 
has one of the richest reserves in the world*
Further it has diversity of rich mineral resources, 
and these are an important item in the country*s 
foreign trade* Between 1961+ and 1968 mining pro­
duction rose by some 33 per cent* An investment of 
£T* U,100 million is planned during the second plan, 
with the biggest increases in production ejected 
from copper ore, petroleum, and iron ore. Turkey*s 
mineral resources have not been measured accurately, 
but investigations are being carried out in all 
parts of the country*
Borne of the other important minerals of Turkey 
are as follows -
Coal - Bitumous coal is found at and around 
Zenguldak on the Black Sea coast* The seams are 
steeply inclined, and much folded, and strongly 
faulted* The mines constitute the Etibank*s largest 
operation, and the coalfield is the largest in this 
part of the world, including the Balkans* Production 
has risen from around 6,000,000 tons in 1962 to 
7,^+57,000 tons in 1967 and 7,506,000 tons in 1968*
Lignite* - It is found in many parts of Central 
and Western Anatolia. Seams located in Western 
Turkey are operated by West Lignite Mines. Total 
production amounted to 6,^00,000 tons in 1966 and 
I967 and indicated a rise in 1969 when production 
exceeded 8,000,000 tons* The chief mines are at 
Soma, Dejiranisaz and Tunebilek.
Iron Ore - Practically all the production comes 
from Livrigi iron ore mine situated between Sivas and 
Brzerum in north-east Turkey. Between 1963 end 1968 
production has more than doubled, reaching 2,223,U00 
tons in the latter year*
Chrome - Turkey is the second largest chrome 
producer in the world* The mineral was first dis­
covered in I8i|8, near Bursa in the Marm&ra region.
The richest deposits today are in Guleman in south­
eastern Turkey, in the vicinity of Iskendurun; dn 
the area around Eskisehir, north-west Anatolia; 
and between Fathiye and Antalya on the Mediterranean 
coast* The Guleman mines produce 25 percent of the 
country*s total. Production rose to a record figure 
of 689,000 tons in 1966 but dropped in 1967 to 
6li+,000 tons and 607,000 tons in 1969*
Copper.- Copper has been mined in Turkey since 
ancient times. Present day production comes from 
the Ergani mines, situated at Maden in Elazig and
All the figures are quoted from The Statesman's
Year-book, 1970-71, Edited by John"Paxtoh,.
Macmillan Co. Ltd., 1970*
the Murgul Copper Mines at Borcka. A third copper 
complex is planned for Samsun* Annual production 
of refined copper and blister is about 35,000 tons, 
most of which is exported to Federal Germany, the 
United Kingdom and the U.S.A. Copper content of the 
ore reserves is estimated at about 255,000 tons 
at Ergani and 1+00,000 tons at Murgul mines.
Other minerals - Manganese, magnesite, lead, 
sulphur, salt, asbestos, antimony, zinc and merjcury 
are important mineral resources. Of these Manganese 
ranks first in importance. Deposits are found in 
areas near Eskisehir and in the Ergeli district.
Lead is mined at Keban, west of Elaziz. Turkey's 
bauxite deposits are about to be developed for the 
first time. An aluminium complex is being built at 
Kayseri with Soviet help. Petroleum - oil was first 
struck in 1950, it now meets about half of total 
Turkish requirements. There are some recently 
discovered deposits at Ga&zan and Ramandag, Magftip, 
Batiraman and Kurtalan. The largest oil refinery 
in Turkey is at Mersin, the capacity being 1+,700,000 
tons of crude oil a year.
1.5 The Concept of R.C.D. Countries Unity - 
Common Problems of Economic Growth
Turkey, Iran and Pakistan are under-developed 
countries and as such they are facing many common 
problems. For instance tbere is the ever-present 
danger of high rate of population growth, 'there is 
a lack of capital formation and an infrastructure 
suitable for economic development and there is the 
dearth of trained managers and technicians who are 
indispensable for industrial progress.
Before going into greater details, however, it 
would be worthwhile to get some idea of the economic 
conditions prevailing in these countries. To some 
extent all the three countries are essentially 
agricultural countries with a large agricultural 
base.
During the course of history, these countries 
have become merely the suppliers of raw materials 
and the buyers of finished products. Their terms 
of trade have not been favourable in relation to 
industrial raw materials which they urgently need; 
such fluctuations have led to instability in their 
economies.
All the three countries have essentially mixed 
types of economies having a large and flourishing 
private sector. Most of the areas of investment are 
open to private individuals although economic controls 
have an important place in the overall economic 
development.
The Government of the three countries have 
already accepted the necessity of planning and are 
busy implementing their development plans* In 
the case of Pakistan, most of the Industrial 
targets set forth in the Second Plan (1960-65) 
have been achieved. The country has demonstrated 
its capacity to achieve growth rates higher than 
5 pe^jent per annum in both East and West Pakistan. 
The investment level is estimated to have risen 
to over 18 percent of G.N.P. The increase in 
national income is estimated to be over 29 percent 
compared to the Plan targets of 2k percent*
The Third Plan (1965-70) stipulates an in­
crease of 68 percent in development expenditure 
over the five-year period, and the annual compound 
rate of about 11 percent. During the Plan period 
the annual rate of growth in G.N*Pi is estimated 
at 6*5 percent as compared to 5*2 percent during 
1960-65.
Similarly during the Third Plan of Iran 
(1963-68) the G.N.P. has increased at an average 
annual, rate of 8.6 percent. The industry and mining 
sectors contributed largely to economic growth 
with an average annual growth rate of Ik percent. 
Agriculture, although continuing to form the 
largest single sector of G.N.P., has shown a
disappointing rate of growth and has gradually 
declined in importance as a eontri'buter to 
national outputG.N.P. is projected to 
increase at an average annual rate of 9*4 per­
cent during the Fourth Plan.
So far as Turkey is concerned, she is also 
busy implementing her industrial development Plan.
In spite of the steady increase in industrialisation 
during the last ten years, Turkey is still predom­
inantly an agricultural country. Although ho per­
cent of her export earnings are still derived from 
agricultural products, the share of industry has 
Increased from 16 percent of the national income 
in 1950 to 23 percent in 196U, and imports of 
capital goods and raw material have also increased 
considerably while that of consumer goods have 
relieved. Private investment has contributed a 
great deal to maintain the upward trend in the 
industrial sector.
1. Echo of Iran, Iran Almanac and Book of Facts, 
1970, Tehran, Iran, p.241*
Common Problems of Economic Growth
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1.5 1 Population ^
It is with these facts in mind that we should 
try to study some of the basic economic problems 
that are being faced in the region and which have 
made it important for unity of the tripartite 
countries. One of the most important problems is 
that of rapid increase in population. Pakistan's 
current population is 102 million and is increasing 
at the rate of around 2.6 percent.
Rapid increase in population has also been 
experienced in the ease of Turkey where population 
has about doubled itself to 80 million fran 15 
million in 1939. The annual rate of increase is 
about 2*8 percent. This is a very high rate of 
growth and necessitates rapid economic development 
so that suitable jobs may be provided for the 
increasing labour force and per capita incomes 
maintained*
So far as Iran is concerned, she has a relat­
ively less acuta population problem at this stage 
because of vast uninhabited areas. However, pop­
ulation is increasing at a hi^i rate of 2*5 percent 
per annum.
In general terms, the pressure of population 
on land, particularly arable land, provides a good
1* See Pig.
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indication or the relative shortage or excess of 
manpower in a country* In &he case of Pakistan, 
the pressure of population on land is extremely 
high, particularly in East Pakistan which is one 
of the most densely populated regions of the world, 
with an average density of about 922 persons per 
square mile, or 2*6 square Km* The western region 
on the other hand is comparatively sparsely populated 
with 138 persons per square mile or 2*6 sq* KM, 
although in this region, the population is increasing 
,at a fast rate.
The comparative figures for Turkey and Iran are
fer
93 persons per square mile or 2.6^Sq* KM and 37
f>&r
persons per square mile or 2.6^Sq. KM respectively*
In relation to arable land, the figures for the 
three countries are 120 persons per 100 acres or 
247* ha for West Pakistan and 277 persons per 100 
acres or 247/ha for Bast Pakistan; 44 persons per 
100 acres or 247a ha for Turkey and 14 persons per 100 
acres or 247*ha for Iran. The output per head in 
these countries can be increased if the quality of 
the labour force is improved, and this can be done 
by free movement of trained labour within the region 
which could help to maximise output.
1. The estimates with regard to population are based 
on population data for the year 1960-61*
1.5 2 Lack of Capital
The lack of capital is a common feature in all 
the three countries* There are two aspects of this 
problem which should be emphasised. First, domestic 
savings are not sufficient for investment purposes.
These will need to be stimulated and mobilised through 
the setting up of cooperative societies and savings 
banks of various kinds to mobilise savings on a large 
scale•
Secondly, the distribution of personal incomes 
is -unequal within all the countries of the region, a 
problem which only can be tackled by appropriate fiscal 
legislation. Another aspect of this lack of capital 
is the heavy dependence of the countries on external 
resources for their development programmes. Iran has 
a potential for earning foreign exchange because of her 
oil, but even in that country the need for foreign cap­
ital is paramount. Similarly, Pakistan and Turkey need 
foreign capital whether Government or private on a large 
scale.
1.5 3 Infrastructure
The countries in the region lack an infrastructure 
for economic growth. There is the lack of suitable roads, 
railways and other means of communication, so that both 
processed goods as well as raw materials may be supplied 
from one place to another. There is also the problem 
of developing electricity and power on a sufficiently 
large scale which may form a basis for the development 
of industries in different regions. All the three 
countries are busy developing power generating and
engineering projects but since these have a long 
planning and construction period, their results 
are not at once evident*
Major developments related to the infrastructure 
are going ahead in all three countries. Investment 
in road, port and other communication facilities is 
a relatively high proportion of total investment.
CHAPTER 2
2.1 HISTORY AM) POLITICS WITH SPECIAL 
REKRENCB TO THE EASTERN CALIPHATE
2.1 .1. The Arab Empire - (Rise and Spread of Islam) 
Islam, more than any other force, has given 
the Middle East its distinctive identity. The 
social, cultural and political life of every nation 
in the region, including Christian Lebanon and 
Jewish Israel, bears the stamp of this latest of 
the Western world’s three great religions. After 
more than thirteen centuries the spiritual force 
of Islam is still vital, and is still the one 
pattern that covers the whole Middle East*
When the founder of Islam, Muhammad, was 
born in the sixth century A.D., his native Mecca 
was in great turmoil. The decline of trade with 
Europe through the dislocation of routes to the 
West by successive battles between the Eastern 
Roman Empire and its Iranian Sassanid neighbours 
adversely affected the economy of the Arabian 
peninsula.
In Mecca the Prophet faced much opposition 
since his ideas endangered established pagan worship 
at the Kabah from which the town’s merchant oli­
garchy earned great profits. It was in 622 A.D* 
that Muhammad along with his few dozen followers
1. See fig. *7 - The Muslim Expansion
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moved from Mecca to Medina some 200 miles away.
This hijra was later designated the beginning of 
the Muslim era. In Medina, Muhammad became the 
town’s leading warrior, legislator, judge and 
civil administrator, planting the just seeds of 
the Muslim states that were later established in 
Syria and Iraq by his successors. Strengthened 
by his success in Medina, he returned to his home 
town and conquered it. By 632 A.D. most of the 
Arabian Peninsula was subjugated.
Following the death of Muhammad on June 8,
632, the newly bom Muslim Community was confronted 
with the problem of succession to the Caliphate 
which remained a living issue until the twentieth 
century when the Kemalist Turks abolished its 
Ottoman phase and several Pan-Islamic Congresses 
were subsequently held in Mecca and Cairo to deter­
mine the rightful heir, but all without success*
The aged Abu-Bakr was by a form of loose 
election^ declared successor, thus ushering the 
|tyst series of Caliphs, that of the Orthodox, so 
called because they followed closely in the foot­
steps of the Prophet. The seat of this short#- 
lived Caliphate was Medina (632-661). During the 
reign of Abu-Bakr (632-63U) the entire peninsula 
was brought under the sway of Islam.
1. The migration of the Prophet from Mecca to Medina, 
the starting point of the Islamic era.
The first significant task facing the new 
leadership was to maintain the degree of central­
ization in Arabia already established by Mohammad. 
Except for Medina, Mecca, and a few other nearby 
places thoroughly controlled by the Muslims of 
Medina, most of the Arabs renounced the political 
and fiscal authority of Medina. Khalid Ibn-al- 
Walid subdued the tribes of Central Arabia, many 
of which had not been conquered by Muhammad.
Following this Islam was thoroughly established 
throughout Arabia, including Bahrayn, Oman, Yamen 
and Hadhramaht.
The reign of the second Caliph, Omar (63U- 
6hU) marked the opening of a ten-year administration 
of an energetic and brilliant man. In fact he 
strengthened Islam with many religious decrees 
and renewed the theocratic state of Muhammad’s time. 
During the reign of the second Caliph the banner of 
the new faith was carried eastward to Persia, west­
ward to Barca'., in North Africa, and northward to 
the Taurus* These permanent conquests developed 
into military campaigns that netted for Islam an 
empire that extended in the Umayyad Caliphate from 
Spain and France in Europe to Turkestan and India 
in Asia, covering all North Africa. Such rapid 
and brilliant successes at the expense of the two 
world powers of the day - the Byzantine and Persian - 
were astounding, not only in themselves but in their 
result.
1
Over the next several years parties raided 
Khuzistan, took Sus, and advanced toward Isfahan. 
Iranian forces rallied at Hamadan, hut with the 
removal of Umar's han on advances into Iran, Muslims 
over-ran that land from one end to another. In 
ten years of Umar's Caliphate, Muslim armies had, 
in an amazing and almost unbelievable sweep, con­
quered Mesopotamia and Iran. Other armies at the 
same time were engaged in conquering ^rria and 
Egypt.
Umar's accession to the Caliphate did not 
change Muslim activities in Palestine or Syria. 
Several .Arab forces converged upon Damascus in 
635 9 and after a siege of more than six months 
the city capitulated to Khalid. During his 
Caliphate, Iran, Iraq, Syria, Palestine and 
Egypt became parts of the Muslim world. They, 
together with Arabia, are still today the heart­
land of Islam.^
Uthman was a member of the very prominent and 
powerful Umayyad family of the Kuraysh. Noted for 
his mild manners and his piety, his only distinction 
as a Muslim leader was having been a respected 
companion of the Prophet Muhammad. He repulsed a
1. Fisher (Nettleton S.)*, The Middle East - (A 
History), New York, 19597T?"A$H~
2. Ibid.
large Byzantine army in 6h7, and in subsequent 
years sent raiding parties into Asia Minor. He 
too built a fleet, took Qyprus in 6U9 and destroyed 
a large part of the Byzantine navy off the lycian 
Coast.
Arab armies were active during these years 
in Iran, ever fanning out eastward. Fars was fully 
subdued by 650, inroads were made into Armenia in 
652, and before the end of Uthman's Caliphate 
raiding expeditions reached Balk, Kabul and Ghazna.
Ali, Muhammad's cousin, was the fourth Caliph, 
who, as an individual soldier in his younger days, 
had shown as one of the great heroes of Muslim 
battles. Generally throughout the Muslim world 
he was recognized as the Caliph, and the new governors 
appointed by him were accepted everywhere except in 
Syria, where Muwiyah refused to resign.
When Ali was proclaimed the Caliph in 656, 
the Arabs had conquered nearly all the Middle Bast, 
including the region from the Egyptian frontier to 
the borders of present day Pakistan. During the 
Umayyad era the Arab Empire expanded to its maximum 
extent. It swept across North Africa and up into 
Spain and France; it reached the gates of Byzantine
I
Constantinople; it spread into Central Asia beyond 
the Qxus river to the north and into the Indus 
valley to the east.**' By 732, the Arab mile extended
1. Peretz (Hon), The Middle Bast Today, New York, 
1963, p*24.
from the Atlantic ocean to the boundaries of India 
and China.'1' Although the religious factor was 
important, the Umayyad Caliphate laid stress on 
the economic and political structure of the Govern­
ment, attempting to centralize their new empire.
Although the Umayyad dynasty brought the Arabs 
to the apogee of their territorial expansion, it 
was marked by numerous internal weaknesses. When 
the Arabs moved northward out of the peninsula, 
there were two major powers on the Middle Eastern 
scene, Christian Byzantine and the Zorastrian 
Sassanid Kingdom of Iran. Fbr 300 years these 
two empires had contended with each other for 
control of the Middle East.
The Byzantine Empire included the Balkans,
Asia#Minor, the Levantine coast, the Nile Valley, 
and North Africa as far west as Libya* The Iranians 
held the area from present day Pakistan west to 
Iraq, bordering on the Byzantine provinces. Both 
the powers were weakened by their struggle and a 
new propelling Arab force errupted, Arabic and 
Islamic influences gradually spread throughout 
most of the Middle East. The region closest to 
Arabia became Arabic in language and culture, although
1. See Fig. *1 - The Muslim Expansion.
many groups with more sophisticated and complex 
religioims remained non-Muslim, retaining their 
distinctive cultural traits.
Throu^iout a much more extensive area whole 
population; converted to Islam without absorbing 
the Arabic language and culture. The advantages 
of conversion was that they were exempted from 
paying the taxes in lieu of military services.
The non-Arab Islamic area included the present 
day states of Turkey, Iran and Pakistan. Muslim 
missionaries later converted millions in Indo­
nesia, China and as far from Arabia as the Phili­
ppines. Iran and Pakistan became Muslim although 
not Arab, the Arabs being driven from these countries 
after they had converted most of the population but 
before the language could take root. Then the 
Turkish tribes over-ran Anatolia and the Balkans, 
bringing the Muslim religion with them long after 
the decline of the Arab Empire. Thus millions of 
Albanians, Yugoslavs and Bulgars also became Muslims.
The early Muslim conquests were nominally 
directed by a central power with headquarters just 
in Arabia, then in the Umayyad capital at Damascus, 
Syria, and after 762 in the Abbasid Baghdad in Iraq. 
For five centuries after the Muslim Empire reached 
the zenith of its western conquests in 732, it held
its ground, recede ding only slowly in the west.
Each block tended to expand away from the centre 
of power. The LatMs pushed northward, seizing 
the Baltic regions and cementing the western Slavs. 
The Byzantines evangelized the Balkans and spread 
into Russia. Islam continued its expansion into 
east and central Asia and Africa*
It was during the illustrious Caliphate of 
Abd-al-Malik and his son that the Arab Empire 
reached its height from Tours in northwestern 
France to Kashgar in Chinese Turkestan, an extent 
equalled by only few empires in history. Spain 
in the course of these conquests, was brought 
within the embrace of Islam, where it remained in 
full or in part for seven centuries; the Indus 
Valley waa subdued and its conquest, after a long 
period of chequered history, emerged as late as 
19*4-7* as the state of Pakistan. For the first 
time vital contact was established with a new ethnic 
element, the Turks, destined to become the great 
champions of militant Islam in Eastern Europe.
The year 750 witnessed the inauguration of 
a new Caliphate, that of the Abbasids, with whom 
the centre of gravity in Islam shifted from Syria 
to Iraq. The Abbas ids were so named from an uncle 
of the Prophet Muhammad. Their assumption of power
was consequent on their victory over their Umayyad 
rivals in the Battle of the Z&b, a tributary of 
the Tigris. On the Abbasids side, Shiites and 
Persians were arrayed. The Abbasid dynasty was 
the longest-lived (750-1258) and the most renowned 
of all the Caliphates. Its orientation was Persian.
The real founder of the Abbasid Caliphate was 
the second in series, Al-Man§ur (754-775) who 
built the City of Baghdad which later developed 
into an emporium of trade. That was in the days 
of Ha$un-al-Rashid (786-809).
The bulk of Muslim "foreign11 trade was with 
the Far East. From Baghdad and Basra, Muslim 
merchants carried their goods by sea to China,
India and the Archipelago, but the main route to 
China lay overland through Samarkand. Trade with 
Italy, France and Germany, or with Constantinople, 
Russia and Scandinavia was undoubtedly profitable.
*Concurrent with the rich agriculture and 
brisk commerce of the Abbasid Empire, there devel­
oped an active industry in every province. Artisan 
traditions of the ancient Middle East had never 
perished, and under a relatively secure political 
system these industries revived and expanded.
1. Hith (Philip K.), History of the Arabs, (from 
the earliest times tTlhi^TenT)Tl^millan,
St. Martin's Press, 1968, p.343.
Textiles of linen, cotton, silk and wool were the 
most important. Althou^i each area produced high 
quality fabrics of many types, every city or pro­
vince excelled in some particular pattern or 
technique; carpets from Bukhara, silk from 
Kufah, linens from Egypt, and brocades from 
Shiraz gained world renown.
The science of paper making was acquired from 
China, and by the tenth century paper mills existed 
in Iran and Egypt. In the twelfth century one was 
built in Spain. Fibre glass was produced in Egypt.
The ceramic industry in the Middle East reached 
back into the most distant past, and the Abbasid 
era created some of the finest potteries and glazed 
tiles* Middle Eastern artisans were equally skilled 
in the shaping, working and hammering of metals; 
iron, steel, brass, copper, silver and gold.
The Middle East in the eighth and ninth cent­
uries utilized many arts, skills and techniques 
of the handicrafts of China, India, Iran and the 
East Roman Empire, and those of the early civilizations 
of Greece, Egypt and Mesopotamia. The synthesis of 
these gave great life to Muslim industry, which was 
regarded in Europe as the best of the ages.
The rise of a new power in Persia, the Saljuqs, 
destroyed the ascendency of the Buwayhids, and the
guardianship of the Caliph passed into their hands. 
This new and vigorous Turkish race, which first 
appears in Muslim history at the beginning of the 
eleventh century, entered upon a career of conquest 
by which it built up an empire, stretching in the 
days of its greatness from the Oxus and the Hindu 
Kush to the Syrian shore of the Mediterranean in 
the west, and from the north of Persia to the 
borders of the Arabian desert in the south. The 
powers of the Buwayhids declined before the rise 
of this new power, till the Saljuqs swept them 
away entirely.
2.1# 3* The Arab Caliphates in Iran
The rapid success of the Arabs was due to the 
exhaustion of the two empires and the unexpected 
nature, movement and direction of the attack.
The Byzantine Empire survived the first shock and 
lost no more than S&ria and Egypt to the Arabs.
The Sassamids were completely overthrown because of 
the extreme dependence of the State upon a partic­
ular dyhasty. The first stage in the conquest of 
Persia was completed in 651-632. The Arab hold on 
Persia was gradually consolidated in the following 
50 years, and between 705 and 715 was extended to the 
regions between the Oxus and Jaxartes to Ferghana.1
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Persia, Geographical Handbook Series, Naval
Intelligence Division, September 1945, p.251»
Persia became Muslim but never an Arab country, 
although, the Arab script was adopted for writing 
the Persian language. Except in KhuziBtan, which 
is only an extension of Southern Mesopotamia (Iraq), 
Arab settlement was numerous enough to form solid 
Arab zones. In the time of the Arab Caliphates 
Shi'ism (a religious sect) was never predominant 
in PerBia. But it was always a disturbing factor* 
This sect bitterly opposed the Umayyad Caliphate 
which ruled the Muslim world from Damascus between 
661 and 750.
The Abbasid Caliphate, which lasted until 1258, 
moved its capital from Syria to Iraq and it was 
only for the first century that the Abbasid Caliphs 
directly controlled the Persian provinces. Within 
the provinces, Persians began to dominate the 
intrusive Arab element, and the revival of Persian 
thought and literature increased its strength in 
each generation. At Baghdad, Persian scholars 
contributed to the new Arabic literature, philo­
sophy and science which was the glory of the Abbasid 
Caliphate, thou^i the direct influence of Persian 
civilization was perhaps greatest on the material 
side as in architecture.
In general the Mongol conquests mark the 
beginning of a new era. It destroyed the life of the 
Abbasid Empire in Iran, introduced a large Turkoman
or Turanian element into the Iranian population, 
particularly in AzdJjaijan in the west and on the 
northern fringe of Khurasan in the east, and helped 
the emergence of the Persian State in the sixteenth 
century.
2.1 . 4* The Arabs in Sind
Sind, at the head of the Arabian Sea, was the 
first province of India to come under Muslim control.
In 711 only eighty years after the death of Muhammad, 
Arab invaders moving across Baluchistan conquered 
Sind and placed it under the control of the first 
Umayyad Caliphate. Thus Sind fell under Islamic 
influence at almost the very moment that Spain did, 
and these two conquests marked the end and farthest 
extent of the first great period of Islamic expansion. 
For several years Sind was occupied by Arab rulers.
(The Arabs reached Baluchistan earlier, but Baluch­
istan, like Afghanistan, lay outside the sub-continent).
At various times ~ in its history, Sind was a 
more or less independent Muslim kingdom, very often 
within the sphere of Afghan or Persian influence.
Sind is not, however, a natural gateway to the rest 
of India. Of all the peoples that have poured down 
into the sub-continent, not many have chosen the 
southern route across the terrible deserts of Makran.
Nor ;, having arrived in Sind did the early Arab 
invaders push further across the Indian desert 
which lies to the east of the Indus delta*
The two towns of Kabul and Kandahar in Afghan­
istan have historically tended to be the anchor 
points for almost all incursions into India, and the 
keys to India’s frontiers. The mountains (Hindu 
Kush) which ring the sub-continent offer three or 
four natural passes, all in the north-west, and these 
two towns command the western approach to those 
passes; the Khyber above Peshawar, the Bolan Pass 
below Quetta, and several other routes in between - 
the Kurram valley, the Bannu plain, the Gomal Pass* 
Aside from the Arab influence in Sind, most of the 
Muslim influence in India filtered through these 
pases, which placed the Punjab first in the line of 
march.
In the tenth century the Punjab was raided many 
times by Muslim Kings based on the Kabul/Kandahar 
line, the most destructive being that of Timurlane.
At last, in 152U, the history of Muslim rule entered 
a new phase by the emergence of the Mughals claiming 
descent from Timurlai.ne who ruled over all north 
India from the middle of the sixteenth century until 
the British first appeared.
2.2 The Ottoman Empire
1
2.2 * 1. The Rise of the Ottoman Empire
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The first seriously organised movement of the 
Turkish tribes on their westward march was some­
where round the year A.D. 1000. Under a leader 
named Seljuk a large number of them crossed the 
Oxus River in Central Asia, and penetrated into 
the northern parts of the Abbas id Caliph’s territory 
in what is now Persia. Their movement was started 
by other nomadic tribes which were pressing on 
them from the remoter parts of Central Asia. As 
they advanced into the Arab Empire they found 
other Turks who had come before them in command 
of the outlying Arab garrisons, while others they 
found as Governors of Arab provinces in the service 
of the Caliph. Probably for this reason they did 
not penetrate further south, but left the Caliph’s 
domain to be absorbed later, and meanwhile sought 
new pastures by turning west towards Anatolia# 
Crossing the low mountain ranges which separate 
what is now Persia from Anatolia, they found them­
selves up against the eastern outposts of the 
Byzantine Greek Empire; they drove them back and 
advanced right into the heart of Anatolia. For a 
time Konia in the heart of Anatolia became the
1. See Fig. B - The Ottoman Empire at its Height.
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Chief Centre of the Seljuks, and during the last 
of the eleventh century 'and the early part of the 
twelfth century the greater part of the .Anatolia 
came under their control. The Byzantine Empire 
never recovered from the shock, and declined from 
this time onward. The Seljjuks ruled Anatolia in a 
loose federation of provinces, with Governors 
appointed mostly from relations of the ruling 
family. The first Seljuk ruler of Anatolia was 
Togtful (1037-63)* then Alp Aslam (1063-72) and 
Malik Shah (1072-92).
Rough nomad tribesmen though these Seljuks 
were, they nevertheless soon began to appreciate 
the civilization of the Persians and the Greeks 
with whom they came in contact, as is illustrated 
by widescale construction of fine buildings, many 
of them standing to this day. The best examples 
of this work are seen today at Konia and Erzerum.
On the other hand there is nothing original about 
Seljuk architecture. The main features to be 
observed are Persian^ and Arab. In literature too, 
they were sufficiently shrewd to encourage religious 
thinkers and philosophers. The famous X  alal-ud-din 
Rumi flourished under the auspices in Konia, and so 
did others of the Sufi school of Persian mysticism.
In the thirteenth century the great Mongol 
invasion of the west started. The greatest of 
the Nomads movements of the Middle Ages swept out 
of Central Asia and carried all before it. One 
great horde led by Hulago Khan, came down through 
Persia in 1275 and reached Baghdad, which it des­
troyed. They thus ended the feeble Abbasid 
Caliphate and advanced into Syria, but were stopped 
by the Egyptians who, with their army under the 
leadership of Turkish Commanders, inflicted a
i
decisive defeat on them*
The Mongols caused great chaos and the masses 
of people left their homes and pastures to settle 
in remote and quiet parts. Consequently a small 
Turkish tribe which had been settled in the regions 
of the Oxus in Central Asia,^decided to move off and 
found a new home with grazing grounds for their 
flocks in the plateaux of Anatolia. At the time of 
this movement, the leader of this tribe v/as Suleiman 
whose son was Ertogriil. He was given the land in 
Anatolia in the neighbourhood of Erzinjan by one of 
the later Seljuk sultans, and here the original 
Qsmanli tribe of Turks first settled. For some time 
they remained under the suzerainty of the Seljuk 
Sultan, but then his political system in Anatolia
1. Kirk (Geroge E.), A Short History of the Middle East 
from the Rise of Islam to Modern"Times, Revised, ™  
New York, 1955, p.20.
started declining. In any case* Osman* founder of 
the Ottoman State and son of Ertogrdl began to 
acquire by capture or by alliance a number of small 
towns such as Eskishehir, Inonu, Bilajik, and 
Yenishehir. Between 13§Q and 1320 using Yenishehir 
as a base, Osman seized the countryside west of 
the Sakarya River as far south as Eskishehir, and 
west and north to Mt. Olympus and the Sea of 
Marmara. Yet they were not strong enough to take
i
the walled towns of Brusa, Nicaea, and Nicemedia*
Not until Osman was on his deathbed in 1326 did his 
son Orhan (Orkhan in old Turkish spelling) take 
Brusa, which surrendered without a struggle after 
several years of seige.
The fall of Brusa was the collapse of the 
Byzantines in that comer of Asia Minor. Orhan 
occupied Nicaea in 1331* Nicemedia in 1337* Thus, 
by 13h5 the Ottoman State included the entire north­
western corner of Asia Minor from the Aegean to the 
Black Sea. The Osmanli being pagans, were tolerant 
of all customs and religions, and in the fourteenth 
century they accepted Islam. Their conversion to 
Islam welded the Osmanlis together. Gradually 
they began to absorb even some of the Greeks into 
their system. Through the Greeks, the Turks came in
1. Fisher (S. N.), The Middle East - A History, 
New York, 1959,
contact with the art and culture of the ancient 
world. In architecture it was Greek influence 
that produced the early Osmanli buildings at Brusa.
The Turkish mosques were based on the style of the 
Byzantine churches. The only original Turkish 
conception in architecture were the minarets. The 
two great civilizations of this period of history 
in the Middle East were the Arabs and the Byzantine. 
The Arab was revived by the Mongul invasion, the 
Byzantine by the Fourth Crusade and the Latin 
occupation.
The Osmanlis under the leadership of Munrad I, 
the son of Orkhan, began contacting the Slav 
civilisation across the Aegean Sea to the west of 
the Byzantine Empire. The* the Turkish forces began 
to cross the sea and land in Thrace. The internal 
disruption within the Byzantine Empire greatly facil­
itated the Osmanlis expansion into Europe. By the 
beginning of the reign of Murad, the Osmanlis were 
securely planted on the coasts of Thrace, taking full 
advantage of the civil War among the Greeks. Thus 
by long before the Turks had any status in Asia 
Minor, they were beginning to become a power in 
Europe. The Turks were advancing into the Balkans 
at a time when the greater part of Asia Minor was 
held by quite different branches, the Turkish speaking
people. In 1360 Murad took Adrianople from the 
Eyzantine. This was the next important city of 
the Empire after Constantinople. The European 
rulers who, up to now, had paid no attention to 
the Osmanlis began to get alarmed at their p rogress 
in military and political power in Europe.
Meanwhile jealousies and quarrels between 
Serbians, Bulgars and Hungarians made easy the 
Turkish advance. Murad was one of the greatest of 
the Osmanli leaders of the early days. His success­
ful military campaigns in Thrace and the Balkans
1made him the real founder of the Ottoman Empire.
Murad had the wisdom to see that the Christians 
were better educated than the Turks, and that 
their incorporation into the Ottoman State, if it 
could be achieved, would ensure administrative 
ability and organizing capacity for political systdms*
When Murad died on the battlefield of Kossovo 
in 1389, his son Bayazid became Emir of Osmanlis.
He made it a point of doing all that he could to 
consolidate the Serbs. He gave them full autonomy, 
and incorporated Serbian troops into his army with 
the same rights as his Muslim troops. However, in 
1U02, he had to give up further plans for the siege
1. Gibbons (H.A.), Foundations of the Ottoman Empire 
(I30k-lk03);
Oxford university Press, 1916, p.112.
Frank Cass & Co., Ltd., 1968, p.120.
of Constantinople in order to meet a much more 
serious danger than the Byzantine Empire. For 
Timur lane, the last of the great Central Asian 
Tartaro conquerors, had entered Asia Minor, had 
taken Sivas hy storm and was marching west.
Timur Lane claimed descent from Genghiz Khan 
through the latter’s son, Djagatai. He was more 
interested in the lands of Syria and E^rpt. Bayazid 
had invaded territory beyond the Euphrates, to the 
Tigris and given indications of ambitions in Syria, 
thereby threatening Timur. The Turkish and the 
Tartar armies met in Ankara in July lh02; and the 
Turks lost the war. Bayazid had a dream of empire, 
but it was shattered at Ankara. It was the first 
defeat which the Ottoman armies had suffered for 
the first three centuries of Turkish history.1
2.2* 2 The Fall of the Ottoman Empire
As long as personal bravery, ability to govern 
and efficiency at the centre of administration were 
the vital qualities which made empires possible and 
kept them functioning, all was well with the Ottoman 
Empire. But with the coming of the sixteenth century 
Western Europe began to stirf with new ideas. Its
1. See Gibbons (H.A.), Foundations of the Ottoman
Empire (130k-lk03), 07W^ri9lT. — '------
also Toynbee (Arnold) and Kirkwood (Kenneth), 
Turkey, Moslem World Series, Vol.VI. Berne, 1926. 
and Edward (Creasy S.), History of the Ottoman 
Turks, London, 1877.
material wealth grew, and with it the fighting strength 
of its armies. But the Turks were quite unaffected 
by all this. The Islamic Law still governed any 
major decisions of policy. Thus the Turks after a 
while found themselves definitely inferior to the 
west in, for instance, military equipment. Turkey, 
in fact, did not keep pace with Europe in the trans­
ition from the Middle Ages to Modern Times.
Moreover, the Ottoman Empire itself now began
l
to feel the effects of internal instability. As 
far back as 1536, in the days of Suleiman, King 
Francis of France, smarting under his defeat at the 
battle of Faina at the hands of the Emperor Charles 
the Fifth, turned to the Ottoman Empire to try to 
redress the balance of power in Europe. The system 
of * capilutations9 took shape which in the new 
circumstances arising out of the Reformation in 
Europe led to grave complications for the Ottoman 
Empire. For, while the Turks were still governed by 
the Sacred Laws of Islam and modern ideas and science 
made no headway in Turkey, the Christian subjects of 
the Sultan were under no such inhibitions. In fact, 
these subject^ races of the Empire became aware of 
the new ideas spreading in from Europe long before
1. Price (Philip M.), A History of Turkey. From 
Empire to Republic,""George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 
1956, p.6U.
their Muslim co-subjects even knew they existed.
This intensified the disequilibrium in the State, 
and hastened the decline of the Empire both intern­
ally and Turkey*s power and influence abroad.
Weak Sultans followed one after the other - 
Selim IX, Murad III, Ibrahim and Mahomed XV.
At the battle of Lepanto in 1571 naval weakness 
had just shown itself, but now at the battle of St. 
Gothard in 1663 the European powers showed that they 
had better naval and military equipment than the 
Turks, whose weapons had not improved since the 
days of Suleiman. Further, in 1683 the Turkfe* 
final attempt to capture Vienna resulted in their 
first really serious defeat and marked the beginning 
of their long retreat from Europe altogether.
But there now appeared on the horizon of Eastern 
Europe a new power which was destined to have pro­
found effects upon the fortunes of the Ottoman 
Empire and to further its decline. For some five 
centuries the Eastern Slavs, hemmed in among the 
forests and swamps of Northern Europe by hostile 
Tartar tribes to the east and south, began now to 
form the centralised state of Great Russia and to 
press towards the Black Sea. The Russians had certain 
advantages over the Muslim people to the south and 
east of them and over the Ottoman Empire in particular.
On the other hand Russia during the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries developed a system of serfdom 
among her peasantry and of large private landowners 
which, as seen, Turkey largely avoided#
The Ottoman Empire began to feel the change of 
this new Slav state growing in the north by the 
middle of the eighteenth century. The former was 
already a declining political and military force*
But Russia, having suffered more at the hands of 
Mongol invaders, like Batu Khan, than the Turks, who 
had only a brief period of subjection to Timur, was 
consequently later in developing its state institut­
ions*
In one respect the histories of Russia and 
Turkey had a common feature. Neither power, being 
East European and Near Asiatic, came under the 
influence of the Reformation. The benefit's of science 
and new discoveries were largely denied to both 
between the 16th and early 19th centuries. But 
starting more or less at the same stage of economic 
development, the balance of power gradually began 
to tilt in favour of Russia on account of her wider 
territories and greater manpower resources.
In the late 17th century Russians began a 
movement of expansion southwards. The urge to 
expand his territories and free himself from physical 
hindrances such as lack of access to the sea, from
dependence on other states for engaging in foreign 
trade, was the chief aim of Peter the Great*s 
foreign policy. In the early 18th century he 
accomplished what Selim the Grim and Suleiman the 
Magnificent had done for the Ottoman Empire in the 
16th century when they opened the way to the East 
and the Mediterranean. He defeated the Swedes in 
1709 at Poltava and opened a wihdow for Russia on 
the Baltic. But Peter of Russia looked not only 
west hut south, and hence his inevitable clash with 
the Sultan, made all the more determined by the 
fact that the Russian and Turkish peoples had 
different beliefs which since the time of the 
Crusades had been in deadly conflict with each 
other*
Between the years 1672-191U there were twelve 
Russo-Turkish wars. Although Karlowitz ceded Azov 
and about eighty miles of hinterland, Peter the 
Great was not satisfied. The Black Sea, the Straits,' 
and outlet to the Mediterranean which would mean free 
commerce with the West, and most important Constant­
inople - all beckoned the Russians on against the 
Ottomans. In 1710 he advanced down the Pruth, but 
got into difficulties, was surrounded by the Turkish 
Army, and only escaped being taken prisoner by 
surrendering Azot. In 1789 Catherine the Great
took the Crimea, breaking the power of the Khan 
and advancing the Russian frontier to the Dniester. 
From now on, however, the influence of the sea- 
powers of the West began to make itself felt in 
defence of the Ottoman Empire. France and Great 
Britain did not want to see a great land power 
capture the gateway between the Black Sea and the 
Mediterranean, and close the Levant to their trade.
At the end of each Russo-Turkish war in the nineteenth 
century, Russia was thus compelled by western pressure 
to give up some of her gains. The Russo-Turkish 
conflict in the nineteenth century began to acquire 
a somewhat different aspect of those of the eight­
eenth century. In the latter time they were mainly 
territorial in aim and opportunities for commercial 
expansion. In the nineteenth century these con­
flicts began to be ideological as well as terri­
torial. Finally, the Emperor Nicholas I of Russia 
was tempted in the 18U05 to draw up plans for the 
dissolution of the Ottoman Empire and its partition 
by the powers of Europe, His plan foundered in the 
Crimean War (185U-56). But the Ottoman Empire, 
though protected by sea powers of the West, con­
tinued in decline, and from that time on was known 
as ”the sick man of Europe”.
A landmark along the road to Russian mastery 
of the region was the 177^ treaty of Kuchuk Kainardj 
terminating a six-year war with the Ottomans. The 
document, which became the basis of Russo-Ottoman 
relations until World War I, ended the Ottoman’s 
exclusive domination of the Black Sea. Russia now 
not only shared the shores of the Black Sea, but 
was also assured of unrestricted commercial 
navigation through it, and through the straits 
leading into the Mediterranean. From that time a 
major drive of Russian foreign policy became the 
complete domination of the Straits to gain unequi­
vocal entrance into the Mediterranean.
2.3 The Muslim Empire in Decline
The Islamic Empire reached its zenith when 
political fragmentation had already begun to erode 
the unity of the empire. When the era of cultural 
flowering began to wither away around 950 A.D*, 
Baghdad, seat of the Abbasid Caliphate, had lost 
its authority. The Islamic cultural influence con­
tinued its general decline until it became almost 
insignificant compared to the new cultures and civil­
izations flourishing in Western Europe. By 1500 
Europe got what there was to learn from the Muslim 
world. As medieval Europe emerged into the modern 
era, medieval Islam withdrew to the east and south 
side of the Mediterranean, where it remained until 
the nineteenth century reawakening.
Muslim civilization grew through its tolerance 
of alien elements, its Arab roots proved too slim to 
carry and unify the legacies of the many parts which 
Islam found itself called upon to administer*
When the Islamic (Turkish) Empire suffered defeat 
at Vienna, then it lost its ground in the west. By 
the end of the eighth century, the Arabs had been 
pushed back to the south of the Pyrenees, and during 
the following centuries, the revival of the kingdom 
of Spain had steadily forced the Arabs even further 
south. In 1492, the last Moorish stronghold in
Southern Spain, was surrendered to the Spaniards 
and thus the Muslims were expelled hy them*
The Turks were driven from the Hungarian plain 
but for many years were able to hold the line of the 
River Danube, The revolt within the Balkan Empire 
had been reduced to a small foothold, the European 
Turkey today. The sovereignty of the Turkish 
Sultans had long been something of a fiction outside 
Turkey, the Balkans and the Middle East, The Muslim 
Empire areas along the North African Coast which 
had been conquered and converted by the Arabs in 
the 7th century had long been a law to themselves, 
and Morocco itself never passed under Turkish control. 
The French began the occupation of Algeria in 1830, 
and then Tunisia in 1881. The British, whose inter­
est in Egypt had been increasing since the opening 
of the Suez Canal, occupied that country militarily 
in 1882. Then in 1907 the French took Morocco 
under their protection. And in 1911, the Italians 
annexed Libya, and hence the Moslem Empire of North 
Africa was gone.
2.4 Arab Nationalism
At the beginning of the nineteenth century, 
Middle Eastern society was organized on a traditional 
religious basis. The religion which was by far the 
most important and which at the same time was the 
religion of the ruling class. By its whole teaching 
and its outlook, the religion Islam, though Arab 
in its origin, was strictly international, or rather 
supranational, representing a brotherhood of the 
faithful; irrespective of descent or race, language 
or native land. This community of civilization and 
way of life maintained itself until the twentieth 
century, morg intensive in its feeling of unity and 
more unified in its outlook. The only differentia­
tion was according to religious sects within Islam, 
and in that respect it might be said that the 
Shi’ites represented on the whole a Persian national 
tradition. The conquests of the Wahhabis who were 
animated by the crusading spirit, and the short 
reign of these religious warriors over the whole of 
Central Arabia from which they were dislodged only 
in 1818 by Egyptian troops, can be regarded as 
the first manifestation of a new Arab nationalism.
As a result of the fact that European Turkey 
was most closely exposed to Western influences,and 
that its officers and administrators had to acquire 
a knowledge of European languages and science, a 
literary and political awakening in the European
sense could first be noticed among Turkish intell­
ectuals in the I860’s. It was, however, only in 
1908 that this reformist nationalism entered the 
political stage with the successful Young Turk 
military revolt. Meanwhile, the Young Turks had 
changed their name to Ottoman Committee of Union 
and Progress, and their rising nationalism encount­
ered the difficulty presented by the rise of other 
and opposed nationalism in the formerly supra­
national Ottoman Empire.
Among these new nationalisms which worked for 
the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire were not 
only those of ^Armenians, Greeks, Serbs and Bul­
garians but also Muslim peoples, above all the 
Arabs, and to a less degree the Albanians and Kurds. 
With them, as in Egypt and Persia, nationalism 
became vocal in the first decade of the twentieth 
century though in Egypt proper the nationalist 
slogan ”Egypt for the Egyptians” was first heard 
as far back as 1878. But this early movement, 
led by one of the few officers of Egyptian origin 
in the Egyptian army, Arabi Pasha, collapsed quickly 
in 1882 and provided occasion for British occupation 
of the country.
It was in the beginning of the twentieth 
century that nationalism appeared as a force in
Egyptian public life, at the same time that it
did in Turkey, in Iran and among the Arabs. In
all these cases, as throughout Asia and Africa,
these new nationalist aspirations drew encouragement
from the Japanese victory over Russia, and from
the example of the Russian Revolution of 1917.
At first nationalism was confined only to purely
intellectual and cultural movements and to a little
1group of intellectuals. The few attempts at what 
might be called a political awakening were hindered 
by the wars. Mustafa Kamal (1876-1908) demanded 
the Union of Egypt and the ^ udan under purely 
Egyptian control. He died in the same year that 
the Ottoman Committee of Union and Progress, 
frightened by the possible consequences for Turkey 
of the British-Russian agreement of 1907* compelled 
the Sultan to reintroduce the constitution which 
had been in force for only a short time thirty 
years before.. The following year, 1909, Abdul 
Hamid II was deposed, and the Young Turks assumed 
full control of Turkey, with the aim of transforming 
it into a modern centralized nationalist state.
To support the Turkish national policy, the Young 
Turks under the leadership of Enver Pasha (1881-1922) 
developed the theory of Pan-Turkanism - a union of
1. Marlowe (John), Arab Nationalism and British 
Imperialism - A Study in Power Politics,
London, 196*1, p.9.
all the Turk^speaking peoples, the hulk of whom
1lived within the confines of the Russian Empire. 
Pan-Turcanism was, in that way, not only to add 
great numerical strength to the Ottoman Turks, a 
minority within the Ottoman Empire, but also to 
counteract Pan-Slavism and the Russian design against 
Turkey.
At the same time, the Turks who had for cent­
uries regarded themselves exclusively as members 
of the Islamic civilization, founded largely on 
Arabic and Persian cultural traditions, rediscovered 
their pre-Islamic racial and linguistic past.
Of a different structure to Pan-Tureanism 
was the Pan-Arab movement with the beginnings in 
the period after 1908, which was a countermovement 
to the strojigcemphasis on Turkish and Tureanism 
Nationalism, destroying the unity of the Islamic 
world. Pan-Arabism aimed to unite the Arab 
provinces of the Ottoman Empire, the Fertile 
Crescent of Mesopotamia and Syria, which stretched 
from the Persian Gulf to the Suez Canal, and the 
nomad inhabitants of the Arab desert, of which only 
the fringes, especially He jets with the Holy Cities 
of Mecca and Medina were under Ottoman control.
1. Edi (Rivlin B.) and Szykowicz (S.), The 
Conteirraorary Middle East, New York, 192*59 
p.217.
But many Pan-Arabs went further and dreamed of 
the Union of all Arabic speaking countries, which 
would include not only Egypt but the whole of 
North Africa. The centre of these Pan-Arab aspir­
ations was partly in Syria, where it was led by 
intellectuals who worked for the decentralisation 
of the Ottoman Empire and the Arab autonomy within 
it, and partly in Mecca, where Hueein ibn-Ali 
(1856-1931) was appointed Sheri$ of Mecca in 1908*
The same years after 1908, which saw the 
beginning of political nationalism among the 
Turks and Arabs, witnessed a similar development 
in Persia. There the Islamic reform agitation of 
Jamal al-Din al-Afghani (1835-1897) and the 
westernizing tendencies of Malcolm Khan, a Persian 
diplomat of American descent, had laid the found­
ations in the later part of the nineteenth century 
for an awakening of the small Persian intelligentsia 
to the need of national reform.
As a result of the World War I, the Ottoman 
Empire was dissolved. Prom the ethical centre of 
the Turkish population, from the highlands of 
Anatolia, came the victorious opposition of the 
Turks under Mustafa Kamal against the victors of 
World War I. His success against the Greek invaders 
of Anatolia in 1922 made it possible for Turkey 
to establish her complete independence within her
ethnic frontiers by the Peace Treaty of Lausanne 
(1923)* Only in eastern Anatolia did the Kurds 
form a national minority and resist in several 
uprisings, their forced integration into Turkish 
nationality* Mustafa K&mal’s reforms transformed 
Turkey from a medieval Islamic State into a modern 
secular nation-state* Zia Gdkalp (1875-192^) may 
be regarded as the intellectual father of the new 
nationalism, with its reinterpretation and re­
appreciation of the Turkish past and its application
1to western ways to the Turkish future.
Under the impact of new nationalism, Islam 
was deposed as the religion of the State; modern 
law was introduced instead of Islamic law, special 
attention was paid to the introduction of the 
people to the new ideology and to the spreading of 
literacy; the language was divested of its Arabic 
and Persian words and influences; Latin script was 
introduced instead of the Arabic; and an all-out 
effort was made to establish the new Turkish civil­
isation on the two-fold foundation of ancient 
Turkish traditions and of modern western influences, 
thus weakening the impact of the Islamic civilization 
which had shaped Turkish life and destiny for the 
last six centuries.
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In 1925 Reza Shah Pahlavi of Iran tried to
emulate Mustafa./ Kkmal’s nationalist reforms, hut
the conditions in Iran were much less favourable 
1than in Turkey. Iran possessed neither long 
cultural contact with the West nor a governing 
class with administrative abilities5 on the other 
hand the strength of Shia religion and complexity 
of native cultural traditions were greater there 
than in its Western neighbours. As in Turkey, this 
new nationalism was accompanied by efforts towards 
a strict centralization of Government, the emanci­
pation of women, and the modernization of economic 
life.
More complex was the development of nationalism 
in the Arab-speaking countries. Various factors 
fought against an early unification of all the 
lands into one Arab national state, as the nation­
alists demanded. There were important religious 
minorities such as the Shi’ites in Iraq, the 
Christians in Lebanon, and the Copts in Egypt, and 
there was the opposition of the fanatical Wahhabis7 
to other Muslims. Even stronger as a retarding 
factor was the hesitation of the Egyptians between 
allegiance to a ‘,Pharonic,, civilization of the Nile 
Valley and the common tie of culture and language 
with the Arab lands. The situation of nationalism
1. Sykes (Percy), A History of Persia. Vol.II. 
London, -1958, pTsCT*
in the Arab-speaking countries may he compared with 
that in Italy in the first half of the nineteenth 
century, when similar circumstances delayed the 
unification of the Italian nation propogated hy 
nationalist intellectuals*
In 19^8 conflicting tendencies among the Arab 
countries were at last temporarily bridged by their 
common resistance to Zionism and to the transform­
ation of Palestine, with its originally large Arab 
majority, into a Jewish national state. To that 
end, the Arab states formed an Arab League, but 
its diplomatic and military measures did not avail 
against the formation of the State of Israel, 
thereby creating the vast problem of Arab expelled 
persons and refugees from Palestine. This ineffect 
iveness of the Arab League reveals the present 
weakness of Arab nationalism.
In India the high point of Hindu-Muslim co­
operation within the nationalist movement came 
just after the first World War. During the war, 
Muslim national sentiment had been particularly 
strengthened, as Muslims found British India ranged 
as part of the Empire, against the Turkish Empire, 
and hence the Caliphate. The war had also fostered 
a rapid growth of national sentiment among Hindus, 
particularly as Indian industry, long held back
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by colonial commercial policy under wartime emergency
conditions* It was a time of great trouble in India.
In 1916 the Muslim League backed up by the National
Congress in demands for home rule, and the two
groups entered into a pact (The Luckhnow Pact)
regarding separate proportional representation for
minorities in the various provinces. The Muslim
League was not, however, particularly aggressive,
nor particularly strong, at that time. In the
years just after the war the Khilafat- Movement,
led by Mohammad Ali, swept over the Muslim community
1and dominated Muslim politics.
Between 1916 and 1922 a number of difficulties 
of nationalistic feeling came together. Nationalism 
erupted in countless acts of violence and demonstrat­
ions. After Khilafat Movement and Gandhi's non­
cooperation movement were virtually one. Muslims 
adopted passive resistance, Gandhi advocated the 
preservation of the Turkish Caliphate in the Peace 
settlements. The Turkish revolution of Keunal 
Ataturk and the disappearance of the Caliphate 
removed another prop from the Muslim Nationalist 
movement.2
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Although from time to time Muslim writers and 
speakers had suggested that a separate Muslim 
nation existed in India, the idea had received 
little attention, even within the Muslim League, 
until late in the 1930’s. In 1930 Sir Mohammad 
Iqbal had first suggested something like a separ­
ate state for Indian Muslims. A little later the 
term Pakistan itself was apparently invented by 
Muslim students at Cambridge University in 1933* 
Finally in February, 19U7, the British announced 
that two dominions should be set up if the Muslims 
Wished, and that a commission should determine 
the boundaries between them on the basis of 
communal majorities. On August lUth, 19^ -7, Pakistan 
officially came into existence and became an independ­
ent dominion in the British Commonwealth. The 
fixing of the political boundary lines and the 
partition of Pakistan would be dealt with in the 
following chapter.
CHAPTER 3
CURRENT POLITICAL BOUNDARIES
3.1 Turkey, Iran and Afghanistan in the Great 
Powers Struggle from 1800 to the Second 
 __ World War __ _____
“In Geopolitics special interest attaches to
the 'Great' and 'Middle' Powers, because in their
hands lie the direction of the international
affairs. Special interest necessarily attaches
also to the regimes, which owing to the facts of
Physical Geography and the events of political
history have attracted the attention and interest
of the Great Powers, for which reason they have
become and can again become danger areas of
international relations”. The region comprising
Turkey, Iran, West Pakistan and Afghanistan is one
1of such "danger areas”. A hundred and fifty years 
of political history is witness to the nibbling, 
infiltrating and the economic as well as diplomatic 
manoeuvring that has at times endangered the 
sovereign rights of these states.
In the beginning of the 19th century, Pakistan 
as such did not exist, nor was it part of India, and 
the whole of the Indus Basin consisted of two 
petty political units. The first was the Punjab 
and Kashmir, a Sikh confederacy ruled by Ranjit 
Singh. The second was the Sindh which consisted
1. Gordon (East) and Modie (M.E.), The Changing 
World, New York, World Book Company, Yonkas- 
on Hudson, 1956, p.30.
of estates of a few Amirs. India was the British 
Base in the rivalry with Russia and Turkey, Iran 
and Afghanistan caught as they were between the 
two Great Powers, served as the stage for diplo­
matic moves and counter moves.
The yydme purpose of the Russian policy was 
to reach the warm oceans and India ... a land of 
fabulous wealth, a vast market and a source of 
many raw materials. As Ellen C. Semple has said,
“it is chiefly the 'Gates of Herat' and the lure 
of India which have drawn Russian dominion across 
the scorched plains of Turkestan1”. The British 
efforts vis-a-vis Russian efforts were bent towards 
keeping the Russians away from the regions of their 
interest (the Mediterranean Sea, the Suez Canal, 
the Red Sea, the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean), 
which were so important to Britain for the control 
of the sea route to India.
The industrial revolution had set a stage 
for large scale trade, for the mass production 
which results from mechanisation necessitates mass 
consumption. Colonies in tropical lands could serve 
as a market for industrial products and in return 
supply the industrial nations with raw materials 
such as cotton, jute, rubber etc. The age of 
voyage and discovery led to an age of colonisation,
■ ■■■' ■■ n   Mil I ... „u«M-    ibi ^  toi .i . m h W 1 mam.w.^ .ia^ aaiiw
1. Semple (E.C*), "Influences of Geographic Environ- 
ment”, New York, Henry Holt & Co., 1911, pVh98.
which reached its peak in the 19th century. Since 
it was profitable for European countries to have 
colonies, the British, French, Butch, Spanish 
and Portuguese actively competed for possessions 
in Asia and Africa.
By 1800 the British in India had extended 
their control as far north as the River Sutlej.
At the same time the southern boundary of Imperial 
Russia lay north of the Caucasus mountains, and 
the Aral Sea. Between the British and Russia were 
a Sikh Confederacy, the Afghan Kingdom, the Turk 
Khanates of Central Asia and Iran. The French, 
who had failed to occupy any appreciable part of 
India, though they reached India before the British, 
were still contesting the area. Russia too was 
looking for the acquisition of an empire.
In 1800 Napolean embarked on a scheme to 
overthrow the British by means of a military 
alliance with Russia, which would make it possible 
to reach India by a land route through Iran and 
Afghanistan. The defeat of Napolean removed France 
from any further competition in Central Asia, but 
Russia and the Great Britain continued as rivals 
in the area. Later, Germany twice entered the 
power struggle, preceeding and during the two 
World Wars.
The Muslims headed by the Turks, became for 
the Russians a legitimate target. There were no 
fewer than twelve Russo-Turkish wars between 1676 
and 191U. Generally speaking, the four centuries
of Russian expansion at the expense of the Muslim 
World coincide with four hundred years of Turkish 
domination of the Arab peoples.
In the sixteenth century, the Russian state 
was already conducting a regular trade with the 
Near and Middle East. During the early part of 
the century Russian trade in this area was largely 
in the hands of Turkish contractors, but later 
direct trade with Iran and Central Asia, partic­
ularly with the Nogai Horde, was established. 
Russian trade with the East \yas of greater signif­
icance for the economic development of the country 
than was her trade with the West.
It was Peter the Great's ambition to extend 
Russian boundaries from the Baltic to the Black 
and Caspian Seas. Motivated by a desire to open 
a route to India, he seized from Persia in 1723 
the western and southern shores of the Caspian Sea, 
including Daghestan and thus initiated the conquest 
of the Caucasus, although this territory was relin­
quished by his successors. The route to India was 
blocked not only by Persian Muslims, but likewise 
by the Muslim Khanates of Khiva and Bokhara in 
Central Asia, and Peter the Great*s efforts to 
expand in this direction proved unsuccessful.
Because of the war fatigue on the part of 
both the nations, the Russ ©-Turkish war was con­
cluded in 1774 by the Peace of Kuchuk-Kalnardji*
By this treaty, a landmark in Russian relations 
with the Near East, Russia retained a control of 
the northern shores of the Black Sea from the 
river Bug to the river Dnieper and the ri$it of 
free navigation of its waters. The treaty of 
1774 set the pattern for future international 
settlements pertaining to the Black Sea and the 
Dardanelles. When the conflict was renewed by 
the Turks in 1787, the Russians once again defeated 
them and expanded Russian territory along the shores 
of the Azov and Black Sea to include the fortress 
of Otchakov.
In 1799 Russo-Turkish collaboration recog­
nized the freedom of passage of Russian ships 
through the Straits, and the closure of this 
strategic waterway to the warships of other foreign 
powers.
When the wars involving Russia in the Middle
East and Near East broke out, the first of these
1was with Iran. The Treaty of Turkmanchay was 
signed in 1828, by which the Russians acquired the 
left bank of the Araxes. In addition Persia paid 
a large indemnity of 36,000,000 roubles and abandoned 
her claim to 1he Caucasus*
1• Hurewitz (J. C.), Diplomacy in the Near and Middle 
East; Vol.I, 1535-1914, Princeton, New Jersey, 
195& , p.96.
Scarcely had peace been concluded with Persia, 
when Russia was again involved in war, this time 
with Turkey* This conflict grew out of the Greek 
struggle for independence (1821-1829)• The 
Russians, supported by the Serbs, almost reached 
Constantinople* The treaty of Adrianople brought 
the war to a close in September 1829, and also the 
dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire* In addition 
to her cessions to Russia, Turkey agreed to recog­
nize the*> independence of the Greeks and to open 
the Bosphorus and Dardanelles to friendly nations*
Since the reign of Catherine II, England had 
watched with increasing concern the expansion of 
Russia at the expense of Turkey, Iran and Afghan­
istan. Having limited their freedom of action in 
the Balkans, the Russians turned their attention 
to Persia and Afghanistan.
While the British were busy in consolidating
the Indian Empire, the Russians were just as busy
extending their Empire southward. By the end of
1826 Iran had lost Mongrellia, Karabagh, Shirvan,
Derbent, Baku, Erivan and Nakhichevan to Russia,
and this southern encroachment was only halted
by the Treaty of Turkomanehay which established
the river Aras as the boundary between Iran and 
1
Russiar Having thus achieved virtual control of 
Iran, the Russians persuaded the Shah of Iran to 
bring Herat under Iranian domination, which would 
have given the Russians a passage to India via
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Qandahar and Quetta, thus bypassing the Amir at 
Kabul, It was not difficult to persuade an Iranian 
King to conquer Herat, for the city had changed 
hands many a time in history# Peeling assured of 
his success, the Shah moved to beseige Herat in 
July 1837* “Although the immediate objective was 
nothing more than the capture of Herat, an offensive 
and defensive alliance between Iran and Afghanistan, 
which would undoubtedly have Russian support would 
bring Russian influence into closer proximity to
1the Indus valley# A counter move was essential’*#
The counter move was a British threat of war against 
Iran# But because Iran could not fi^ht against the 
British, so the Shah retreated from Herat, and the 
Russian plan to reach India was checked for the 
time being#
In 1837> a new wave of Russian conquests 
started# The island of Ashur-ada in the Bay of 
Asterabad was occupied# A Russian expedition 
conquered the independent Khanates of Bukhara and 
Khi&a# This close approach of Russia to the Iranian 
and Afghan borders was viewed apprehens ively by the 
rulers of India, who until that time had been follow­
ing a policy of non-interference „in the affairs of 
Iran and Afghanistan#
1# Fraser-Tytler (Sir W. K.), Afghanistan, London, 
Oxford University Press, I95F, p.90#" “
The British recognised the role of the Hindu 
Kush Mountains as the natural barrier to the 
Indian Sub-continent# Since they could not 
depend on the Afghans and the Sikhs effectively
/MCI
to take matters into their own hands dropped 
the policy of non-interference in favour of a policy 
of “forward to the Hindu Kush“# A justification 
of this policy of aggression was that “the civilised 
must for the sake of their own preservation, over­
run and absorb into their domain the uncivilised 
on their border# If they do not do so, they will
i
themselves be overwhelmed”# The real issue 
remained the establishment of a balance of power 
in Central Asia as shown by Lord Palmerston’s state­
ments that, “the loss of KhlVC.n independence would 
be considered injurious to the British interest 
and might result in a counter move across the 
Hindu Kush* Occupation of KhlVa would give Russian 
access to the lower Oxus, and England might consider
the command of the upper course of the river necessary
o
as a measure of precaution and defence•“
%• William (Habberton), Anglo-Russian Relations 
Concerning Afghanistan, 1837-1901, Urbana, 
Illinois, University of Illinois, 1937?
?t# Praser-iytler (Sir W#K*), AP^ianistan, London, 
Oxford University Press, 1958, p775T"
The Russian pattern of aggression hai a 
characteristic feature# They always trjeito have 
more than one front so that if opposition stiffened 
at one point they can switch to a weaker area#
Prom 1855 onward the pressure was lessened on the 
Iranian front and increased on Turkey. Russia 
helped Bulgaria get her freedom from Turkish 
control. By the treaty of San Stefano (1878), 
the Bulgarian, boundaries extended to the Strait 
of Dardanelles, which would have meant passage to 
the Mediterranean for Russia. But the treaty of 
Berlin cancelled Russian gains and transformed 
•Russian success into defeat. Russia,checked in 
Europe, transferred her attention to Asia and in 
particular to British India. Por any attack on 
India, an alliance with Afghanistan would be necess 
ary. The British, however, concluded the Treaty 
of Peshawar with Dost Muhammed, who until then had 
been following a closed door policy# By this 
treaty, Dost Muliammed premised not to let any 
hostile nation pass through Afghanistan, and the 
British in return were to help Dost Muhammed win 
back Herat which had been lost to Iran during the 
Pirst Afghan War. The British succeeded in extend­
ing their influence to the Oxus River, and the 
Zulfikar Pass, which is called the Gateway to Herat 
came under Afghan control# This move was necessary 
because Herat under a Russian dominated Iran was 
a danger to India. The Herat - Qandahar - Quetta
route is the easiest connection between Russia 
and India, and both Russia and Great Britain 
have tried to keep Herat under the control of the 
country that happened to be under their influence#
The south and southeastern boundary agree­
ment of 18939 between the British and Sardar Abduf 
Rahman came to be known as Durand Line after Sir 
Mortimer Durand, who demarcated the boundary. The 
control of the Sulaiman Passes was brought under 
the Indian Government by running the Durand Line 
along the highest summits of the ranges except 
where it crosses a pass#
In the 20th century up to the Second World War, 
Afghanistan was not a big issue between Russia and 
Great Britain. The Third Afghan War freed the 
foreign policy of the state from the British in 1919# 
Since then Afghanistan became a member of the League 
of Nations under the auspices of Turkey^non­
aggression pact The Pact of Sadabad was signed 
with Iran, Iraq and Turkey in 1937-^ The existence 
of this pact in spirit was reconfirmed in Kabul and 
Tehran as late as 1949# The 1931 Treaty of Neutrality 
and Mutual Non-aggression between Afghanistan and the 
Soviet Union was extended again in December 1955*
1# Hurewitz (J.C.), Diplomacy in the Near and Middle 
East; Vol. II, 19l5-1^5^T™Px'inceton, New Jersey, 
1955, p.214.
3*2 Boundary Problems of Iran
Alliances and wars dominated Iran’s foreign 
policy in the first half of the nineteenth century, 
boundary problems and economic activities received 
major emphasis later. Not that boundary problems 
did not exist earlier, but the Anglo-Russian rivalry, 
which continued to be such an important factor in 
Iranian foreign policy, reached a peak after Russian 
advances into Central Asia, and this intensified 
Iran’s own boundary difficulties with Russia*
Anglo-Russian rivalry continued to be the most 
important factor with which Iran had to contend in 
foreign affairs. This rivalry intensified in the 
second half of the 19th century and reached a new 
peak after the spectacular Russian expansion in 
Central Asia. Iran’s boundary problems with Russia 
and Afghanistan were intimately interwoven with 
the whole Central Asian Question.
Russia’s advance into Central Asia has been 
attributed to a wide variety of considerations, 
different observers emphasizing different motives. 
Russian expansion in Central Asia has been character­
ised as a way to solve the Eastern Question, a 
“detour on the royal road to Constantinople and the 
Straits.” The road to the Straits had been barred 
by Great Britain, hence Russia had to strike at the 
enemy’s heart - India. It has also been stated that
Central Asia proved &o*attractive to Russia that she
1
could not resist the temptation of conquest. The 
attraction of the area, it is argued, lay in the fact 
that a vast power vacuum stretched all the way from
the Caspian Sea to the borders of China, from Afghan­
istan to the edge of the Siberian plain. Another 
view stresses that the object of Russian policy in 
Central Asia was the attainment of an outlet to 
the ocean both in the Near and Middle Bast. This
view linked the Central Asian Question to the Persian
1
Gulf, where Russia wished to get a foothold.
Sir Henry Rawlinson insisted in “Memorandum 
on the Central Asian Question” that the easiest route 
for Russia to take towards India was not through 
the heart of Afghanistan by way of the difficult 
mountain passes to Kabul and the Khyber, but via 
the country’s western flank, from the Caspian littoral 
down to the Merfi, Herat and Qandahar. This flank 
was commanded, or at any rate presided over, by 
Iran. Iran’s existence had always been a political 
necessity for the Indian Empire; now Iran’s strength
p
had become ”a military requisite.”
The Central Asian problem affected Iran in two 
different but related ways. First, the Russian 
conquests east of the Caspian Sea made Russia the 
immediate neighbour of Iran along the borders of 
Khorasan. No definite frontiers had previously 
existed between Iran and its nomadic neighbours, and
1* See Geoffrey (Drage), Russian Affairs, London, 
1904, p.564. — — —  - -
2. England and Russia in the East; London, 1875, 
pp•263-92• See also Thornton (A.P.), “British 
Policy in Persia, 1858-1890”, English Historical 
Review, LXIX (1954). —
Russia’s move into the area faced Iran with a 
question: Where would Russia stop? Second, Iran
was affected by the strategic significance that 
the Russians advance in Central Asia added to the 
areas coveted by Iran. Sistan was one of these 
areas. Its geographic position and other features 
made it “an object of much interest, both to 
Russia and Great Britain^ Situated at the point 
of junction of the frontier of Persia, Afghanistan 
and Baluchistan, its future affects the destinies 
of all the three countries*”^  Great Britain, 
therefore, became directly involved in Iran’s 
frontier problem with Afghanistan.
1. Greaves (R.D.), Persia and the Defence of India:
  1............ *   ■ — — • r—f" • rr 'T r-r-i nr limT1 iiriifir nrn n mil i m i in'n i itn.ii >■ m» .im r
188U-1892, London, 1959, P.18.
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3.2 * 1* Iran’s Boundary Problems with Turkey
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Iran’s boundary dispute with Turkey in the
nineteenth century was a legacy from an earlier
era. The inconclusive wars of the Safari’s had
been concluded by a treaty in 1639* The obseure
boundary provisions of this treaty had done little
to help the relations of Iran and Turkey. The
same vague provisions had been confirmed in the
peace treaty of 1746 that terminated Nadir Shah’s
1
war with Turkey. The problem of the controversial
2boundaries continued into the nineteenth century.
Whether the war between Iran and Turkey which
■z
started in 1821 was instigated by Russia , or by 
Great Britain^-, the ambiguous terms of the old 
boundary treaties did not help the situation. The 
immediate cause of the wars between Iran and Turkey
v
however, was a dispute over wandering tribes. In 
1821 the Serakier of Brzerum (in Turkey) and the 
Governor of Tabriz (in Iran) wrangled ov$r two 
wandering tribes, which Iran’claimed as its subjects 
and to which Turkey offered protection. The clash 
dragged on until 1823, when as the result of British 
mediation, a new peace treaty was signed at Erzerum.
1. The text of the treaties of 1639 and 1746 are in 
Hurewitx (J.C.), Diplomacy in the Near and Middle 
last, Vol.I, Princeton, HI.J., 1956, PP.l, 21-23, 51-52.
2. Sir Ward (A.W.) and Geoch (G.P.), The Cambridge
History of British Foreign Policy. New York, 1923,p.11, 2PM.
3. Sykes (Sir Percy) A History of Persia, London, 1930,
pp. 11, 316.
4. Mahmud Farhad Mutamid, Tarikhi-i Ra&abit-i Siyasi-i 
Yran SaTfemani,’mTehran7T326' "(3Ig^ E7^ 3+5XJ p'^ 'SS^
Hie failure to demarcate the boundary defin­
itely had led to further tense relations between 
the two countries soon after the treaty of Erzerum 
was signed, claims and counter claims began to 
mount. Iran claimed that some of its Kurdish 
tribes had been "unfairly” abstracted from its 
territory and demanded compensation for having 
allowed the Turkish tribes of Sulaymaniyah to 
pasture their flocks on Iranian soil during the 
summer months. Turkey protested Iran’s retention 
of the district of the bridge of Zohab on the 
frontier of Kermanshah. From 1834 to 1840 tensions 
increased dangerously. The districts of Kotur and 
Khoi were ravaged, the districts of Margavar was 
plundered and the town of Mohammarah was demolished. 
War between the two again threatened, but British 
mediation a.v&>dted it.
A boundary commission composed of Iranian, 
Turkish, British and Russian members sat between 
1843 and 1847 and produced a new agreement between 
Iran and Turkey (1847), which confirmed some of the 
previous treaties’ provisions. Iran undertook to 
relinquish the extensive province of 2hob, i.e. its 
western territory. In return Turkey recognised 
the sovereignty of Iran over the town and port of 
Mohammarah, the island of A1 Khizr, and the lands on 
the left side (the eastern bank) of the ShatK-al- 
Arab, which were admittedly in the possession of 
Iranian tribes.
The boundary having been defined in general 
terms, another commission, composed like the first 
one, covered the frontier zone (18^8-52). Its 
surveys were discontinued during the Crimean War, 
but were resumed in 1857* 'The British and Russian 
surveyors laboured for eight years in St. Peters­
burg and in 1865 produced two separate maps "in the 
first eight sheets of which were four thousand dis- 
crepancies’1'". The task was continued until 1869» 
when the "Carte identique" was completed. During 
the same year Iran and Turkey agreed to preserve 
the status quo and respect the disputed lands until
the boundary lines were settled as the result of
2
the efforts of the four power Commission.
3*2 2 Iran’s Boundaries with Russia
Iran’s boundary problems with Russia involved 
both sides of the Caspian Sea. The boundaries west 
of the Caspian were established in the first half of 
the nineteenth eentuxy. Russian conquests were 
confirmed by the treaties of Gubistan (1813) and 
Turkomanchay (1828). The Iran-Russian boundary as
1* See Boggs (S.W.), International Boundaries - 
A Study of Boundary Functions and Problems,
N iF T o r k 7 lW F a lif; — -----— *
2. The text of the temporary boundary agreement of 
1869 is in Sir Edward Hertslet, Treaties etc* 
Concluded between Gt. Britain and Iran and 
between Iran and other Foreign Powers,"wholly
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yet set by the second of these treaties was to 
run from the Turkish frontier to the summit of 
the Little Ararat and then descend to the Lower 
Karassotf River. Thence it was to follow the 
Aras and the Astatfa rivers to the point of the 
latter’s discharge into the Caspian Sea.
Bast of the Caspian, Iran’s boundary problem 
was the result of the Russian conquests in Central 
Asia. Russia occupied Krasnovolei.sk in 1869* Iran 
regarded this Russian advance as a threat to its 
claims to Merry and Akhal. These areas were inhab­
ited by the Turkomans, who did not owe allegiance 
to Iran. Twice between 1857 and 1861 the Governor 
General of Khorasan had attacked and occupied Merv, 
but he had failed to establish Iran’s control over
During the Russian advance in Turkoman!stan, 
Iran had mixed feelings. It was alarmed because 
one of the nine tribes dwelling along the Iranian 
border and on the shores of the Caspian Sea for the 
most part owed allegiance to Iran. On the other 
hand, although Iran had watched the Russian sub­
jugation of the tribes with considerable alarm, it 
could hardly protest the result. Iran, like Russia 
nursed many grievances against the ruthless Tekeh 
Turkomans who had plundered Khorasan, Iran’s north­
eastern province, for many generations. It is 
believed that in 1873 Iran had been aggrieved by 
the Tekeh horder raids that the Shah promised 
Russian cooperation in punishing the tribes in Meru 
and Akhal.
Iran finally signed a treaty regarding its 
eastern boundary with Russia in 1881. By the 
Treaty of Akhal-Khorasan, Iran and Russia agreed 
not to allow the Turkomans arms or ammunition.
Iran also relinquished its claims to Meru. The 
frontier was drawn along the lower Atrek, beginning 
at the Hasan Quli Gulf on the Caspian Sea, follow­
ing the Atrek and thence along the outer flanks
i
of the Kopeh Dagh to the Tejen River. Iran also 
undertook to evacuate the forts of Ginab and Gul- 
gulah.
Although the treaties of Turkomanchay and 
Akhal-Khorasan defined the frontiers of Iran with 
Russia to the west and to the east of the Caspian 
Sea, frontier controversies between the two countries 
continued. On the eastern side, for example, Russia 
pressured Iran into signing a new agreement in 
1893 by which the frontier village of Firuzah 
was taken from Iran in return for a piece of land 
on the west side of the Caspian. Boundary problems 
with Russia as with Turkey continued to plague 
twentieth century policy makers,
1. The text of the Akhal - Khorasan treaty is in 
Hertslet, op. cit., pp.l36-Uo.
3*2 3* Iran - Afghan Boundary Disputes
Iran’s third major boundary quarrel during 
the second half of the nineteenth century was 
with Afghanistan. As mentioned earlier, Great 
Britain became involved in the boundary problem 
between Iran and Afghanistan because of its strat­
egic interests in the latter country# A dispute 
flared up in 1870 over sovereignty in Sistan.
This problem can be traced back at least to the 
time of Nadir Shah. After Nadir’s assassination 
In 17^7 and the break up of his empire, Sistan had 
joined a part of the new Afghan Empire. Af^ian 
control over the area continued for over a 
century, and Yar Mohammad Khan, the ruler of 
Herat, held it as a tributary until his death 
in 1851.1
From 1851 on, the situation at Herat and 
Sistan favoured Iran. Yar Mohammad’s immediate 
successors pursued pro-Iranian policies. Nasir-al- 
Din Shah’s decision in 1856 to recover Herat by 
force of arms was influenced by favourable con­
ditions at Herat. In fact, the ruler of Herat 
welcomed the army of the Shah, although subsequent 
developments in the city, and also Great Britain’s 
reluctant war with Iran, forced him to abandon his 
plans.
1. Sykes, op.cit., pp.326-66.
The Treaty of Paris (1857), which terminated 
that war and by which Iran recognised the independ­
ence of Afghanistan, made no provision for Sistan*
The Shah complained to the British of Afghan 
aggression against Sistan, and repeatedly requested 
the British Government, during 1861-63, tb intervene 
under the terms of the Treaty of Paris. Great 
Britain, however, was pursuing a policy of "neutrality" 
and did not recognize the sovereignty of Iran over 
Sistan in any case. Iffihen Great Britain was pressed 
for a definite answer by the Shah, the Foreign 
Office stated that "Her Majesty’s Government, being 
informed that the title of the territory of Sistan 
is disputed between Persia and Afghanistan, must 
decline in the matter, and must leave it to both 
parties to make good their possession by force of 
arms."
In 1870, when Sher Ali Khan, the ruler of 
Kabul, threatened war with Iran over Sistan, the 
British decided to intervene. British political 
interests in 1870 were, in essence, the same as in 
the 18U0’s. In the Irano-Turkish dispute they had 
intervened to arrest a war because it would have 
further weakened the two Muslim States separating 
the vast possessions of Great Britain in India 
from those of Russia. In the Irano-Afghan boundary 
disputes the same consideration predominated and 
Sistan’s strategic significance for Great Britain 
increased as the result of the Russian advance in 
Central Asia.
Great Britain complied with Iran’s request 
for an arbitrator in 1872* In general the Iranian 
claims to Sistan rested upon two major grounds: 
ancient rights and present possession. The Afghan 
claim, on the other hand, rested primarily on its 
recent exercise of sovereignty over Sistan, i.e. 
from llhl 9 when the province joined a part of the 
Afghan Empire, until 1855, when Iran began to 
exercise considerable, if not complete, control 
over it.
The Iranian claims based on ancient rights 
were first disposed of, it was found to be uncertain 
and not clearly supported by historical evidence, 
and more than a century of Afghan control over 
Sistan to be cogent evidence in favour of Afghan­
istan. The second question, i.e. "present possession", 
was more difficult. Although it was clear that 
since 1855 Iran had exercised considerable authority 
over sistan, it was problematic what the term 
"Sistan" included at the time of arbitration. It 
was "very vague", the award said, "for ancient 
limits have long become obsolete."
The arbitration award distinguished between 
"Sistan Proper" and "outer Sistan". The former 
was "compact and concentrated" and the latter was 
"detached and irregular". These two Sistans were 
separated by the Helmand River. The award gave 
Sistan Proper to Iran, on the grounds of geographical 
and political requirements, and outer Sistan to
Afghanistan, which was also given both hanks of 
the Helmand above the Robah Band, Furthermore, 
the award emphatically stated that "no works are 
to be carried out on either side calculated to 
interfere with the requisite supply of water for 
irrigation on the banks of the Helmand.
In 1891, the Helmand began to change its 
course. By 1896, the main channel of the river 
flowed considerably west of the channel which 
Goldsmid had designated as the boundary in 1872.
The local Governors of Iran and Afghanistan managed 
to compose their differences over utilization of 
the water for a number of years, but in 1902 Iran 
felt that the problem should again be referred to 
the British for arbitration because the local 
officials were no longer able to handle the matter*
In requesting the appointment of a new arbitrator, 
however, Iran made it absolutely clear that any 
award that might be given "must completely comply" 
with Goldsmid’s award of 1872.
Great Britain complied with the request and 
dispatched Henry McMahon to head an arbitration 
Commission to Sistan. Having completed its studies, 
the Commission gave an award in 1905* Its fundamental 
point was that Sistan had often suffered, not so 
much because of a shortage of water, but because 
of floods. On the basis of this observation, the
award provided that Iran should have onfcthird of 
the water of the Helmand River from the Kamal 
Khan ham down* It also repeated the earlier 
injunction that no works were to be carried out 
by either Iran or Afghanistan that would interfere 
with the requisite amount of water needed for 
irrigation on both sides of the banks of Helmand*
Iran vigorously protested the award, objecting 
in particular to Its small share of the water*
Iran believed that the award was incompatible with 
Goldsmid’s ruling in 1872 and that it could there­
fore be rejected* The Foreign Office retorted that 
Iran could not reject it; the Iranian Government 
might only appeal to the British Government if it 
had any reasonable grounds for complaint* It also 
warned that should Iran fail to file an appeal 
within a reasonable period of time, the award 
would be regarded as final and binding* The 
Helmand River problem had not been settled*
3.3 * 1* Pakistanfs Boundary wlth Afghanibtan.
The only boundary vYhich bad an international 
status prior to the establishment of Pakistan and 
which has been inherited unchanged by the new 
state, is the western boundary of West Pakistan*
For the most part it borders on Afghanistan and 
has been very problematic; only in the south-west 
Y^ hex1© it borders on Iran is peaceful and satis­
factory to both countries*
The boundary with Afghanistan can be divided 
into a northern and southern part* The northern 
part is the same as the Durand Dine which was 
demarcated by the Anglo-Bussian Boundary Commission 
in 1895 with the concurrence of the Afghanistan 
Government. '*A rugged and inaccessible spur of 
the Saikol range in the north of the Indian sub­
continent carries the boundary into regions of 
perpetual ice and snow to its junction with the 
main range, the Hindu Kush. Here, amidst a solitary 
wilderness . above sea level, absolutely
inaccessible to man, with few living creatures other 
than Pamir eagles, the three great Empires actually 
meet. No more fitting trijunction could possibly 
be found.y In the extreme north-east the long 
narrow Wakhan ridge served as a buffer strip between 
the two spheres of influence.
1. Fraser-Tytler (Sir W. K.), Afghanistan: London, 
Oxford University Press, 1958,*“pT£.
From the westerly end of the Wakhan ridge to 
the Mandal Pass, the boundary follows the water 
divide of the Eastern Hindu Kush, separating the 
Ko.cha river of the Oxus system in the north from 
the Chitral which flows into the Indus system in 
the south* Crossing the western arm of a bend in 
the Kabul river obliquely, it cuts across the 
Kabul-Peshawar highway and leaves the famous Kbyber 
Pass inside West Pakistan. From here it turns west­
ward along the Safed Koh.Parachina, the old garrison 
atop the range guards very difficult country. On 
the Pakistan side of the Khost salient lie two 
important river valleys (The Kurum and Tochi) which 
form traditional settlements areas as well as old 
routes from Afghanistan in India.
South of the Khost salient, the boundary pro­
ceeds south-westerly across the Gamal river to 
Chawan, leaving the Gcmal Pass, the bulk of the 
G-omal Valley as well as Chaman on the Pakistan side#. 
It can be seen that, from the geographical point of 
view, the Durand Line is a most inefficient boundary. 
It consistently follows neither any single natural 
feature, nor any astronomical line. It cuts across 
four river valleys, many lines of communication, 
and numerous tribal regions.
The southern half of the Afghan-Pakistan 
boundary runs in a barren and uninhabited region 
which has little attraction for the Afghans# From 
Chaman it descends to the Registajm of Lora, climbs 
the Chagai range, and finally descends westward 
to the southern margin of the salty wastes of 
Sistan. The entire belt along the boundary is 
barren and virtually isolates Baluchistan from 
Afghanistan. South of the Quetta and Chaman garrip 
sons lies the state of Kalat which serves as an 
additional barrier to any Afghan threats from the 
north.
3.3 ♦ 2. Pakistanis Boundary with Iran
From Koh-Malik Siah, which forms the tri­
junction of Iran-Afghanistan-Pakistan boundaries, 
the boundary runs south-eastwards along the edge 
of the Baluchistan range in Iran and the Baluchi­
stan Salt range in West Pakistam. It crosses the 
low saddle between the Baluchistan and the Siaham 
ranges, turns south-eastwards, forming a deep 
salient in the desolate area, and finally reaching 
Gwatar Bay on the Arabian Bea.
The only section of economic importance along 
or near the boundary is in the north where mining 
for sulphur and chromium is carried on. Zahidan,
on the Iranian side, is also located in this 
section. It is the terminus of the railway line 
from Quetta and in future may become a town of 
great value when it will be linked to Tehran by 
rail. Relations between the two countries are 
most friendly and the boundary is likely to remain 
satisfactory and peaceful as it has been in the 
past.
The Iran-Pakistan boundary agreement was 
concluded as far back as 6th February 1958. What 
took place on 15th July 1963 was purely the cere­
monial act of the transfer of the areas concerned. 
This arose out of the obligation incurred by both 
the countries under the boundary agreement of 6th 
February 1958. It is not a fact that Pakistan has 
given away 7769.7 sq. Km. to Iran. Pakistan agreed 
to give Iran 802*9 sq. Km. of its territory which 
was occupied by the British, when they were rulers 
of the sub-continent and against which occupation 
the Government of Iran had always protested. In 
18719 1896 and 1905 Iran had been asked to conclude 
a boundary agreement but they had consistently 
refused to demarcate the boundary on the basis of 
those agreements. With the advent of Pakistan, 
and in view of its friendly and fraternal relations 
with Iran, a solution of this problem, which had 
been left over from the Colonial period, became 
possible.
With the transfer of some 802.9 sq. Km. of 
territory to Iran, the Government of Iran has 
ceded 246 sq. Km. of territory hitherto under its 
occupation, to the Government of Pakistan. If 
the demarcation of the border had taken place in 
accordance with the 1905 agreement, concluded 
between the British and Iranians, 777 sq. Km. of 
territory would have had to be relinquished to 
Iran, but there would have been no cession by 
Iran of the 246 sq. Km. of the territory which 
Pakistan has now acquired under the agreement of 
1958. Pakistan has gained 246 sq. Km. of territory 
under the border agreement.
In the extreme north, the boundary traverses 
a highly mountainous, very sparsely populated and 
relatively inaccessible region which contains the 
function of four international boundaries, respect­
ively of West Pakistan, Afghanistan, and beyond 
the Afghan buffer, of the People*s Republic of 
China and the Soviet Union.
The eastern boundary as a whole is a good 
geographical divide. It separates the canal- 
irrigated, densely populated Indus alluvium from 
the sparsely populated riverless desert uplands 
of Thar and Rajputana in the south, the newly 
irrigated lands of East Punjab farther north, and 
the mountainous state of rUammu and Kashmir in the 
north-east.
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North of the Radeliffe line the boundary 
follows the old line separating the province of 
Punjab from the princely state of “3!ammu and 
Kashmir. Differences of race, language and 
economy between the two areas are well known. 
However, the bulk of the people on either side 
have a common religion, and issue which has been 
highlighted by the political dispute between 
Pakistan and India over the control of Kashmir.
i
3*4 Boundary Disputes of Pakistan
Even if a state be economically and. politically
A
strong internally, it must still contenj/ with 
threats from its neighbours and other outside 
powers. This is particularly true in the case of 
Pakistan, whose relations have been least friendly 
with India, and not cordial with Afghanistan, the 
two countries with which it is most closely related 
historically and geographically as mentioned in 
the previous two chapters.
3.4 * 1. Dispute with Afghanistan
The unfriendly relations between Pakistan and 
Afghanistan arose when, since 1947* Afghanistan 
has consistently repudiated the Durand Line and 
demandedothe right of self-determination for the 
Pathans because she does not consider them a part 
of Pakistan. Pakistan refutes this assertion, 
insisting on the validity of the Durand Line, and 
considers the Afghan claim a violation of inter­
national law. Hence it is a matter of international 
politics rather than a local reality. The terri­
torial claim for a Pakhtun state has varied from 
tribal territory to the entire trans Indus area 
from Chitral to the Arabian Sea. The status of this 
state had sometimes been desired as an independent 
state and at others as an autonomous unit within 
Pakistan.
According to Afghan sources,^ Pakhtunistan
consists of the area west of the river Indus up
to the Afghan frontier, a tract of land of i+92081
sq. Kin., inhabited by seven million people who are
divided into numerous tribes. It extends from
Chitral in the north to Baluchistan in the south,
both inclusive, and besides these it includes the
districts of Hazara, Kohistan, Sul at, Dir, Bunar,
Peshawar, 3Eirah, Ba^ aiir, Kohat, Banna, Beraghazi
Khan, Dera Ismail Khan, Waziristan, Khyber,Pezu,
Gomal, Bolan and Malakand. According to the same
sources Baluchistan is also inhabited by Pakhtun
clans, principally the Shorani in the north and
the Kahari, Dunar and Mandokhel in the south.
This inclusion of Baluchistan is questionable,
since its population of about two million consists
of Baluchis, Brahimjs, Jats and some other Indian
as well as negroid people, none of whom is regarded
as Pakhtun. Percival Spear, emphasising the
difference between the Baluchis and the Pathans,
says; "In dealing with the frontier the distinction
must always be remembered between the Baluchis and
the Pathans, peoples very different in customs and
o
situation, who require separate treatments."
1. Pakhtunistan - The Khyber Pass as the Focus of 
the New State oFTakhtSis’fanT^foiie, T6Fdonr”T952.
2. Percival Spear in Smith (v.A.), (ed.), Bag Oxford 
History of India, Oxford, 1958, p.698.
Fraser-I^tler also says that the majority of the 
Baluchis are not Pathans, hut rather of mixed 
race*
The development of Pakhtunistan as a political 
issue started in 1929» when Nadir Shah, the father 
of the present Afghan King Zahir Shah, criticised 
the Durand Line because it divided the Pakhtuns 
who wanted independence from foreign rule* In 
the same year the Khudi Khidinaiigar (Red Shirts) 
movement for Pakhtun independence got under way*
This movement cooperated with the Congress Party,
Which was working for the independence of India*
The leader of the Khudi Khidmatlgar, Abdul Ghaffar 
Khan, was even called the "frontier Gandhi"*, The 
basis for cooperation between the two movements 
was the understanding that in the event of Indian 
freedom the Pakhtuns would also gain their independ­
ence, and not be under Hindu domination*
Afghanistan has been a buffer state between 
two Great Powers - Great Britain and Russia. When 
Great Britain left India, it became imperative for 
Afghanistan to have a friendly India as a substitute 
for British Power. Afghans also doubted the emergence 
of true Hindu-Muslim unity. Paced with this duel 
nature of the problem, the Afghans wanted at least 
to be assured of the independence of the Pathans.
"Many years before Pakistan had ever been mentioned 
as a possible solution to the India problem, a 
high official in Kabul put Afghan fears into words, 
'We know the Durand Line is, but what about the 
Gandhi Line?*" It seems that Afghanistan would 
have liked to redraw the eastern boundary, but 
how far? During the Durraid period, the glorious 
age of Afghans, the eastern boundary of Afghanistan 
was along the Stitlej River; and around 1800 it was 
the Indus River* The Indus Line was justifiable 
to some extent on ethnic basis. Actually no 
specific boundary was proposed until after partition 
of India, when Sardar Najibullah, then Afghan 
Ambassador in India, drew a plan for the state of 
Pakhtunistan which included the entire area from 
Chitral to the Arabian Sea. In the official map 
the southern limit was a little below the northern 
boundary of Baluchistan. (See Pig. lb)*
The Hindus were conscious that the Pathans 
could not be kept under their domination by any 
means. They also wanted a friendly Afghanistan for 
the defence and peace on the northwestern frontier. 
It is a matter of speculation, but India might have 
acceded to a change in the Durand Line that would 
have included the tribal area only. The addition
n-TTT—   r I n 1— i- r i~ i r n n*liwn rM.iiii.i— j i ------------------- r imTm-..-11. <■ n in , n M I  i.n ii in i. > i ■^■ tu iin ii^ in i i  n.nun-i.an-vtT*
1. Praser-iytler (Sir W.K.), Afghanistan, London, 
Oxford University Press, 1958," p.257.
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of some more tribal units without the advantages 
of the Indus Basin would not have helped Afghan­
istan in any way* However, the chance to make 
any such agreement did not arise because the idea 
of Pakistan came to the fore inviting the hostility 
of both Afghanistan as well as India*
Towards the end of 19^ -7? Bardar Najibullah 
proposed a Pakhtun state within Pakistan* A 
periodical 'Pakhtunistan* was published in Delhi 
and a Pakhtunistan Day was held in London. This 
kind of propaganda continued, and in 1950 a refer­
endum was called for by the Afghan Government so 
that the tribal people would have the opportunity 
to choose between Pakistan and an independent 
Pakhtunistan* The Pakistan Government did not 
agree to such a proposal* Consequently relations 
between the two countries became strained, and 
transit trade was partially stopped* After a short 
quiet spell the issue again became hot in 1955 
following the merger of the Western States of Pak­
istan, including the North-West Frontier province^ , 
into a single West Pakistab* The closure of the 
frontier was a sharp blow to the Afghan economy, and 
its consequences contributed to the resignation in 
March 1963? after ten years as virtual ruler of 
Afghanistan, of Prince Daud, who then held the 
position of Premier. It was after him that tension 
between the two countries began to ease and, through 
the good offices of the Shah of Persia, diplomatic 
relations were restored in May 1963*
But since the clash of 1960-61 between Afghan­
istan and Pakistan, the Russian attitude has changed# 
Having made a notable effort in 1965-66 to compose 
the quarrel between India and Pakistan over Kashmir, 
Russia will not want to see yet another frontier 
war flaring up in an area where the development of 
its interests require stability# The main aim of 
the current Soviet diplomatic effort seems to be to 
persuade Afghanistan and Pakistan that they have 
mutual economic interests, for it is on their re­
cognising this that the unhampered outflow of 
Russian goods through these countries largely depends# 
The Governments of Afghanistan and Pakistan 
are certainly becoming more aware of their mutual 
interests; and in their dealings with one another, 
if not in their public pronouncements^ 1963 seems 
to have marked the beginning of a new phase in their 
relations. Pakistan cannot afford further frontier 
involvements when already overextended in its struggle 
with India over Kashmir. On the other hand, Afghan­
istan now realises that it cannot afford to provoke 
Pakistan again into closing ,the common frontier, 
because Afghanistan is a landlocked state whose 
shortest and easiest access to the sea or the out­
side world lies through West Pakistan. Communications 
within the country are also meagre."’ It is the
Note: The new road is very good indeed. Prom
Herat, Khandahar, Kabul, also to U.S.S.R. 
through Herat.
only free country in Asia without a single mile
out
of railway, and the only motor road^of Afghanistan 
open all the year round leads across the K h y h e r  
Pass into West Pakistan. It is possible that 
the boundaries of a friendly or subservient 
Pakhtunistan would enable Afghanistan to use the 
Indus River, but even then the rfvhr would be 
useless as long as Peshawar in the north and 
Karachi in the south remain in Pakistan, and can 
block Afghanistan’s foreign trade. As the Pak­
istani side of the Frontier is economically better 
developed, Afghanistan cannot avoid the fear that 
this may tempt even its own Pathans to defect to 
Pakistan*
3*U • 2. Pakistan*s
Unlike Afghanistan, India is the largest and 
the common neighbour of both the units of Pakistan.
It is most unfortunate that its relations with 
Pakistan have been so unhappy. With India other 
problems have resulted from partition and particularly 
from the Punjab boundary award. On the basis of 
’’other factors’*, the G-urdaspur district east of the 
river Ravi was awarded to India although it was a 
Muslim majority contiguous district. Thus India 
attained access to Kashmir via Pathankot-Kathna road, 
east of which high ranges bar every access to Kashmir.
•” s
In the words of Lord Bridwood, "had the Gurdaspuru
district not heen awarded to India, India could
i
certainly never have fought a war in Kashmir."
But Lord Bridwood justifies this inconsistency in 
the boundary avrnrd on the basis that to have awarded 
the Gurdaspur district to Pakistan would have placed 
the headworlcs of the upper Bari Doab canal at Mad- 
hupur under Pakistan control. The canal irrigates 
Lahore, Amritsar and Gurdaspur districts. This 
reasoning seems incorrect as well as unfair.
Amii'tsar district lies between Gurdaspur and Lahore 
would inevitably irrigate Amritsar in between, and 
there is nothing objectionable or illegal in 
placing a canal that irrigates most Pakistan lands 
under Pakistan control.
On the contrary, it would have been the only 
proper arrangement. There are headworks of canals 
which irrigate land in both parts of the Punjab, 
Madhupur headworks on the Ravi and Perozpur on the 
Sutlej. The Perozpur headworks undei* Pakistan would 
have kept a balance in the control of river waters* 
By awarding control of both to India, India uni­
laterally controls the waters of the Ravi and the 
Sutlej Rivers, the award also gave India the ability 
to parch West Pakistan at will. "No army with bombs
1. Lord Birdwood, India and Pakistan, New York, 
Prederick A. Praeger, 1954, pTJST
and shellfire could devastate a land as thoroughly 
aB West Pakistan could be devastated by the simple 
expedient of India's permanently shutting off the 
sources of water that keep the fields and people 
of West Pakistan alive.n’*'
Early in 1948 the Central Bari Boab Canal and 
the Bipalpur Canal were closed. Pakistan faced 
with a host of problems, hastily pressed for some 
kind of agreement that would reopen the Canals.
On the 4th May the East Punjab Government assured 
the West Punjab Government that it had no intention 
of withholding water from West Punjab without giving 
it time to tap alternate sources. After this agree­
ment India quickened work on dams and canal con­
structions for the development of East Punjab 
agriculture. Bakhra Bam on the river Sutlej was 
raised to 127 m. which is higher than the Hqyer Bam. 
The dam now has the capacity to hold the entire 
flow of the Sutlej. Harike Bam at the confluence 
of the BeaS1 and Sutlej Rivers is under construction. 
As a result of these dams, the eastern part of West 
Pakistan, which is one of the most highly productive 
areas, is dry. Buring these twenty three years of 
independence, numerous agreements and proposals have 
been made, but none have been satisfactory. Since
1. Bavid Biljenthal, tfLil»enthal Proposal for Indus 
Basin Water Bispute’1, Colliers, August 4th, 1957*
the Spring of 1958 the Central Barti Doab and 
Dipalpur Canals have been completely closed*
This water dispute is also tied to the Kashmir 
problem. The dispute over the division of water 
has been referred to as the Indus Basin Water 
Dispute, and the Indus Basin includes Kashmir*
Had the Kashmir been a part of Pakistan, the dispute 
would have been limited to the waters of the 
eastern rivers - Sutlej, Beas and Ravi, and India 
could never have attained full control of the 
waters of the three above mentioned rivers. The 
International Court of Justice's decision on 
water supply was influenced by Indian occupation 
of Kashmir, although the Kashmir prbblem is yet 
to be settled. The decision as it stands today is 
that the entire flow of Sutlej, Beas and Ravi, the 
eastern rivers, is Indian and that the entire flow 
of the western rivers, ie. Indus, Chenab* and 
Jhelum belongs to Pakistan, except that Kashmir 
may claim her pre-partition supply from the Jhelum 
River. Since India does not use the water of the 
western rivers in their upper course, Pakistan 
cannot claim her pre-partition share of water from 
the eastern rivers, in their lower courses. The 
World Bank has suggested the establishment of a 
tribunal to study the equitable use of the eastern 
rivers but India is not ready to assign to any 
tribunal the right to interpret the May 1948 agreement.
Indian occupation of Kashmir is impinging not 
only upon Pakistan's economic development, but on 
the development of Kashmir itself* The natural 
terrain of the state is towards the southwest*
Various mountain ranges projecting from the Great 
Himalayan Range shut off any access from East Punjab, 
whereas, these open as valleys and spurs towards 
the West Punjab. Most important waterways are the 
Jhelum and Chenab rivers, important highways are 
Rawalpindi-Srinagar road and Sialkot-Jammu road, 
and other means of transport and communication are 
also much better on the western side than on the 
eastern.
Sheikh Abdullah once pointed out that the nearest 
railway station from Srinagar is Rawalpindi and the 
nearest seaport Karachi.
th^mterss^^„bhe=^eszt^ gn r^ivera-- Indiar^ -s-
Hydroelectrie projects cannot be developed by either 
Kashmir or Pakistan because they would be too close 
to the boundary, and hence vulnerable. Although 
the Riasi district is quite rich in iron ore, it is 
too close to the Pakistan border. Neither state is 
willing to develop this section, and India doesn't 
need to develop this part for her better investments 
are in Orissa and the Deccan plateau.
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It has been seen that the R^dcliffe Award, 
by awarding Gurdaspur district to India, provided 
the only natural link between India and Jammu*
The Raja being Hindu naturally inclined towards 
India, but the 77 per cent of Muslim population was 
opposed to the idea of accession to India* Just 
three days before the final boundary award was to 
be announced an interior agreement signed between 
India and Pakistan postponed the decision* The 
next event of great importance was the march of 
the tribal people into the vale of Kashmir* There 
were good reasons for this tribal campaign. The 
population in the western and the north-western 
parts of Kashmir consists of Pathans who had never 
been ruled by the Raja, and accession to India 
meant that these Pathans would also become Indian 
subjects. In this light, the campaign was a revolt 
against the Raja and his suspected accession to 
India. Secondly, the tribal people had long 
resented the Raja’s tyranny. They would have gone 
and fought in Kashmir long before, but British 
control was effective enough to prevent such a move# 
Kashmir is now a divided state. The Pakistan 
section is in two political units. The small strip 
of Jkammu and Kashmir along the Punjab, known as 
Azad Kashmir, is one unit. The other unit comprises 
Gilgit and Baluchistan, the Chiefs of which have 
acceded to Pakistan. The greater part of Kashmir 
and Jhammu and Ladakh province belong to India*
This unit maintained some pretence of autonomy 
until 1952-w  During this period of partial autonomy 
Sheikh Abdullah, the leading figure in the struggle 
of freedom for Kashmir, and the first Prime Minister 
of Kashmir after accession of the state to India, 
seemed to be shifting from Independent Kashmir to 
having close relations with Pakistan. Indian de­
duction is that since Kashmir is an integral part 
of India by virtue of the fact that legally the 
state had acceded to India, there is no need for 
a plebiscite, though the legality of accession was 
conditioned by a plebiscite. For further justly 
fication, the 1957 election in India-held Kashmir 
is considered enough of a plebiscite. If a pleb­
iscite is limited to the region where the population 
is rather mixed, it necessarily implies partition 
of Kashmir, an idea India has never even tolerated. 
The present truce line is neither acceptable to 
India nor to Pakistan.
India seems to have succeeded in her campaign, 
and any further discussion on the Kashmir Issue has 
been dropped. There is little possibility of a 
plebiscite now because, according to Indian leaders, 
an impartial attitude from the United States cannot 
be expected because of military aid to Pakistan.
They want the whole issue withdrawn from the Security 
Council.
Although the need to solve the Kashmir* Issue
is a pressing one, the chances for a solution are
remote. The only possibility for the issue to be
revived is if a third party enters the scuffle,
and should that occur, both India and Pakistan
would be losers.
Pakistan as a nation has many problems, the
forces that resulted in the creation of Pakistan
may still be strong enough to preserve its future.
The birth of Pakistan was highly idealistic, and
idealism is a powerful force. Mackinder said:
uIdealists are the salt of the earth, without
them to move us, society would soon stagnate
1and civilization fade.’1
1. Mackinder (Sir Halford J*), Democratic Ideals 
SP^^lsOity;; New York, Henry Holt Company,*
19E27 p.7.
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CHAPTER h
ETHNIC STRUCTURE OP R.C.D. COUNTRIES1 
The homogeneity of a society is a major 
factor in the solidarity of a state. Such 
homogeneity may he ethnic, racial or psychological. 
The ethnic structre of the region, which includes 
Turkey, Iran and West Pakistan, is so complex as 
to invalidate any generalization. Prom 2500 B.C. 
to the end of the 14th century there were large 
scale migrations from the north and north east. 
Various tribes moved south plundering and fighting 
the previously settled people, and settled them­
selves in the same areas. Every new onslaught 
resulted in a superimposition of another ethnic 
group on the preceding groups. People from the 
north were not the only cause of this diversity in 
the ethnic pattern. The Persians, the Greeks and 
the Arabs expanded their empires to the east. This 
east-west shift of empires v/as accompanied by a 
complementary movement of people, which further 
confused the ethnic picture. Many of these tribes', 
partially cut off from one another by the nature of 
the land, survived as homogeneous groups which pre­
served their differences in social life, language 
and, to some extent, codes of law. The ethnic
1. See Fig. Itf.
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homogeneity so desirable for a strong and co­
herent state is hard to achieve in any of these 
countries in spite of the fact that people of the 
area are mostly Aryans or Turks, or a mixture of 
the two, known as Turko-Iranians*
Very little is known of the people indigenous 
to the region* The earliest records indicate three 
migrations of the Aryans. The first group settled 
in Asia Minor and Western Iran, the second advanced 
to the east of the Caspian Sea and occupied eastern 
Iran, and the third took a more easterly course 
and inhabited what is now Afghanistan and West 
Pakistan. Among the Aryans were a sprinkling of 
Creeks. Being small in number and cut off from 
their homeland, they were absorbed by the Aryans, 
so there is no group of people that can be recognised 
a s Greeks today even though their influence may 
seem to appear among the inhabitants of some iso­
lated valleys.
The Aryans were followed by Scythians, Yueh Chi 
and Kushans who pushed the Aryans further east and 
west and colonized the bridging land, or northern 
Afghanistan. The Arabs brought Muslim rule, but 
their area of effective colonization was confined 
to the western slopes of the Zagros Mountains and 
the southern coastal strip along the Persian Gulf, 
the Gulf of Oman and the Arabian Sea. Prom the 8th
century to the 13th century was a period of Turkish 
advent. This was the longest period of encroachment 
on the Middle East and Northern India "by one type 
of people, and consequently the impact of the Turks 
has "been the strongest.
Over the years, and especially after the innov­
ation of Islam, there has been considerable inter­
mingling, yet settlement of various groups in 
different valleys separated from one another helped 
preserve the tribal organisation. Today each 
country offers varying degrees of tribal complexity, 
and must be considered separately. A description 
of various groups and area relationships will be 
given for the individual countries.
-H*l Turkey:
Though the nomad expansion during the tenth 
and eleventh centuries the word 'Turk*, which started 
as the name of a small clan of the Hiungun people 
of Mongolia, had been extended to cover a large 
number of tribes of mixed descent, some conquering, 
some being conquered. They were far from uniform 
either in physique or in culture, and their only 
bond was that all spoke dialects related to the 
speech of the original Turks. In its ethnological, 
as opposed to its political, sense, therefore, the 
word 'Turk* is strictly speaking, a linguistic term,
and it is incorrect to speak of the Turks as a 
'race*. In this sense many existing tribes of 
Central and. Western Asia can call themselves 'Turks’, 
though they are not included, in the political defin­
ition of the constitution of the Turkish Republic.
Hie Central tribes, and those who faced 
eastwards, took on the culture of the Mongols, 
with whom they also mixed physically in varying 
degrees, until at the present day some of them are 
indistinguishable from the Mongol n e i g h b o u r s ,  except 
in their speech. These have been called, as a 
body, 'Turanian Turks’, though no hard and fast 
line divides them from the 'Iranian Turks’. The 
term means only that they are under Mongolian,
Chinese and Tibetan cultural influences, while 
retaining Turkic speech. Their main tribes are 
the Kirghiz-Kazak, who live between the Aral Sea 
and Lake Balkash, and near the borders of the Lena 
river and its tributaries in eastern and northern 
Siberia, and the Tatars, who still roam over the 
steppes of southern Siberia, Dzungaria and northern 
Mongolia.
Those who moved westwards, but did not go 
into Asia Minor, fraternized with the Iranians, 
whose jnode of life they adopted, while keeping 
their own language. Their chief representatives 
today are the Turkoman, the Sart, the Taranchi, and
the Uzbeg. Their culture was strongly influenced 
in the past by the Arabs, and later by the Persians, 
and ethnologists therefore find it convenient to 
group them together under the title 'Iranian Turks’•
It is estimated that there are about twenty-five 
million people speaking various Turki languages - 
Turanian and Iranian - outside the present boundaries 
of Turkey. Most of them are now under the jurisdiction 
of the U.S.S.R. and form the majority of the popul­
ation in eleven of its republics and autonomous 
provinces. The Tatar invasions, which were respon­
sible for the presence of Turki-speaking groups on 
the Volga and in the Crimea, also left groups in 
northern Persia and Afghanistan. Further east a 
large part of the population of the Chinese province 
of Sinkiang (which used to be called Chinese Turk- 
istan) is also Turki-speaking.
The differences between the Anatolian Turks 
and those of Iran and Central Asia result from the 
circumstances of their arrival in their historical 
home. Westward infiltration of Turkish tribes into 
Anatolia had probably begun a century or two before 
the mass migration, of which the Seljuk and Osmanli 
(Ottoman) are the most important. They occurred in 
the eleventh and twelfth centuries and were due to 
Mongol pressure from farther east. All alike began 
in the search for new pastures by pastoral nomads;
they therefore affected the fertile and populous 
areas less than the steppes and foothills. There 
was intercourse from the first, and frequent inter­
marriage, especially when Turkish families became 
sedentary and settled in the towns. There are, 
however, still pastoral communities in many districts 
of the plateau and adjacent highlands whose breed 
is as little changed as their mode of life.
P h y s i c a l  observations show that the modern 
Turks are a mixed people, compounded of the types 
of breeds characteristic of the Mediterranean and 
of the Mountain £one, but there is certainly a marked 
Mediterranean strain. As this has been found also 
on ancient sites, it seems likely that both these 
physical types have lived together in Anatolia 
since prehistoric times.
The evidence of physical, anthropology supports 
their claims both (a) to be descended from Central 
Asiatic ancestors, and (b) to be akin to the Hittites 
and other ancient inhabitants of Asia Minor. It 
has been estimated that the Turkish people of today 
owe perhaps 75 per cent of its ancestory to the 
inhabitants of Anatolia before the first inrush 
of Turki-speaking nomads, and about 25 per cent to 
those new comers from Asia.
One minority group - the fords - stands out 
from the rest of the population. The western Kurds,
especially, are tall and are extremely long-headed, 
among very round-headed neighbours. They are past­
oral nomads who graze their flocks and herds over 
parts of Turkey, Persia and Iraq with little respect 
for political frontiers, particularly during their 
seasonal migrations. Their language is Iranian, 
akin to Persian, and quite distinct from Turkish 
or Arabic; they may therefore-be descended,from 
early immigrants out of the northern steppe. Within 
the present political boundaries of Turkey they are 
chiefly concentrated in the south-east. The descend- 
ents of this ancient people are still numerous, 
especially in the eastern province bordering on 
the Armenian district of Pefsia and the U.S.8.R. 
Their cradle-land is in the Ararat highland, the 
uppermost Murat Valley, and the Van basin, between 
the Caucasus and Mesopotamia, extending westward 
as far as the Central Plateau, and southward into 
Taurus, where they have long been inextricably 
intermixed with Kurds.
North of the Armenian homeland lie the isolated 
mountain districts of Azaristan and Lazistan, the 
classical Colchis. The people of both districts 
are allied closely to the Georgians of the Caucasus, 
a fact proved by their language; but they are 
distinguished from these by their religion and the 
habits acquired under Islam, They are moxmtain
people living in village settlements along the 
mountain valleys, both cultivators and herdsmen. 
They are known to the Turks as Kazars and formerly 
enjoyed a bad reputation among the ruling class.
If. 2 Iran
In Iran the Persians are of the old Aryan
v
tribes. They constitute a little less than two- 
thirds of the total population. They are the 
well educated community of the country and are 
particularly powerful in and about Tehran. The 
national language of Iran being Persian and the 
Persians being all of the Shia sect of Islam, they 
contribute to the homogeneity of the Centre 
However there are Turkish tribes in Mazan&erman 
and G-ilan. At one time in history they provided 
the ruling dynasty* The Qajars, the ruling Turkish 
tribe held sway from 1736 to 1926 in spite of all 
the international troubles and internal disorder. 
At present there is no friction between them and 
the Persians.
Surrounding the Persians are several tribal 
units of varying strength. The most important of 
these tribes are in Azarbaijan. They are called 
the Azeris and are descendents of a Turk tribe of
1. For details see Arberry, The Legacy of Persia, 
Oxford University Press. ~
the same name. The more than two million Az&ris 
have preserved their Turki culture and languages, 
and though Persian is taught in the schools, many 
Azeris are not yet bilingual as is the case with 
other ethnic groups. They do belong to the Shia 
sect, the state religion of Iran.
The SafaVi dynasty, which preceded the Qajars, 
reconquered the northern and the north-western 
provinces from the Ottoman Turks, brmging the 
boundary of Iran to the Caucasus Mountains. The 
Qajar period, however, was a period of Russian 
aggression, and the boundary of Iran was pushed 
back to the Aras River in 1826 (Treaty of Turko- 
manchay). As a result Azarbaijan was split 
into Russian Azarbaijan and Iranian Azarbaijan, 
which means tha-t the Iranian Azeris have racial, 
linguistic and cultural affinities with their - 
kinsfolk north of the river Aras. Divided as it 
is between cultural and national ties, Azarbaijan 
has been exploited by the Soviet Union more than 
once and is still in a politically exploitable 
state. There are also Armenians, Assyrians and 
the Turki tribes of Qizilbash and Shah Sanan in 
Azarbaijan.
1. Sykes, Persia, Oxford University Press, 1931? 
P.50.
The other ethnic groups are mostly pastoral, 
and in general the tribes are self-contained 
economic units organised for the control of their 
pastureland. The Bakhtiaries tribes, one of the 
well organised groups, live in the valleys of the 
Zagros around Isfahan. Some of the Bakhtiari&s 
speak § Persian dialect and others a Turki dialect. 
They are supposed to be the descendents of a Mongol 
noble, Bakhtiar by name, Turki influence in their 
dialect signifies a mixing of Turkish tribes.
They are of Shia faith and feel quite close to 
the Persians, even though they were an autonomous 
unit until 1924.
The Kurds, an important political and ethnic 
entity, occupy the area west and south of Lake 
Urinia around Mahabad. Aryans by race, they are 
believed to be the descendents of the Medes. Their 
language is closely related to Persian, but is 
distinctive enough to be designated as Kurdish.
In religion they belong to the Sunni sect of Islam. 
The Kurds also live across the Iranian boundary in 
Iraq and Turkey. Their aspirations for independence 
have been curbed with force by all of the states 
of which they form a part. Kurdish nationalism 
in Iran springs from the fact that, "since they were 
members of the same Iranian racial family as the 
Persians proper, there is no reason why they could
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not form the same combination as did the ancient
1Medes and Persians 1 • This would mean a Kurdish 
republic within Iran which is not justified by 
cultural or political separateness, even though 
mountain barriers come between them and the Persians#
Between the Kurds and the Bakhtiaris live the 
Lurs, They are thought to be the indigenous people 
of Iran# They speak a Persian dialect, are of 
the Shia sect. They are good hunters. They are 
proud and feel very superior to the Kurds.
East of the Bakhtiaris are the Turki speaking 
tribes known as the Qashqai. Their centre is 
Shiraz. They have mixed with the Arabs to some 
extent, but their cultural traits are still 
Turkish. The only cultural element they really 
have in common with Persians is religion. South 
of the Qashqai group there are Arabs along the 
Persian Gulf and the Gulf of Oman. They are of 
course Sunni in their belief and speak Arabic*
Their influence is considerable in the province of 
Khuzistan. Bahrain was lost to the Persians because 
of Arab numerical superiority, though in Persian 
official books Bahrain is still part of Iran and
p
is shorn as the eleventh Ostan.
1* Roosevelt (Archie), "The Kurdish Republic of
Mahabad," Middle East Journal. I, July 19^7, p.262.
2. Ostan is the Persian word for province*
Other tribal groups are Turkmen in northern 
Khurasan along the Russo-Iranian border, and the 
Baluchis in the south-eastern part along the 
Pakistan border. A greater number of* Baluchi 
people live in Baluchistan, West Pakistan. A 
contiguous area in southern Afghanistan also has a 
small number of* Baluchis. These tribes of .Aryan 
origin were forced southward by the successive 
raids from the north. They speak Baluchi, one of 
the Aryan groups of languages. Among the Baluchis 
a remnant of the Dravidians has survived. They are 
called the Brahmis. Their language belongs to the 
Dravidian family of languages. A major group of 
the Brahmis is in West Pakistan. The Makrams, a 
negroid race, live along the Makran Coast both in 
Iran and West Pakistan. ( ^  **-1
An interesting feature of the ethnic distrib­
ution in Iran is that each major group has a city 
as its centre. Tehran for the Persians, Tabriz 
for the Azeris, Shiraz for Qashqais, Isfahan for 
the Bakhtiaris and Kermanshah and Hamadan for the 
Kurds.
The ethnic picture of Iran would be incomplete 
without mentioning the Afghans. Afghans d>-omination 
of Iran began with the reign of Mahmud GhaznaVl*
In the period following a number of Afghan tribes 
migrated, among which the Aldalis, and Chilzais were
of importance. At the beginning of the 18th century 
the Afghans lost their importance as soldiers 
because the 18th century marks the beginning of 
Qajar rule and Russo-British rivalry, and a decline 
in the strength of the Iranian national army. Most 
of the Afghans, therefore, returned to Qandahar, 
though some remained and still are in Khurasan and 
Sistan.
As for the ethnic groups of Afghanistan, one 
of Persian origin is called the Tajik. The Tajiks 
are non-nomadic people engaged in various business 
pursuits and farming, and are peaceful and hard­
working. Most of them live in the north-eastern 
part of Afghanistan in the Valley of the River 
Panjshir. Other areas of Tajik settlement are the 
plateau of Badakshan, Kohistan and the cities of 
Kabul and Herat. At the time of Turkish invasions 
the Tajiks werd the ruling tribes. The Ghori dynasty 
from the Tajik tribe once again rose to power around 
1150. Their language, known as Tajik, is an older 
type of Persian, and people knowing present Persian 
can converse with Tajiks without difficulty*
The Pathans, usually referred to as the true 
1Afghans, are the dominant group in Afghanistan.
The original home of the Pathans was supposed to
' ^
have been around the Sulaiman ranges^ According
1. Praser-iytler (Sir W.K.), Afghanis tan , third 
edition, Oxford University Press7 1957* P.^
1to Ravlerty , ,fthe Pathans derive their name from
the fact that they are the people who live behind
or between the ridges of the Sulaiman Range, the
word Pasht in Tajik Persian signifying the back
of a mountain range **. A1 Otbi, secretary to
Mahmud GhaznaM, mentions the Afghans as unruly
tribes of the Sulaiman mountains which were suMued
by the Turk rulers of Ghazni. In 1333 r Ibn Batuta,
a Moorish traveller, described the Pathans as
highwaymen from the Koh-i-Sulaiman. They rose to
prominence in the country after their contact with
the Turks, and formed a major part of the armies
of the GhaznaVh, the Moghuls and the Persian Kings.
Recent studies indicate that the indigenous people
of the Sulaiman Mountains, for whom the term Pa than
■5
is used, freely intermingled with the Turks. Some
decades back, the Ghilzaiis or the Khiljis were
considered true Pathans, but it has been proved that
they are the descendants of a Turkish tribe known 
kas Khalaj. In all probability the Pathans are
1. RaVerty (Henry G.()), is the author of Notes on 
Afghanistan, considered the most authentic work 
on the country.
2. Fraser-Tytler (Sir W.K.), Afghanistan, London,
' ' ■ H H-i t_ ■ IL ■ J
Oxford University Press, 1953, p.k9.
3. Geographical Handbook Series, Turkey, Vol.I, 
April 19U2, N.I.D., p.3U5.
4. Fraser-Tytler (Sir W.K.), Afghanistan, London, 
Oxford University Press, 19S9T"p»53«
either direct descendents of the Turks or mixed 
Turks and indigenous Pathans.
Currently the designation ’’Pathan” includes 
all pushtu speaking people in the area extending 
northeast from Qandahar to Rawalpindi. Along the 
Indus River a section within the area of Pathan 
population, the Pathans are a settled society, hut 
in a belt straddling the Durand Line the tribal 
organisations are strong. The Pathans are probably 
the majority ethnic group of Afghanistan, constit­
uting nearly 60 per cent of the population. What 
may be even more surprising is that there may be 
so many, if not more, Pathans in West Pakistan. 
According to the 1961 Census figures there were 
3,6k7,158 Pathans in tribal territory. The North 
Western Frontier population, which is primarily 
Pathan$p was given as k,258,000. There are Pathans 
east of the river Indus in the district of Attock, 
Mianwali and Dera Gazi Khan. In addition a number 
of tribes settled throughout the Punjab and since 
partition, many of them have migrated from the 
East Punjab to West Pakistan.
The Hazaras are a third major group in Afgan- 
istan. These people are Mongol by race, and their 
language has been described as ’’archaic Persian”.
1. Ginsberg (Norton S.), (Edi t or), The Patterns 
of Asia, Engleward Cliffs, New Jersey, 
Prentice-Hall, Inc. 1958^ f>, 6§o.
They are found mostly in the central part of the 
country, north and south of Koh-i-Baha, hut when 
Amir AbduT Rehman was subduing various tribes to 
unify the Afghanistan State, many of the Hazana 
tribes fled to Peshawar and Quetta and some to 
Meshed. Also, since they live in a poor part of 
the country, many moved out in search of a liveli­
hood, and for this reason smaller groups of Hazara 
people may be found far away from their homeland 
JJazarijat in the North West Frontier Province, 
probably takes its name from these people, though 
the present population is quite mixed. A notable 
difference of the Hazaras is that they profess to 
the Bhia faith in a predominantly Sunni Afghanistan 
There are other Turk and Turco-Mongol tribes 
in the northern part of Afghanistan along the 
Soviet boundary. From west to east they are 
Turkomen, Uzbeks and Kirghiz* The Kirghiz tribe 
is a small group confined to the Wakhan section.
The Uzbeks are Turko-Mongol, who speak a Turki 
dialect, but most of them also understand Persian. 
They number about 820,000 according to Soviet est­
imates, and are mostly farmers and shepherds. West 
of the Uzbeks about 200,000 Turkomen live in Afghan 
istan. As the name indicates, they are rather 
unmixed, Turk tribes. A far greater number of 
Turkomen, Uzbeks, Tajiks and Kirghiz live on the 
other side of the river Oxus in Russian territory.
The Kafirs, another small group, may he added
to this tribal set up. The name signifies that
this group did not accept Islam so are called the
Kafirs. According to this version they could be
of early Aryan descent pushed into seclusion of their
present abode by later invasions. There are other
versions too. One is that they are the relics of
the Greeks. They have also been referred to as
Dravidian aborigines of the wild country. They
1live on either side of the Durand Line in the 
Kumar River Valley.
k*3 West Pakistan
As for the ethnic structure of West Pakistan, 
the Pathans and the Baluchis have already been 
mentioned. The majority of the population may be 
grouped as the Punjabis and the Sindhis, the names 
of the provinces from which the inhabitants also took 
their name. After the birth of Pakistan these terms" 
have lost some of their significance, since millions 
of immigrants from other provinces of India have 
joined the Punjabis and the Sindhis, and the Punjab 
has been divided. The significant fact is that 
almost all the tribal groups that make up the ethnic 
structure of Iran and Afghanistan are also represented 
in West Pakistan, but without the tribal organisation.
1. The International boundary between West Pakistan 
and Afghanistan.
Under the present classification, in addition to
the Punjabis and Sindhis, there are the Pathans,
known as the "frontier people”, and the immigrants
who form a special group known as "refugees”.
However, Turkish is the strongest single element
1among the Pakistanis. This is borne out by the 
prevalence of Turki words in Urdu as well as in 
various other dialects spoken in West Pakistan, 
by the similarity of food and certain customs, and 
by facial characteristics in common with the Turks. 
Some believe that the Rajputs of India are also 
Turks. This idea can be supported on the grounds 
that the Rajputs of today might probably be the 
Kushans, who came to India before the advent of
2Islam and were absorbed in the Indian population.
Other Turkish invasions after the advent of 
Islam brought many more Turks into the northern 
part of India, but the restrictions of Islam on 
intermarriage with idol worshippers seemed to keep 
the Muslims and Hindus of the Indian sub-continent 
apart* The religious ban on mixing made the 
preservation of Turkish traits possible, especially 
among the elite.
1. Spear and Ikram, The Cultural Heritage of 
Pakistan, Ke^ acWi, i^ sTm T”  ~   ~
2. Rauf (Abdur), Renaissance of Islamic Culture 
and Civilizati6nTOin""P^ is tan,^Lahore", ’19&5* p, to
k General Ethnic Patterns
Returning to a consideration of the whole 
area, a general ethnic pattern emerges in spite 
of the apparent ethnic complexity. Aryan tribes 
occupy the central area from Iran to Baluchistan.
The various Turkish tribes are to be found along 
the northern borders of Iran and Afghanistan, 
extending from Aaarbaijan to Wakhan. The Arabs 
live in the south along the Persian Gulf and the 
Arabian Sea, their number and influence decreases 
eastward, i.e. from Khurzistan towards Makran.
All the foregoing ethnic groups are so mixed in 
West Pakistan that any tribal identity is lost 
except in the extreme north western part. What 
separates various groups is not the cultural differ­
ences, but their tribal organisations which were 
their political organisations prior to the growth 
of the national state.
To correlate the study of ethnic groups to 
the study o f ‘cores’ ' :•; it may be said that,
within the total area of Turkey, Iran, Afghanistan 
and Pakistan there are many individual ‘cores* geo­
graphically bounded by marshlands and ethnically 
homogeneous. However, in the states as political 
units, this homogeneity is lost because they con­
tain within their boundaries numbers of dissimilar
c^ores*. The different cores produced by history
and preserved hy geography have been a hinderance
1to the development of national unity. The
homogeneous 4cores* have first call for loyalty of
2the individuals beyond the national state*
Bach of the states has therefore more than one 
*corei At the same time there has been a shift of 
certain Asiatic capitals to the coast. At the 
beginning of the eighteenth century the capital of 
Russia was moved from Moscow, the historic capital, 
to St. Petersburg, the newly built "window on the 
west", a shift symbolic of the new-found desire of 
the Czars for contacts with western Europe. By 
the time of the Communist Revolution, this westward 
orientation had exhausted its role, the national 
tradition was now to be emphasised, and the capital 
was restored to Moscow,
The movement in Turkey shows a more complex 
pattern of movement. The Ottoman Turks conquered 
Asia Minor in the fourteenth century and established 
their capital successively at sites farther and 
farther west until in 1326 it came to Biijisa. In 
the fourteenth century they invaded Europe and over-
1. Febvre (Lucien), A Geographical Introduction to 
History, London, Kegan & Paul, Trench, Trubner & 
Co., 1932, p.310.
2. Derwent (Whittlesey), gheBarth and the State,
New York, Henry Holt. & Co.", 19®+, p.597; "Core 
or Nuclear Core. The area in which or about
which a state originates".
ran the Balkan peninsula. Their capital was moved 
to Sdirne (Adrianople), in the Maritza valley.
It remained here until it was moved to Constant­
inople, which fell to the Turks in li+53* Constant­
inople (Istanbul) was well placed to serve as the 
capital of an empire which stretched from the 
Danube to the Euphrates and the Nile. When the 
European possessions had largely been lost and the 
Asiatic seriously diminished, Constantinople (Istanbul) 
ceased to be as suitably placed geographically. After 
1923 Turkey became an essentially Turkish state.
The new ruler, Mustafa KA-mal Attaturk, emphasised 
the narrowly national aspects of the state, the 
capital was transferred to Ankara, a site in the 
midst of the plateau of Anatolia, where essentially 
Turkish traditions could be developed.
In Iran the major core at Tehran is the strong­
est, but it is not ethnically homogeneous. Tabriz, 
Mahabad and Isfahan are effective separate ethnic 
cores within the main core area. Meshed and Kerman 
are two small cores in the eastern part of Iran.
In Afghanistan there are three cores, Kabul, Herat 
and Qandahar. Kabul is the most important because 
it is the capital of the state and enjoys a relatively 
safe location. Qandahar and Kabul are connected, but 
both are cut off from Herat by the large Hindu Kush 
ranges. Herat is closer to Meshed than to Kabul.
In Pakistan too there were three cores, Dacca,
Lahore and Karachi, hut now Rawalpindi has also 
been added to the core areas. Prom the point of 
view of homogeneity, the Dacca core in East Pakistan 
is very t. West Pakistanis population is
rather varied, and added to the three provincial 
groups, it has received more than 7,000,000 refugees. 
The refugee influx has made the population of Karachi 
more varied than that of any other city or town in 
the country. It is often referred to as "the city 
of strangers". The roots of this homogeneity are 
not very deep and strong. However, under the exist­
ing conditions Karachi seems to serve as a boundary 
core between the two main cores of the country,aat 
Lahore and Dacca.
In January 1959 the suitability of Karachi as 
the permanent capital of Pakistan from the point of 
view of geographical location, communications, 
defence, Climate and availability of a productive 
hinterland, was considered. The Commission came 
to the conclusion that Karachi was not suitable.
They finally recommended that the capital should 
be located in the Potwar Plateau near Rawalpindi.
So the present capital is about seven miles from 
Rawalpindi under the lee of the Marjala Hills.
Spread over 906.5 sq. Kin. of the Potwar Plateau, 
the site is of natural terraces and meadows, rising
from 518 m. to 609*6 m. above sea level with mountain
ranges. The place has a rich history. It was one
of man's earliest homes, dating back four hundred
thousand years, as shown by the Stone Age relics
of the "Sohan culture found in the Potwar Plateau,***
As for the boundaries of these states, few are
what might be termed natural. The one between Iran
and Afghanistan runs through a marshland, except
in the vicinity of Herat, and the southern bound-
aries of Iran and West Pakistan are oceans. All
other boundaries cut through core areas. The
northern boundary of Iran west of the Caspian Saa
divides the Azeris. Bast of the Caspian Sea the
northern boundary of both Iran and Afghanistan extend
along the southern limits of a marshland which has
been annexed by Russia, At the extreme north-east
end, this boundary cuts across a part of the Tashkent-
Samarkand core (Turk), On three sides, the boundaries
2
of West Pakistan cut through the Punjab* which as
a geographical entity includes Kashmir and the North
West frontier Province, It divides the Pathans in the
west, and Kashmir in the north, and the Punjabis in
the east. The eastern boundary, however, has become a
sharp ethnic line between Muslim and Hindu due to the
mass migration following partition of the sub-continent 
in 19U7.
1, Wheeler (Sir Mortimer R.S.), Five Thousand Years of 
£lMs±an, Christopher Johnson LtdT, 19froT
2. Before 1900 the Punjab included the Vale of Kashmir 
and a greater part of the present N.W.F.P. In 18£*6 
Kashmir was made a separate state and in 1901 Lord 
Curzon created a North Western Frontier Province.
CHAPTER 5
R.C.D. PACT INCLUDING INTERNAL BILATERAL 
AGREEMENTS.....
FIELDS OF COOPERATION
Today the greatest concern of the developing 
countries is to raise the per capita income and 
living standards of their people* This aim under­
lies the development plans that now constitute an 
integral part of the approach to the problem of 
effective allocation of resources* These early 
years of ROD are difficult and crucial, because 
the expectations of the masses of the developing 
countries have been raised to a point such that 
it is even by the most ingenious methods difficult 
to maintain the required pace of development.
One marked characteristic of the world econo­
mic situation is a clear concentration of wealth 
and well being in certain regions of the world* 
This seems to support the hypothesis that economic 
development once started, accelerates and gains 
impetus in certain regions, within a country as 
well as in the world at large, i*e* there are 
growth points or centres and around these points 
a more rapid and accelerated growth process takes 
place. What is more striking, however, is that 
not only there exists a large gap between the 
incomes of a different region, but that this gap 
tends to widen through time. In most of the 
developing countries the existence of national 
economic barriers may be a factor impeding more 
speedy growth. Therefore adherence to the idea
of regional cooperation between the developing 
countries has become desirable. The cooperation 
thus engendered through regional cooperation 
could result in a more broad based economy, a 
fruitful application of the factors of production, 
a larger marketing area, a greater bargaining 
position for trade with other countries and cap­
ability to undertake large joint projects on a 
regional basis.
The emergence of regional economic cooperation 
involving preferential treatment is an outstanding 
feature of the ev/oiotton of international economic 
relations in recent years. Although this cooperation 
shows variations in form and purpose, a common 
feature is that they seek not merely to provide 
a means for discussion for joint action on common 
problems but also to integrate the economics of 
member countries by removal of quantitative restrict­
ions and tariffs on trade amongst them coupled 
with other measures necessary to secure the est­
ablishment of a unified market.
Not for many years would it be a practical 
proposition to build up international economic 
relations on the concept of the world as an appro­
priate economic unit. Meanwhile regionalism has 
come to be considered preferable to both world 
wide freeing of trade and national self-sufficiency.
Three forms of regional cooperation amongst 
the member countries may be distinguished. First, 
there are those activities which do not directly 
involve commercial and development policies. 
Secondly, there are those activities consisting 
of joint efforts to secure the common or integrated 
development of process facilities or natural re­
sources but which do not directly involve limit­
ations on the independent determination of commer­
cial policies of the member countries. Thirdly, 
there are those forms of cooperation which arise 
from the treatment of the region as a whole as 
a single market. Cooperation at this level 
directly impinges on the development and commer­
cial policies of member countries and thus results 
in decisions of a larger and far-reaching nature 
than is involved in other forms of cooperation. 
Nevertheless, it is precisely in this field that 
regional cooperation seems particularly appropriate. 
But undoubtedly the difficulties of securing this 
are much greater because it requires the establish­
ment of preferential economic relations among member 
countries including freer trade and coordination of 
development plans. In order to achieve this, member 
Governments must be prepared to make special efforts 
and to accept limitations of their sovereignty in 
carrying out their development and commercial 
policies.
5.1 Joint Purpose Enterprises
The Istanbul Summit Conference decided that 
the development plans and production potential 
of the countries of the region should be studied 
with a view to making recommendations on joint 
purpose projects and long-term purchase agreements. 
It was observed that joint purpose projects would 
feed the requirements of the three countries.
There were several projects for which none of 
these countries can provide a sufficient domestic 
market, yet they could be viable projects if the 
total requirements of the three countries are 
taken into consideration.
Joint Purpose Enterprises constitute the major
field of RCD activity. ROD provides a market of
some 180 million people. The Gross National
Product of the RCD countries - Pakistan #13 billion,
Iran #7 billion and Turkey #lp billion is estimated
at about #30 billion and this is estimated to be
growing at the rate of 8 per cent to 10 per cent 
1
per annum. The number of people and the size of 
G-NP indicates that it is possible to establish 
almost any worthwhile industry on an RCD basis.
The scope of RCD Joint Purpose Enterprises 
has been kept flexible so as to obtain tie largest
Pakistan : Third Plan 1965-70, Iran : Third Plan 
1962-687 Turkey : First Development Plan 1963-67.
possible measure of cooperation in this sphere.
Under the aegis of ROD, Joint Purpose Enterprises 
can he undertaken in various forms such as joint 
ownerships, eilher in the public or private 
sectors, ownership by one country or more for 
making supplies to the others, establishing pro­
duction facilities in one country for which raw 
materials are produced in the other, and long-term 
purchase agreements based on productive facilities 
in any of the countries. This definition has been 
repeated in Article 3 of the “Agreement amongst 
Iran, Pakistan and Turkey for Promotion and Oper­
ation of Joint Purpose Enterprises**.
During the course of the last six years ROD
has made steady progress in the establishment of
joint purpose enterprises, including petroleum and
petrochemical industries. Thirteen joint ROD
industrial enterprises started production in 1968,
according to a statement released by the ROD Sec-
1retariat in Tehran recently. A total of fifty-five 
Joint Purpose Enterprises had been approved by the
ROD countries since the establishment of the alliance*
2
These were:
Located in Iran:
1. Aluminium; 2* ROD Carbon Black; 3* Dumpers Plant;
1* Pakistan News Digest, February 15th 1970, Karachi*
2. Regional Cooperation for Development, Fifth 
Anniversary Publication, July 21st 1969* Tehran, 
p • 25T ~ * ~  ~ ~
*4-. Seamless Steel Pipes and Tubes; 5* Sodium Tri­
polyphosphate; 6. Napthol Dyes; 7- Caprolactum;
8. Polyisoprene .Rubber; 9* Carbon Rods and Carbon 
Products; 10. Rotating Electrical Machinery;
11. C-lycerine; 12. Diesel Engines for use in Marine 
Craft, tractors, earth moving equipment and light 
and heavy trucks and buses.
Located in Pakistan:
13. Bank Note Paper; 1*4-. Kraft Paper; 15. Ball 
Bearing; 16. Textile Machinery Manufacture; 17* PAS 
Sodium; 18. Reactive Dyes; 19. Optical Bleaches;
20. Ultramarine Blue; 21. Toxaphene; 22. Dipterex;
23- Jute Manufactures; 2*-W Machine Tools; 25. Crawler 
T^ rpe Earth Moving Equipment; 26. Shock Absorbers;
27* Gear Boxes; 28. Aluminium Sheets etc; 29. Poly­
ester Fibre; 30. Polyacrylonitrile Fibre; 31. Poly­
butadiene Rubber; 32. Methanol; 33. Glycerine;
3^. Manufacture of Resistors, Capacitators, semi­
conductors and TV picture tubes, RF Transformers,
IF Transformers, Audio Transformers, Speakers,
Mobile Radio Equipment, sound equipment excluding 
Movie Equipment, and Testing and Measuring Equip­
ment; 33* Diesel Engines for use in Marine-craft, 
Tractors, Earth Moving Equipment and Light and 
Heavy Trucks and Buses; 36. Static Electrical Equip­
ment.
Located in Turkey
f  n»Ti<m »nqnc3«ajik.»w .m i w g M W * OH.*j>* *u-M>Uvi
37. Locomotives; 38. Kraft Paper Pulp; 39. Organic 
Pigment Lyes; 40* Basic and Chronic Dyes; 41. Borax 
and Boric Acid; *4 -2 . Manufacture of Machinery for 
Tea Industry; *+3. Rubber Tyred Earth Moving Equip­
ment; *44. Tungsten Carbide Tips and Tools; *4-5# Cen­
trifugal and Special Filters for Chemical Industry; 
*4-6. Locomotive Diesel Engine Project} 47. Izmir 
Oil Refinery Project; 48. Polystyrene Project;
49. Filament for Electric Lamps; 50. Manufacture 
of Resistors, Capacitators, semi-Conductors and 
TV Picture Tubes, RF Transformers, IF Transformers, 
Audio Transformers, Speakers, Mobile Radio Equipment, 
sound Equipment excluding Movie Equipment and Testing 
and Measuring Equipment; 51. Diesel Engines for use 
in Marine-craft, Tractors, Earth-Moving Equipment 
and Light and Heavy Trucks and Buses.
Eight Joint Purpose Enterprises, namely Ball 
Bearings, Jute Manufactures, and Shock Absorbers 
located in Pakistan, Aluminium located in Iran, and 
Izmir Oil Refinery located in Turkey, and the three 
projects relating to Diesel Engines required for 
use in Marine-craft, Tractors, Earth-Moving Equip­
ment and Light and Heavy Trucks and Buses project 
located in each of the three countries, were under 
various stages of implementation and should go intd 
production by the end of 1970 or shortly thereafter.
5.1 * 1. The ROD Aluminium Project:Wl> H J t * <fInl^tw WVHy11inT#wW,KW!>CT»»W»«»>*l'» MFMultTtlWH
At Arak in Iran, this project has an annual
£Vw4*-t*'V'*
production capacity of i4-5>000 metric tons^and is 
based on imported alumina* The total cost is 
estimated at 0k5*6 million* The equity of the 
project is $20*5 million, of which Pakistan is 
providing #1 million, Iran $14 million and Reynolds 
International of U.S*A. 05*5 million. The long­
term borrowings are $25*1 million which will pro­
bably be obtained from the Export-Import Bank of 
U.S.A. The annual recurring cost on the import 
of alumina, interest on foreign loan and technical 
fees is estimated at $8 million as against foreign
exchange earnings through exports to countries
o
other than Pakistan of about $10.^ million. In 
addition, Pakistan has undertaken to purchase 
10,000 tons of aluminium per annum (05*3 million) 
for five years commencing from the time the plant 
goes into commercial operation.^ The project will 
thus give a net earning of 07*7 million every year 
in foreign exchange. It is estimated that the 
project will earn a profit of 10 per cent per annum 
when it goes into operation in the beginning of next 
year, i.e. 1971*
1. President’s Secretariat, *BackgrohddflPaper on RCD’,
_  ,  « . < *  . '1 • i n il i>—'^ Hn l n~f iT rm • *r / r  I ■■ I tff  m il f n n i ' Ifcn ■ i— i i wiiiiiwr nil n "
edited by Adil, A., Government of Pakistan, October- 
November 1967, p.9.
2. The figures are quoted from Commerce and Industry’, 
An BCD Magazine, October-November *
3. Ibid.
5*1 » 2 * ROD Jute Mill
The setting up of an RCD jute mill in East 
Pakistan with the cooperation of the tripartite 
countries, that is Pakistan, Iran and Turkey, is 
another joint purpose enterprise in the field of 
industry. The RCD Jute Mills project envisages a 
capacity of 500 jute looms (kO0 for hessian and 
100 for sacking) with provision for further expan­
sion, The total capital cost is estimated at 
08*68 million. The total equity capital of the 
RCD Jute Mills Ltd., will he 0k million. Iran
and Turkey will contribute $^00,000, each to the
1
equity of the project. The balance will be 
provided by Pakistan. Iran and Turkey have agreed 
to obtain their entire requirements of jute manu­
factures from Pakistan. Their anticipated require 
ments are estimated at about 20,000 tons per annum 
The annual recurring foreign exchange cost of the 
project is estimated at $588,000 as against a 
foreign exchange earning of $5 million. The 
project is estimated to earn a profit of 25 per 
cent per annum on equity investment.
1. Pakistan News Digest, Karachi, 1st February,
5.1 * 3* The Bank Note Paper Project
The RCD Bank Note Paper project which has
gone into production in mid-January 1969 was set 
up in Karachi adjacent to the Pakistan Security 
Printing Corporation with a total annual production 
capacity of 1,440 tons of Bank Note Paper. The 
total cost of the project is estimated at $5*8
-1
million (Rs. 2.8 Crores ) with a loan component 
of $3*3 million (Rs. 1.6 Crores). Iran and Turkey 
will participate in equity of the project to the 
extent of $265*000 each and will meet their re­
quirements of Bank Note and other securily Papers
from this project.2 A loan of $1.9 million has 
been obtained from the United Kingdom for financing 
of 85 per cent of the foreign exchange component 
cost of this project. It is estimated that the 
project will earn foreign exchange worth $700,000 
through exports to Iran and Turkey*^
511 * 4 A Carbon Black Project
This is being set up in Iran as a Joint Pur­
pose Enterprise amongst Iran, Pakistan and a foreign 
collaborator. The total cost of the project is 
estimated at $4.8 million out of which^l.92 million
..i.-ft.w .P in.1.1 ■, . I . 11 ■ ■ ! ,  ( Ilfi——  t-t-rrr-fY-rllTr i - * t - «n ■■■« *  rtii n>  ...... m\,\ mu t t
1. One Crore is 10,000,000
2* RCD News. The Bulletin of Regional Cooperation
for Development, Vol.4, No.31* December 1968* 
Tehran, p.11.
3. Kayhan International, July 16th, 1969, Tehran.
would be equity investment* Pakistan has under­
taken to invest in the equity of* the project as 
well as purchase 2,500 tons of carbon black per 
annum during the first five years of the operation 
of the project* The Iranian Government is negotia­
ting with foreign Governments and firms for tech­
nical and financial collaboration in this project*
5*1 # 5* The PCD Ball Bearing Project
This project envisages an.l annual production 
of 1.12 million deep grooves ball bearings in the 
first phase and 1.46 million in the second phase.
It is proposed to finance Phase I of the project 
through an equity investment of $0.9 million,
$0.77 million through Pakistan Industrial Credit 
and Investment Corporation loan, and the balance 
through local loan. The Sponsors have signed an 
agreement for technical collaboration with Messrs.
N. S. K. of Japan. Equity participation to the 
extent of $157*000 each has been offered fco Iran 
and Tui»key. The project expects to make an annual 
profit of 10 per cent on equity investment.
Under the aegis of RCD, Joint Purpose Enter­
prises can be undertaken in various forms such 
as joint ownership either in the public and private
1. Islam, Q.V. "Financing of RCD Joint Purpose 
Enterprises", in R.C.D., Fourth Anniversary* JT““' I I' ■ ■ II I.M I I I **
Publication, July 21st, 1968, Tehran, p.4o.
sectors, ownership by one country or more for 
making supplies to the others, establishing pro­
duction facilities in one country for which raw 
material is produced in the other, and long-term 
purchase agreements based on productive facilities 
in any of the countries.
The general criteria governing the establish­
ment of Joint Purpose Enterprises are as follows
1. Products of such enterprises established in 
a^particular country should be sold to other 
member countries at internationally competitive 
prices.
2. The Joint Purpose Enterprises should take all 
the measures necessary to ensure acceptable 
quality and standard for its products.
3* In determining the projects for regional 
development priority should normally be 
accorded to the establishment of such indust­
ries which require a market larger than any 
one member country can provide to ensure 
economic production.
4. Within the broad concept and spirit of Regional 
Cooperation for Development, attempts should be 
made to try and secure over a period of time, 
a reasonable share to each member country in 
the benefits that would flow from the establish­
ment of Joint Purpose Enterprises
5*1 * 6* Petrochemical Project
Perhaps the most fertile ground for cooper­
ation on a Joint Purpose Enterprise is in the 
field of petrochemicals* Iran has prepared a 
project for the production of Carbon Black with 
the participation of the United Carbon Company of 
U.S.A* Turkey is also setting up this project 
and so will purchase some of the raw material from 
Iran. Since Iran could meet only its own require­
ments from its petrochemical complex, so it was 
suggested at the Council Meeting of the RCD Ministers 
held in Tehran in October 196? that the development 
of aeronautics should be a Joint Purpose Enterprise. 
Turkey signed to buy aeronautics from Iran if its 
own production fell short of domestic consumption.
Pakistan’s requirements for sulphur are met from 
T^ ve
Iran. annual requirement for sulphur
12,000 tonsjwkseh* increased to about 30,000 tons 
by 1970. Iran’s two petrochemical plants will 
produce 50,000 tons per annum initially to be raised 
to a million tons. Iran could supply Pakistan with 
75$000 tons of required sulphur. Iran has agreed to 
supply 25 f000 tons per annum of pure Caprolactarnto 
Pakistan and 1,000 tons per annum to Turkey for 
polymerisation into Chips and further processing 
in the latter countries.
Pakistan’s project 011 Polyester Pibre started 
at the end of 1968, and then she supplied Iran 
with 3,000 tons and Turkey with 2,000 tons per 
annum. Both Turkey and Pakistan will purchase 
their tetraethyl lead requirements from Iran.
Their requirements are estimated at 500 and 430 
tons respectively by 1970, rising to 1,000 tons 
each by 1980.
5*1 • 7* Izmir Oil Refinery
The development of the Izmir Oil Refinery 
in Turkey is under way. This was approved in the 
ROD meeting held in Ankara on January 23-24th 
1967* Iran will construct a pipeline to carry 
oil from Iranian oil fields to a Mediterranean 
port in Turkey. Turkey has proposed that the 
3*5 million tons a year refinery should be supplied 
through a pipeline from Iranian oil fields under 
the terms of a long-term contract. At the same 
time the pipeline route would be open for the trans­
port of other Iranian oil to a Mediterranean terminal 
on the Turkish coast. The project has obvious
political and strategic advantages, since it would 
offer a means of by-passing the Suez Canal and at 
the same time cement RCD economic ties.
1. The Pakistan Times, January 26th, 1967, Lahore.
5*2 Technical Cooperation and Public Administration 
Members of RCD countries need technical assist­
ance if they are to maintain the rapid rate of 
economic development. To this end they have been 
receiving technical assistance from a number., of 
foreign countries, chiefly the United States and 
Western Europe. But within their region they 
have developed high skills and experience in a 
number of fields. In these fields they are able 
to offer technical advice to other countries. It 
is therefore essential that RCD members should offer, 
and accept, technical aid to and from each other*
The Committee on Technical Cooperation and Public 
Administration has been busy in this respect. A 
comprehensive programme has been under implement­
ation since 1965* Under this programme the member 
countries have exchanged trainees and experts, 
organised seminars on subjects of common interest 
and published papers read at the seminars. The 
cost of the training facilities and experts is 
shared by the member countries. In respect of 
trainees the recipient country pays for their inter­
national passage whereas the donor country provides 
the subsistence allowance and other facilities* In 
the case of experts, the donor country bears the 
international travel cost and the recipient country 
provides subsistence allowance, internal travel, 
office and other facilities.
The RCD Programme of Technical Cooperation 
for 1967 envisages 113 training facilities for 
Iran (78 in Pakistan and 35 in Turkey), 83 facil­
ities for Pakistan (52 in Iran and 31 in Turkey), 
and 51 for Turkey (25 in Iran and 26 in Pakistan), 
also an exchange of 29 experts, organisation of 8
seminars and publication of papers read at the 
1
semxnars. 80 far seminars on such important 
subjects as problems of economic development, pro­
blems of education and social welfare, family 
planning, implementation of development programme 
in the public sector, banking, role of local govern­
ment in national development, and status of women
2have been organised.
An ad-hoc Committee on Health comprising of 
top medical experts from the three countries w§s 
set up under the provisions of the report of the 
fifth session of the Council of Ministers of RCD.
The Committee met at Islamabad on October 26-27th 
1967 and reviewed the field of health for cooperation. 
Other effective measures recommended by the Committee 
include training facilities for health personnel on 
reciprocal basis under the RCD Technical Cooperation 
Programme, intra-regional trade in drugs and
1. Papers read at the RCD Seminar, held at Tehran 
September 25th-29th 1967.
2. Papers read at the RCD Colloquium, Karachi, 
June 28t h - 3 ' 0 t h 1967, 19F8*
pharmaceuticals, family planning and the formation 
of an RCD Medical Association.
In the field of Public Administration the 
constructive part has been the organisation of the 
First Joint Course on Public Administration and 
Management at the Pakistan Administrative Staff 
College, Lahore from October 9th 1967- The 
course was attended by 10 participants from Pakistan, 
6 from Iran and 5 from Turkey* Two speakers eabh 
from Iran and Turkey came to deliver the lectures.
At the same time useful seminars have been held 
by RCD. These include one on family planning 
held in April 1966 in Karachi; one bn Islamic 
architecture, held in Tehran in June 1966*
A bibliography on Public Administration and 
Management has been prepared by the RCD Secretariat.
1. Decided at the RCD Council meeting held at 
Islamabad October 26th~27th 1967*
3*3 Communication and Transportation
Communication plays an extremely important 
role in the socio-economic life of a nation, and 
its significance is heightened in a developing 
economy. Economic development and its rapid growth 
depend upon an effective well developed transport 
and communication system. The availability of 
easy, quick and cheap means of communication have 
a direct connection with the expansion of trade 
and commerce, exchange of information, social, 
cultural contacts making a deep impact on the 
national life and its pattern. The economic 
development and social integration of the region 
would to a large extent depend upon the quality, 
adequacy and efficiency of communication.
5.3 • 1* Telecommunications
The development of telecommunication as an 
infra-structure is a must for the development of 
a country. It is a matter of satisfaction that 
there has been useful cooperation between the ROD 
countries in telecommunication so far, and a big 
field is open to the countries of the region for 
helping each other to attain rapid economic de­
velopment in this sector. The different important 
aspects of the cooperation in telecommunications 
between the regional countries are as follows:-
1. Reduction of rates of telephone calls and
telegrams between the three countries.
2. Reduction of the rates of transit of inter­
national telephone and telegraph traffic.
3. Transmission of television programmes between 
the three countries.
h. Manufacturing of different telecommunication 
equipment to make the region self-sufficient 
as far as possible and to give stability to 
telecommunication.
5. Collaboration in the field of satellite
communication.
Soon after the formation of RCD, the telephone 
and telegraph rates were reduced to bring them in 
line with the local telephone and telegraph rates 
applicable in the three regional countries. The 
telegraph charges between Pakistan and Iran were 
reduced by 51 per cent and those between Pakistan 
and Turkey by 81 per cent. Telephone trunk call 
rates between Pakistan and Turk^r were also reduced 
by 71 peiybent. As a result of this, telephone 
traffic within the three countries has risen to 
more than 30 times.
The region of Pakistan, Iran and Turkey is 
geographically situated centrally between the 
countries of Europe, Africa and Asia. Therefore 
it is ideally placed for the transmission of transit 
traffic between these countries. The CENTO micro­
wave system, the longest in the world when it was
constructed, utilizes 88 relay stations to provide 
up to 600 simultaneous telephone channels - 
from Ankara through Tehran to Karachi, a distance 
of U$2h Km.*1" Completed at the end of 196kf it 
was tested for six months and then turned over 
for Government operation in June 1965* In Iran, 
and to some extent in Turkey, the system is becom­
ing the major trunk-line for telephone and tele­
graph traffic within the country# The introduction 
of operators dialling between Ankara, Tehran and 
Karachi .started in 1966#
The telecommunications experts of the three 
countries have worked out a plan which will enable 
the introduction of semi-automatic trunk dialling 
among the three countries of the region on the 
microwave link.
3*3 * 2. Postage Rates
Postage rates on all categories of surface
letter mail, viz# letters, commercial papers, books,
newspapers, samples of merchandize and small packets,
have been reduced to the level of internal rates of 
2
each country# This means that a letter or a packet 
posted in any of the regional countries can go any­
where in the region without extra charge. This reduct­
ion has helped the free flow of printed matter like
1* CENTO, Public Relations Division, Ankara, 1967j P*36#
2. RCD 4Report on the Regional Planning Council and 
Regional Ministerial Council’, Fifth Session, 
held at Tehran, May 18th-21st, 1966, p.51*
books and newspapers and can thus provide cultural 
collaboration* The postal charge on a parcel for 
Turkey weighing 22 lbs. from Pakistan was 15*00 Rs, 
but has now been reduced to Rs.8.25* Similarly, 
a parcel for Pakistan of the same weight from Iran 
was Rs.18*36 but now has been reduced to Rs.6.25*
To mark the fifth anniversary of RCD on July 
21st 1969, the three countries, Pakistan, Iran and 
Turkey, held the exhibition of stamps, issuing 
special stamps showing Mughal (Pakistan), Safavi 
(Iran) and Ottoman (Turkey) miniature paintings.
5.3 ♦ 3- Shipping
The sea is the preferred medium of transport 
for heavy and bulky goods. For this reason, inter­
national trade and commerce largely depend upon 
ships plying the oceans. Even countries connected 
by l§nd, circumstances often favour the movement 
of goods by sea, specially when the distance over 
land are large. Iran, Turkey and West Pakistan are 
so situated that movement between them is possible 
without hindrance by land and air and by sea also. 
Unrestricted movement between East Pakistan and the 
other two countries is possible by sea.
1. Regional Cooperation for Development, Fifth 
Anniversary Publication, July 21st, 1959^“  
Tehran, p.42.
Iran — West Pakistan
Since the time of Alexander the Great, recorded 
sea communications have existed between Iran and 
Pakistan. The routes from Basra to Indo-Pakistan 
sub-continent, South East Asia and Africa, all 
passing initially along the Iranian coast, were 
established by the Arabs in and after the eighth 
century. As in the case of Alexander the Great, 
the sea route from the Persian Gulf to Pakistan 
area was opened mostly for military purposes, but 
soon sea communication had to be maintained for 
commercial purposes. The route between the Persian 
Gulf and the Indo-Pakistan sub-continent grew in 
importance with the passage of centuries after 
the Muslims established themselves as rulers here, 
and is even now quite a flourishing route even 
though, with the discovery and exploitation of 
the vast oil fields around the Persian Gulf, the 
emphasis has shifted to oil tanker traffic to Europe.
From Karachi the distance to the nearest port 
of Gwatar is 1+83 Km. and to the farthest Khorramshar 
18989 Km., the nearest Iranian ports being not 
of much interest. The main stress of Iranian 
commerce, including oil, flows from the ports at 
the head of the Gulf. They are also connected by 
rail with Tehran and other Iranian cities. A sea 
route from Iran to Pakistan should play an important 
part in facilitating and developing Pakistan-Iran 
trade•
Turkey - Pakistan
There is no long established or existing sea 
communication between Turkey and Pakistan* Before 
the closure of the Suez Canal in 1967 the distance 
from Karachi to the nearest Turkish port of 
Iskanderun was 5230 Kin., and to Istanbul 5910 Km*
The route was comparatively circuitous and now is 
even more so, having been increased by 70 per cent 
through the closure of the Canal. Even so, the 
cost of transport by sea would be cheaper than 
across land by the rail and road routes yet to be 
established across Iran. The best route apparently 
is between Pakistan and the Black Sea ports of 
Eastern Europe and Russia, on which the Turkish 
ports lie directly. Another alternative would be 
to use the Pakistan - U.S.A. or Pakistan - Continent 
route by malting a slight diversion to the southern 
Turkish ports of Iskanderun, Mersin or even Izmir. 
West-bound ships to the U.S.A. also usually go full 
and they can benefit from any cargo available 
between Pakistan and Turkey.
Iran - Turkey
The two countries of Iran and Turkey share a 
common frontier and the distance over land between 
their centres of production and consumption is. 
perhaps less than 1609 Km. Road communications 
already exist and are being developed, and railway
communications are being provided* On the other 
hand, the sea route round the Arabian Peninsular 
and Africa is extremely long and circuitous, the 
distance between Khorramshahr and Istanbul being 
6691 Km.
There is thus a great future for establishing 
firm shipping links between Iran and Pakistan and 
Turkey.
The RCD Shipping Services has been established 
since June 1966 at Istanbul. The Service was in­
augurated when M/V Padma sailed from East Pakistan
with U000 bales of jute manufactures to the port
1of Istanbul in Turkey. The second anniversary 
of the signing of RCD Istanbul Pact came shortly 
after the commencement of the service and this 
occasion was marked by the sailing of a Turkish 
vessel M/V Kirsehir with general cargoes for 
Karachi. During a period of one year from May 1966 
to May 1967* the RCD Shipping Services provided 11 
sailings from Turkey to Pakistan and 11 from Pakistan 
to Turkey, 12 sailings between Pakistan and Iran
o
and other Persian Gulf ports and Red Sea ports. The 
frequency thus achieved was one sailing every five 
weeks in each direction between Turkey and Pakistan, 
and a sailing a month between Pakistan and Iran, 
Persian Gulf Ports and Red Sea Ports.
Pawn, July 21st, 1966, Karachi.
2. Pakistan and RCD, Three Years of RegipJ^ al^ JjO-
° £ g £ a . Developnient, lWff-l‘9<37, Government
of Pakistan, p.i-i-6.
As a result of the closure of the Suez Canal 
in June 1967? the Intra-Regional services were 
badly disrupted and direct sailings between Turkey 
and Pakistan were curtailed depending on the avail­
ability of economic load of cargo# However, the 
trade continued to be served through transshipment 
at the German port of Bremen.When a direct railway 
was not possible, the shipping services have offered 
reductions of 30 per cent in the normal freight 
rates from U.K./Continent to the port of Trabzon 
with reduced port charges to make this transportation 
arrangement economically viable'and to avoid the 
long, circuitous route via the Cape.
The main service of the RCD from United States 
Gulf and the United States Atlantic Ports to Turkey 
and Pakistan commenced in August/September 1966.
Since the time of starting the services 201,123 tons 
of cargo have been carried from the U.S.A. to Turkey,
and 501,582 tons from the U.S.A. to Pakistan in 
1
RCD vessels. A frequency of two sailings a month 
to Pakistan and two sailings a month to Turkey has 
been provided. Services also provided to the Persian 
Gulf and the Red Sea Ports by the National Shipping 
Corporation which is a member of the RCD Shipping
ioe.fc
Services. During one year, 12 sailings, provided inA
East and West direction, serving the ports of Muscat, 
Doha, Kuwait, Khorramshahr and Basra.
1. The Pakistan Times, June 2nd, 1967? Lahore.
The cargo covered by the RCD Shipping Services 
is carried hy the respective Flag carriers in the
l
designated trades in the following proportions:- 
RCD Trade Total per­
centage of 
Traffic of 
Joint Ser­
vices
a) Turkish trade
b) Iranian trade
c) Pakistan trade
35
15
50
Percentage of trade to 
be carried by - 
Turkish Iranian Pakistan 
Flag Flag Flag 
Carriers Carriers Carriers
80
5
12*5
2
80
b.5
18
15
83
25*3 * h* Air Transportation
As in the case of shipping, air transportation 
also offers a field of cooperation with the ultimate 
aim of forming a regional air line capable of offer­
ing full regional network and of competing with the 
mador airlines of the world.
The RCD air service came into operation by the 
first RCD flight by PIA on November hth 1966, linking 
Karachi with Tehran and Istanbul. The flight goes 
on to Bondon via Beirut and Geneva. Iran Air inaug­
urated its jet service between Tehran and Istanbul* 
going to points beyond Europe, early in September 
1967* PIA has also established a route to Europe 
via Istanbul. During the summer months, a seasonal 
line operates from Tabriz in Iran to Diarbekir in
^ I I Ml ■ ■■ w m'irn.... ..n* .1 _ - ■ . , - nri~~ |i Biniii wt I i 1 ■ 1. -inn r■ n n 1 r 1 r .  - ir*-im rrr.ni r - r tr rnrr—
1* President’s Secretariat, *Background Paper on RCD’ 
Edited by Adil, A., Government of Pakistan, 
October-November 1967, p.27*
2. See Fig.]& - Airways and Microwave Dinks.
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Eastern Turkey. The lines between Tehran and 
Karachi have been established for several years, 
with PIA and Iran Air having several regular 
flights between Karachi and Tehran.
As part of the RCD air transportation policies 
to appoint each other general sales agent‘in their 
respective countries, PIA is now General Sales 
Agent for Iran Air in Pakistan, Iran Air is General 
Sales Agent for PIA in Turkey. Iran Air is now 
appointed as PIA’s General Sales Agent in Iran,
PIA as THY’s General Sales Agent in Pakistan and 
THY as Iran Air’s General Sales Agent in Turkey.
The RCD Committee on Air Transportation which 
met in Tehran on December 2nd, 1966, accepted the 
proposal of Iran Air for naming Pakistan International 
Airlines and Iran Air services linking Karachi,
Tehran and Istanbul as RCD Air Services.
An agreement in principle has been reached among 
the RCD partners that an international aviation con­
sultant be appointed to examine the feasibility of
establishment of a joint airline to operate jumbo-jets
1and supersonic aircraft. It is proposed that the 
three national airlines remain independent and that 
the new company concentrate solely on operating the 
larger aircraft likely to become the basis of inter­
national travel in the next five years.
1. Quarterly Economic Review, Iran? No.l, 1969, 
Economist Intelligence Unit, p.llw
,^5*. 1* Roads
Turkey, which a decade ago had a modest 
system of roads, embarked upon the development 
of roadsyfend has spent several hundred million 
dollars on road construction during the last 10-15 
years. The total network of roads in Turkey is 
57,499 Km. long.
In Iran the modern network of roads and high­
ways was started by His late Majesty Reza the Great. 
Several major highway projects were drawn up in 1926. 
Within nine years and at the cost of 450 million 
rials, some 17*000 Km. of highways and secondary 
roads were built throughout the country, despite the 
primitive road construction equipment available in 
those days. Parallel with this, a Trans-Iranian 
Railroad was built connecting two major ports in 
the Persian Gulf and the Caspian Sea to the capital. 
These works continued until the outbreak of the war 
in Iran in 1941. Further development work was dis­
rupted because of the war. The present road network 
of the country totals 27,000 Km. of which 12,000 Km. 
are highways. Of the total highways, 5,700 Km. are 
asphalted. At the moment, many major highways and 
secondary roads are under construction or in the 
planning stages as part of the national development 
plans.
In Pakistan also, during the Third Five Year 
Plan - 1960-6 5, the Government allocated an amount 
of Rs.9000 million for the development of roads in 
West Pakistan which system would link Iran.
The aim of the three countries is to establish
road links joining Istanbul in the West to Karachi
in the Bast, The length of the sub-standard and
missing portions is about Km. between Pakistan
and Iran, a little over 72-k Km. in Iran and about
1
322 Km. in Turkey. The ROD Highway linking Iran,
Pakistan and Turkey was expected to be completed by
the end of 1969, but still work is going on on some 
2
highways. Turkey has paved and completed the 120 
KM. stretch between Ankara and Gerikli, the 225 Km. 
stretch between Samsun and Giresum, the 325 Km. 
road between Askale and Trabzon. The 137 Km* between 
Askale and Horas&n and the Iran border are third 
class paved roads. The Turkish Government has also 
undertaken work on a direct road via Sivas.
In Iran, several stretches between Takistan 
and the Turkish border at Bazargan have been paved 
and completed. A two-lane highway already connects 
Takistan to Qazwim, Tehran, Qum and Isfahan. Both 
the Takistan-Bazargan and Kerman stretches were 
completed in 1968.
In Pakistan, a surface treated road exists 
between Quetta and Kalat. Work is under way on the 
road from Khuzdar to Uthal. Prom Uthal to Karachi
1. Turkey : Pirst Pive -jeag_.P.e7 PI an, Table
No.29U, p.S W r Ankara7“ ” ‘
2. See Pig. 13 - ROD Highway and Port Project.
3* See Pig.13 - RGB Highway and Port Project.
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a paved road already exists, Tlie ROD Highway will 
be about 6,3Qk KM. long and will consist of 3,77^ 4- 
Km. in Iran, 1,317 Km. in Pakistan and 1,21^ Km. 
in Turkey. The three countries have agreed in 
principal to adopt a uniform system of road signs 
and agreed for the international system used on 
the Continent of Europe, but the final decision 
has been deferred until UNESCO holds an international 
meeting on this question early in 1971*
The 605 Km. of the RCD super highway 1inkling 
Karachi with Qila Sufaid on the Pakistan-Iran border 
have been completed. A total distance of 596 Km. 
of the 1,288 Km. Karachi-Kalat-Quetta-Zahidan RCD 
Highway, linking Pakistan with Iran, had so far 
been 'black-topped at a cost of Rs.6 Crore9, Mr. 
Manzoor Ahmed Sheikh, Chief Engineer, Western Region, 
told "The Pakistan Times".2
He said the remaining portion of the Highway 
would be black-topped by the end of 1970 at a cost 
of Rs.8 Crore. He also said this was the only over­
land route linking Pakistan with the RCD, Middle 
Eastern and the European countries. Due to the 
growing socio-economic relations with the RCD and the 
Middle East countries, the West Pakistan Government 
was giving top priority to the completion of this
1. Regional Cooperation for Development, Anniversary 
Publication, July 21st, 1965, p.75, TehranT
2. The Paki.stan Times, July 19th, 1968, Lahore.
large project to meet the ever-increasing flow of 
trade and tourist traffic.
The construction has been divided into three
' 1sections at Karachi, Khuzdar and Quetta. Rs.^O Lakh 
on the Karachi-Khuzdar section, and Rs.30 Lakh each 
on the Khuzdar-Kalat and Dalbandin-Zahidan sections. 
The terrain through which the Highway passed was 
mountainous, with scarcity of water and labour.
This highway would reduce the distance between 
Quetta and Karachi by 160 Km. Zahidan was also 
being linked with Lahore by a metalled road via 
Quetta, LoralAi and Dera Ghazi Khan - 186 Km. long 
portion of this road survey has been completed.
The Western Provincial Government has sanctioned 
Rs.7° Lakh for the construction of another 97 Km. 
of the road in this sector* On completion of this 
road, the distance between Quetta and Lahore would 
be reduced by 2hl Km. This project would cost 
Rs.1.87 Erore and would also be completed by the 
end of 1970.
The highway systems of the three countries 
would be linked, roughly near the northern and south­
ern ends of the borders, making possible all-season 
passenger and freight traffic from West Pakistan and 
Iran to the Turkish ports on the Mediterranean and 
Black Sea, and through Istanbul to the European road 
systems. Completion is anticipated earlier on the 
shorter, mountainous roads between Turkey and Iran
1. One Lakh is 100,000
than on the much longer sections crossing the Iran-
Pakistan deserts,
2. Railways1
As regards the rail link, the working group
on Roads and Railways, at its first meeting held at
Tehran from August 29th, 1967, observed that the
most suitable connection between Iran, Pakistan and
Turkey was to link Mus in Turkey with Sharafkhaneh
2
in Iran, and Kasham with Zahidan in Iran, to provide 
a continuous link between Ankara and Quetta (Pakistan), 
thus linking the Turkish and Pakistani Railway;; System* 
The construction of the Turkish-Iranian link was 
completed in 1969. The stretch between Mus and Tatvan 
was opened in 1961}. in Turkey and the remaining stretch 
between Tattfan and the Iranian border, with a length 
of 200 Km. is nearing completion. Part of this 
stretch passes Lake Van, which requires the construct­
ion of a ferry system using two ferry harbours and 
two wagon ferries and a railroad between Van and 
the Iranian border.
The Western section of the Iranian railway, 
linking with Turkey, is shorter (11+0 Km.) passing 
through mountainous terrain. The Qotour valley 
alone, for instance, requires a bridge klO metres 
long, and 110 metres high. A total of 6 tunnels is 
to be constructed on this line, with lengths ranging 
between 85 m. to 1+00 m.
1. See Pig. - RCD Railway Project.
2. Dawn, July 22nd, 1968, Karachi.
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On the Iran - Pakistan side, the length of 
the link from Zahidan Kashan is 1236 Km#, comprising 
three sections, namely (i) Zahidan » Ban - Kerman;
(ii) Kerman - Yazd; and (iii) Yazd - Kashan, t&his 
was completed in 1969#
On the Pakistan side, a railway link takes off 
the Sihi - Quetta main line of the Pakistan Western 
Railway at Spezand and goes up to Zahidan to Iran#
Its total length from Spezand to Zahidan is 709 Km#, 
out of which 616 Km. are located in Pakistan and 
93 Km. in Iran# The capacity of this line is 8 
trains each way daily. The present traffic consists 
of one mixed passenger-cum-goods train and one goods 
train per week in each direction.
The CENTO projects were approved to provide 
links between the railway systems of the three 
regional countries. One traverses the 27h Km# of 
rugged mountainous terrain between Turkey’s eastern­
most rail terminus and the nearest railhead in north­
western Iran. The other spans sane 805 Km. of bleak 
desert between Kashan in Central Iran and Zahidan 
the border town which is where Pakistan’s western­
most rail link ends# The Turkey - Iran link was 
completed at the end of 1969*
The United States extended long-term loans of 
£»10#5 million and 07 •Sh million to Turkey and Iran 
respectively for the completion of the railway link, 
between the two countries; the new loans should permit
1# U.S.I.S., Tapestry of Progress, “Linking the 
CENTO Regions1*, 1967• —
the construction of the 200 Km. stretch between 
Kara Tepe in Iran and the Turkish town of Van.1
» \*)l7, - '
5*h Cultural Cooperation
The RCD Regional Cultural Institute has 
been set up at Tehran from June 1966. The branches 
of the Institute have been established at Istanbul, 
Lahore and Dacca. The RCD Regional Cultural Institute 
has drawn up comprehensive publications programme 
which included a book on history, culture and civil­
isation of Iran, Pakistan and Turkey; a book on 
social customs and practice in Iran, Pakistan and 
Turkey; translations of Allama Iqbal’s works in 
Turkish and Persian; publication of selected poems 
of Qazi Nuzrul Islam into Persian and Turkish; 
publication of monograph on Mehmet Akif in English, 
Persian, Urdu and Bengali; translation into Persian, 
Urdu and Bengali of the Autobiography of Ataturk 
and Shahinshah Aryamehr Reza Shah. Research by 
the RCD Regional Cultural Institute is being carried 
out &n translation of Persian, Urdu and Bengali and 
Turkish words into latin character, and documentation 
of manuscripts and research on the development of 
Muslim miniature art in Iran, Pakistan and Turkey.
A Quarterly Journal is being published by the 
Institute covering wide range of subjects in the 
field of history, literature and art, mainly relating 
to the region.
CHAPTER 6 
ALLIANCES AND REGIONALISM
W: i«a"icia»un i«« » %»WWI
6.1 The Background to these Alliances
Much of the Western effort to defend the 
Middle East has gone into the building of alliances 
and treats^  systems. To obtain the necessary 
cooperation from the Middle Eastern governments, 
it seemed logical to seek commitments from them 
to help in defence of the region in times of 
crisis, or at least provide needed facilities so 
that the Western powers could defend it. Turkey, 
an ally of Britain and France since 1939 > though 
it remained neutral until almost the very end of 
the Second World War, made its choice after the
in
war^ favour of formal alignment with the West through 
NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organisation) and was 
ready to participate in a treaty organisation for 
the Middle East. Iran at first maintained its 
historic policy of balance between Britain and 
Russia, wishing to provoke neither by too close 
ties with the other, but after the fall of Mosaddaq. 
in 1953 the Bhah was forced to consider alignment 
with the West. In the Arab countries two treaty 
systems were in existence at the close of the war, 
one of British origin and the other the Arab League.
The British Government had already seen during 
World War II that it would have to make more of a 
compromise r^ith Arab nationalism in order to make 
the system work, and had given its consent to the
League of Arab States, established in 19^ 45* But
basically the League was the result of Arab self-
assertion, not of British diplomacy. In 1950 its
members concluded an Arab Collective Security Pact
pledging military action in case of an attack on
1
any one of them.
The entrance of the United States on to the 
scene raised new questions. 1 Would it become a 
partner in the British system, or try to replace 
it, or would it attempt to work out seme new 
relationship with the local Governments? In the 
Middle East the American approach was guided by 
three concepts : the strategy of air power with 
its requirements for bases near the Soviet Union, 
the principle of collective security, and the desire 
for friendly relations with all concerned.
The first concept was largely responsible 
for the special relationships which the United 
States developed with Saudi Arabia and with Libya 
providing for use- of Dhahran and Wheelus respect­
ively with economic benefits to the local countries. 
We have seen the efforts of the United States and 
the United Kingdom to build a military alliance 
system linking Turkey and the Arab States with the 
West, and also a successful attempt to create an 
alliance of states on the "northern tier" of the
1 • Hurewitz (J.C.), Diplomacy in the Near and 
Middle JSast, A Documentary Record, V*2, ’ 
pp 7210-21197 311-31U.
Middle East, and the result the Baghdad Pact, 
joined by Britain but not by the United States*
And we have seen how Iraq’s defection to the West 
nearly broke up the Arab League through the 
refusal of others to follow Iraq’s example and 
the attempts of Abdul Nasser to build his own 
alliance system through bilateral treaties with 
Syria, Saudi Arabia and Yemen. The Arab States 
fell into a number of different and conflicting 
alignments, although all proclaimed loyalty to 
the Arab League and its Collective Security Pact 
of 1950.
The decision of Pakistan to join the Baghdad 
Pact was motivated by its desire to maintain peace 
and stability in the Middle East. It is an area 
which is contiguous to West Pakistan and has been 
in the grip of the same ferment that seized South- 
East Asia. Pakistan has manifold interests in 
the Middle East. It is a natural area for the 
development of her trade, though until recently 
it has accounted for only 10 per cent of Pakistan’s 
exports and 15 per cent of her imports. But lately 
the prospects of jute exports have brightened, for 
Pakistan is helping Egypt, Iraq and Lebanon to set 
up jute mills. The Pakistan Industrial Corporation 
is investing capital in them. Pakistan’s intrinsic 
Interest in the Middle East also stems from the 
fact that it was the cradle of Islamic culture and
civilisation. The majority of the people of 
Pakistan are Muslims and as such they have strong 
religious, ethnic and cultural ties with the 
people of the Middle East (see Chapter .if). Its 
occupation by any hostile power could not only 
harm Pakistan economically, but militarily also 
it can endanger her freedom and security.
6.2 The Strategic Importance of the Middle East 
Because of its great strategic importance, 
the Middle East has always been coveted by the 
Great Powers* Britain’s first and paramount 
interest in the area was, and is, to obtain oil 
under fair commercial conditions from the States 
which produce it, and then to bring it to Europe 
by the cheapest and safest route. The second 
interest is to keep open trade and other communic­
ations to the lands east of Suez. Her third 
interest is. that the Middle East land bridge to 
Africa should not fall under the influence or 
possession of any power hostile to her. It is a 
land-bridge that provides sea and air communications 
between three continents of the world, namely 
Europe, Asia and Africa. The geographical factor 
in Middle Eastern history has great significance, 
since no other region is so strategically located 
in the Middle land, where three continents meet 
and merge, along the middle sea, the Mediterranean, 
which connects or separates three oceans. The 
geographical and geostrategic heritage of the Middle 
East has been shared by every nation of that area, 
from the early epoch when the Trojan War was 
fought for control of the Dardanelles and the 
first "Suez Canal" was built by the Pharoahs, down 
to our century. The Middle East contains nearly
rtwo thirds of the world’s oil reserves. It is not 
surprising, therefore, that since the beginning 
of World War II the Middle East should have figured 
highly in the Great Powers’ strategy. Great Britain 
always feared that the conquest of this region by 
the Soviet Union, which is contiguous to it, would 
endanger the West's southern flank and also cut 
off her communication lines with the Par East.
America’s interest in this part of the world, 
though in time they may become more involved with 
oil, are mainly of a politico-strategic character, 
and stem largely from the Gold War. The Middle 
East to America is a 'large piece of real estate’ 
whose passage into the Soviet orbit would materially
i
upset the American defence position and effort. ’
Such a passage might in the view of America’s 
leaders occur either through direct military action, 
or subversion developing out of the social and 
political instability of the area, and its Govern­
ment. Direct Soviet entry into the area is to be 
met by force. This was the purpose of the section 
of the Eisenhower Doctrine of 1957? and which said 
that the sovereignty and independence of each and 
every nation of the Middle East is against the pre­
datory desires of ’‘international Communism”.^
1. Royal Institute of International Affairs, “British 
Interests 'in the Mediter r"ane arTand Middle East”, 
Oxford University Press, London, 1958, p.J+O.
2. Marlowe (John), Arab Nationalism and British 
Imperialism : A studyTLn*Power 'Polltics,
London, 19^ 1, p. 11+7 •
Soviet Russian aims and interests are almost 
completely the reverse and are chiefly concerned 
to stimulate any development that promises to mar 
Western interests generally. Russia is keen to 
counter American action if not to exclude America 
altogether from the Middle East. If America visual­
ises her policy as being to ring the Soviet Union 
with 'defensive’ alliances and bases, Russia’s 
leaders are naturally cynical about the degree of 
offensiveness that a defensive alliance may cover, 
and see it as their policy to encourage the dis­
integration of such alliances. If the American 
desire for 'defensive’ alliances leads her to do 
her best to promote stability in the ax*ea, then it 
may be Russia’s interest to encourage instability.
Behind this lies the more general question of 
Soviet expansionism, on which it is impossible to 
give any very conclusive answer. It is always 
possible that the absence of stable, secure regimes 
in neighbouring countries may at some time tempt 
one or other into a foreign adventure. However 
World War II proved a set-back to the Russian 
aspirations in the Middle East. Russia did occupy 
Persia in cooperation with Britain during the course 
of the war. When the war was over, Russia not only 
continued occupation of Persia but also created in 
its North a puppet Communist Government, but she 
withdrew when Britain and the United Nations protested 
vigourously. After that, for some years, she did
not take any active interest in the Middle East#
There were many reasons for this. The Soviet Union,
which emerged from the war badly mauled, was afraid
to tempt American intervention. Britain and France
were so devastated by the war that they could
hardly contain the Soviet penetration in the Middle 
1East. The Soviet Union, therefore, preferred 
to keep away the United States even at the cost 
of tolerating the British. Furthermore, the 
Soviet Union was busy consolidating her gains in 
Eastern Europe and could not possibly embark upon 
new ventures in Asia.
1. Lenesowskii (George), Russia and the West in Iran, 
1918-1948. (A Study in'Big Rivalry)7 Cornell^”" 
University Press, Ithaca, N.Y., 1949*
6.3 The Strategic Location of Iran.
Protection of India was the main objective 
of the British policy in the area. Napoleon had 
demonstrated the Ivulnerability of the route to 
India and measures were taken to keep the route 
through Iran out of his grasp. The Treaty of 
Tehran in 1814 provided for British subsidy and 
military help to Iran in case of aggression and in 
return Iran promised to resist the passage of any 
foreign troops towards India. In 1856 Iran attacked 
Britain’s ally Afghanistan in order to seize the 
strategic fortress of Herat. The British declared 
war on Iran. Peace was concluded in 1857 in Paris. 
Iran renounced Herat, and thus indirectly, Russia 
was deprived of an opportunity to infiltrate this
i
buffer territory of India.
In the book 'Russia and the West in Iran’, the 
writer indicates the strategic importance of the 
Middle East including Iran with reference to India 
in the eyes of revolutionary Russia. “India is 
our principal objective. Persia is -the only path 
open to India. The Persian revolution is the key 
to the revolution of all the Orient, just as Egypt 
and the Suez Canal are the key to the British domin­
ation of the Orient. Persia is the Suez Canal of 
the revolution. If we shift the political centre of
1. Lenezowskk (George), Russia and the West in Iran, 
1918-1948, (A Study
Cornell University Press, Ithaca, N.Y., 1949* P.k
gravity of the revolutionary movement to Persia,
the Suez Canal loses its strategic Value and
importance. This precious key to the uprising of
the Orient must be in the hands of Bolshevism,
cost what it may ... Persia must be ours, Persia
must belong to the revolution.’1
Iran was never treated an an area of direct
colonial expansion but simply as a buffer state
1between India and Russia. Petrovsky, a Soviet 
Ambassador in Tehran, once gave the following 
description of Russo-Iranian Relations. “What 
counts in Persia is North Persia only and the latter 
is fully dependent on Russia. All North Persian 
products that must be exported can find their ohly 
market in Russia. If we Russians stop buying them, 
Persia is bankrupt in one month. This is Russia’s
o
strength which has no equivalent on the British side.” 
Petrovsky’s statement was not inaccurate and Russia 
more than once made use of this economic weapon in 
her dealings with Iran. If Turkey was the pivot 
of what is commonly called the Eastern Question,
Persia no less than Afghanistan may properly be 
regarded as a focal point of the Central Asian Question.
1. Greaves (Rose £§) Persia and the Defence of 
India, 1884-1892, The Athlone Press, University 
of London, 1959, P*2#
2. Campbell (John C.), Defense of the Middle East, 
Harper and Brothers ,^YT;T5557TnSin^,— “ "
The Russians and the British emerged as the principal 
opponents in what came to be named by one of its 
participants “the Great Game in Central Asia“.
The game lasted for more than a century and was 
played upon a field which extended north over the 
plateau of the Pamirs and east into Chinese Turkes­
tan* it s^ept westward through the deserts and 
steppes of the Muslim Khanates of Central Asia; 
it moved south over Afghanistan’s Hindu Kush 
mountains, and it found its westward limits in 
the Iranian plateau.
1. Kaye (j. W.) in his History of the War in 
Afghanistan seems first to have popularised 
the expression “Great Game in Central Asia” 
when he used it in his second Chapter in 
Volume II.
6Ji Northern Tier Alignment between Pakistan and Turkey 
The cornerstone of any northern tier align­
ment could only he Turkey, the strongest state in 
the Middle East, Already a member of NATO, Turkey 
had committed its armed forces wholly to the NATO 
Command. Together with Greece, with which it had 
signed a treaty of friendship in February 1958, it 
provided indispensable territory and manpower for 
the defence of the eastern Mediterranean area.
Turkey happened to be also the only firm base from 
which the Western Alliance system and Western 
powers could be extended to the Middle East.
As early as August 1952, Washington had been 
eyeing Pakistan as another potential position of 
strength, an eastern cornerstone for a Middle East 
defence system. Pakistan might conceivably play 
the military role that British India had played 
before partition, providing manpower and supplies 
for the defence of the Middle East. Pakistani 
reasons were eminently practical. They wished to 
strengthen their country's international position, 
particularly against India. Concern over Soviet 
agression, either directly against Pakistan, or in 
the Middle Bast, was hardly a major factor in their 
decision.'*'
1. Chaudhuri (Ahsan M.), ’’Pakistan and the United 
States”, Pakistan Horizon, Volume 9 (December 
1956), pp.200-20?.
On April 2nd 195U, Turkey and Pakistan signed
a Treaty of Friendship and Mutual Cooperation for 
1Security* It was no military alliance, providing
only that the parties would study the means and
extent of their cooperation for collective defence
to meet an attack from outside* It was actually
intended as a constructive step toward “better
ensuring the security of the whole Middle East,
and specifically open to accession by other States*
The logical land-bridge, Iran, now rid of the
Anti Western Mosaddqq regime, and working its
way slowly towards political stability and a
settlement of the controversy with the West on oil,
was not yet ready to consider adherence* Iraq
seemed a more likely candidate* For Iraq, however,
the decision to ally with Turkey and thus indirectly
with the West was one of great moment to take, for
it raised the whole question of relations with other
Arab states and the possible breaking of the "solid-
arity" of the Arab League. The Turkish-Iraqi pact,
signed at Baghdad on February 2i+th, 1955, pledged
the two nations to cooperation "for their security
2
and their defence".
1. Text of Agreement in Documents on American 
Foreign Relations, 195^ , cited, pp.376-378*
2. Text in Middle East Journal, Volume 9, (Spring 
1955), pp.177-178.
Counterbalancing these setbacks in the Arab 
World had been the success in completing the 
alliance across the northern tier. Pakistan 
acceeded to the Baghdad Pact in September 1955, 
and Iran joined in October. Turkey was already 
a member of NATO, and Pakistan by allying herself 
with Turkey became an indirect associate of NATO. 
East Pakistan is a vital link between South East 
Asia and the Indian sub-continent. It stands in 
relation to Communist China much the same as does 
West Pakistan to Soviet Russia. In view of this, 
the Turco-Pakistan alliance was an invaluable 
contribution to the build up of a defensive bulwark 
against Communism. By 1956 the American - Pakistan 
Turkish arrangements formed part of the 'northern 
tier plan’ and a five nation security organisation 
covering the previously open gap between NATO and 
SEATO.
But Pakistan’s alliances with Turkey and the 
United States, respectively, were opposed by Egypt, 
India and the Soviet Union. But in Pakistan the 
MEDO (Middle East Defence Organisation) was favour­
able. The Pakistan newspapers quoted - "Pakistan 
is both a Middle Eastern, as well as an Asian 
country; One half of Pakistan is contiguous to the 
Muslim Middle East, and the other and more populous 
half is firmly planted in the very heart of South- 
East Asia". Egypt considered this pact as an idea
to split the Arah World* Soviet Union also opposed 
the idea and stated that she could not regard with 
indifference the reports about Pakistan's particip­
ation in a United States plan to set up a military
1aggressive bloc in the Middle Bast. The Government
of Pakistan replied that her primary concern was the
security of the country and was not intending to take
any step hostile to the U.S.S.R. In March 1953#
Moscow sent a warning to Turkey as well that her
treaty with Pakistan had a "direct relationship to
Soviet security", and therefore she must take upon
herself the responsibility for the consequences of
2such a situation.
Regarding Iran, she had pursued a neutral policy 
for over a century and a half, and being the next door 
neighbour of Russia, was afraid of antagonising this 
powerful neighbour. Why did Iran set aside her trad­
itional neutrality? It was because the Shah came to 
reali&e that in the present world no weak state could 
afford to remain neutral without jeopardising its national 
interests. He felt under the new strain of international 
politics that like other members of the United Nations 
the country was entitled to join any regional pact 
that guaranteed her security. Adherence to the Baghdad 
Pact was welcomed by its proponents because it closed 
up 'northern tier' defence.
1. Chronology of International Events and Documents, 
November' 19th, 19539 P-770.
2. The New York Times, March 2bth, 195U.
6.5 The Formation of CENTO Pact
As at this stage Russian influence had begun 
to penetrate into the Middle East, the fear grew 
that the Soviet ground, air and naval forces which 
were stationed in areas adjacent to the Baghdad 
Pact Countries, could march into the Middle East 
at any time. There were various factors which 
combined to strengthen this impression. The creation 
of the Baghdad Pact had highlighted some old dynast­
ic feuds and rivalries in the Middle East. These 
rivalries stemmed directly from Cairo's constant 
efforts to gain ascendancy in the Arab Yforld. During 
the Conference in January 1955 held in Egypt, it was 
announced that the Arab countries would not join the 
Turco-Iraqi Pact or any other military or political 
pact without the approval of the Arab League (22nd 
March 19U5)- Besides the Conference paved the way 
for the Arab defence pacts between Egypt, Syria and 
Saudi Arabia as a counter move to the Baghdad Pact.
But this cooperation could not be very effect­
ive, since none of these countries was strong enough 
either economically or militarily to resist agression. 
Egypt wanted to become militarily strong because the 
State of Israel held a constant threat to its security. 
The United States was willing to give military aid to 
Egypt but on condition that Egypt either sigied a 
mutual security pact, giving the United States the 
right to supervise the use of military aid supplied 
by her, or paid the price of arms and ammunition in
dollars. Egypt refused to accept these terms. But 
soon afterwards entered into an agreement with the 
Soviet Union, bartering cotton and rice for Soviet 
jets, tanks, submarines and other war equipment.
This commercial agreement provided a much-south after 
opening for Russia.
The arms deal provoked an international chain 
reaction. A few months after the Soviet-Egypt agree­
ment, the Unitdd States and Britain refused to finance 
the Aswan Dam. President Nasser reacted sharply by 
nationalising the Suez Canal Company and declaring 
that its revenues would help build the Aswan Dam.
The nationalisation of the Suez Canal touched off a 
new world crisis; it paralleled in many respects Dr. 
Mossadaq’s nationalisation of British owned *Anglo- 
Iranian Oil Company’.
The British, French and Israeli action against 
Egypt aroused the indignation of Muslim members of 
the Baghdad Pact. They called a meeting in Tehran ' 
and condemned Israeli aggression. So strong was the 
pressure brought to bear on Britain by the Muslim 
members of the Baghdad Pact that it contributed in 
no insignificant measure to the cessation of hostil­
ities in Egypt. These developments saved the Baghdad 
Pact itself from breaking up. Iraq had stated earlier 
that It would boycot any Baghdad Pact Council meeting 
attended by the United Kingdom. Under constant pressure 
from other members of the Arab League, Iraq had also 
announced that she stood together with the other Arab
countries against the danger to their ’'freedom and 
dignity”.
The usefulness of the Pact for Pakistan and 
other members is very evident from the fact that 
it has been singled out by the Communists and 
neutralists as their special target. To Pakistan 
it gave an unmistakable assurance that she had 
allies on whom she could count in the event of 
aggression from outside. Addressing the Pakistan 
National Assembly on February 23rd, 1957? Prime 
Minister Suhrawady had stated: ”We were spending 
far too great a percentage than our national 
economy demands on our Armed forces purely for 
defensive reasons. We found it, therefore, necess­
ary to look out for friends and it was fortunate 
that countries that professed the same attitude 
and believed in the same form of democratic Govern­
ment came to our assistance. We found it necessary 
to request the United States for military assistance, 
and an agreement was drawn up. The aid we have 
thus received has enabled us to be strong enough 
to meet aggression from any quarter. It has there­
fore been necessary for us to join the Central 
Treaty Organisation. This is a Pact of purely defen­
sive nature. It does not permit any country which 
may have committed aggression would be helped by
"i
any of the members of the Pact #”
Dawn, Karachi, February 23rd, 1957*
6.6 Pakistan and SEATO
Since Fakistan had rejected the policy of 
neutrality, it was, therefore, natural that she 
should join hands with the West in maintaining 
peace and security. Five months after the signing 
of the Mutual Assistance Agreement with the.United 
States for economic and military aid, Pakistan 
became a signatory to the South-East Asia Treaty 
Organisation in 195U. In doing so, Pakistan’s main 
objective was to deter countries which might have 
aggressive designs against her, and to ensure peace 
and stability in South-East Asia. It is a region 
in which, as has already been pointed out, Pakistan 
has vital interests. East Pakistan’s coast line, 
opening on the waters that separate the Pacific 
from the Indian Ocean,lies close to Burma, Malaya, 
Thailand and Indo-China. These countries are 
Pakistan’s first line of defence against an attack 
from the East. In the last World War, it was only 
after the Japanese had acquired control of Thailand 
and Indo-China that their conquest of Burma became 
possible and they made Burma the base for land 
attack on the Indo-Pakistan sub-continent.
Pakistan has great strategic, political and 
economic interests involved in this region. Her 
geography makes her an integral part of South-East 
Asia. East Pakistan has a 1200 mile long frontier 
with India, and borders on Burma. Beyond Burma to 
the north-east is the Chinese mainland. To the
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east and south of Burma lie Thailand, Indo-China 
and Malaya. The Indo-Chinese frontier is about 
500 miles from East Pakistan and Thailand is even 
less than that. Pakistan, therefore, has always 
been vitally interested in the peace, security and 
economic development of South-East Asia. Apy 
disturbance in the region is likely to worry 
Pakistan because of the vulnerability of its 
eastern zone, access to which from West Pakistan 
can be easily intercepted by a hostile power block­
ing the Bay of Bengal.
In the economic field the countries of South- 
East Asia are large producers of food and raw 
materials for export. Burma occupies, a place of 
some importance in Pakistan’s foreign trade. > It 
exports rice to East Pakistan and timber to both 
East and West Pakistan. On Pakistan’s import sched­
ule copra and coconut oil from Indonesia and the 
Philippines occupy a prominent place. If these 
countries were to come under communist domination, 
it is not certain what trade policy they would 
follow. They might just confine their trade to the 
Communist bloc. Though that is a remote possibility, 
the threat could well upset the economic equilibrium 
that now|obtains in the area. The imposition of 
communist rule in these countries, whether by force 
:,.'or by subwtwsion, would endanger the independence 
of Pakistan and disturb the status quo of the rest 
of Asia.
The creation of SEATO, and Pakistan’s partic­
ipation in it particularly, invoked strong reactions 
from India, China and the Soviet Union# To the 
Prime Minister of India, SEATO was "an unfortunate
development as it was bound to increase the sense
1of insecurity among the people ". To the Chinese 
Premier, 8EAT0, like NATO, was established "for the 
sole purpose of obtaining manpower and ensuring the 
setting up of new military spring-boards and bases, 
as well as to place the small countries in a sub-
pordinate position, politically and economically ". 
There is no evidence, however, that 8EAT0 was 
directed against any country*
The reaction of the Soviet Union to SEATO was 
similar* SEATO, as the Prime Minister saw it, was 
aimed at the "preservation and consolidation of 
colonialism, suppression of national liberation 
movements and interference in the affairs of the 
Chinese Peoples’ Republic and the other Asian 
countries
1. The Statesman, New Delhi, Pebruary 26th, 1955.
2. Kahin (George M.), The Asian-African Conference, 
New York, 1955, p.63.
3* At the Bandung Conference, the Prime Minister 
of Pakistan explained to the Chinese Prime 
Minister that SEATO, from Pakistan’s point of 
view was a purely defensive pact.
U. The Statesman* New Delhi, May 13th, 1955*
Notwithstanding the criticism levelled against 
SEATO, it is an incontrovertible fact that this 
Treaty has increased a sense of security among all 
nations of the area, even though they do not happen 
to be members of SEATO# But before discussing its 
usefulness, the steps taken to implement SEATO 
must be noted. The first meeting of the Council 
at Bangkok on February 23rd, 1955$ decided on the 
Pact’s mode of operation and the organisational 
framework of the Council itself. To carry out the 
economic commitments arising out of the Treaty, a 
body of economic experts was provided with the 
express purpose of assisting and advising the 
Council of Representatives.
At the second meeting of the SEATO Council of 
Foreign Ministers which was held in Karachi in 
March 1956, it was agreed that there should be a 
stronger central organisation with the headquarters 
in Bangkok. The total volume of the United States 
allocations for economic aid to the Asian members 
of SEATO increased almost fourfold since the signing 
of the Treaty. It was confirmed that since the 
sovereignty of Pakistan extends up to the Durand 
Line - the frontier between Pakistan and Afghanistan - 
all borders of Pakistan fall under the protective 
mantle of SEATO. This was an important development 
because it meant that Pakistan could invoke the 
Treaty in case of attack on her western territories 
inhabited by the Pathans. Besides, the SEATO Council
affirmed the need to settle the Kashmir question 
through the United Nations or by direct negotia­
tions. This assumed a particular significance 
after the Soviet leaders’ inflamatory statement
on Kashmir and 'Pakhtoonistan’ during their tour
1of India and Afghanistan in December 1955*-
1. Crowley (Desmond), " The Background to Current 
Affairs", Macmillan Companyplf-th edition, 
1%Z, p.284.
6.7 Present Importance of these Pacts in
Relation to the Changing Foreign Policy 
of the Tripartite Countries of ROD 
towards Russia, U.S.A. and U.K., with 
Special Reference to Pakistan’s Poreign 
 _ Policy __
The last few years have witnessed a distinct
change in the external policy of the three Regional
Cooperation Development countries, viz. Pakistan,
Iran and Turkey. Pakistan’s policy has "been reflected
in her relations with the major Powers as well as
with the Afro-Asian countries. Prom a policy of
non-alignment, she has gradually shifted towards
one of qualified alignment. Though she is still
formally allied with the United States by a whole
band of bilateral agreements and has not formally
renounced her membership of SEATO or CENTO, these
relationships are not, as they were in the years
195U-1960, 4the sheet-anchor’ of her foreign policy.
Attempts have been made, and are being made, to
establish closer relations with the Afro-Asian
countries, and to repair links with Moscow which
had been badly damaged when she decided to align
herself with the West.
Pakistan has cemented her relations with 
Communist China. A boundary Agreement was signed 
in March 1963 (mentioned in Chapter 3'), followed
1. As stated by the Poreign Minister of Pakistan in 
an address on "Poreign Policy of Pakistan", 
given at the Pakistan Institute of International 
Affairs. See Pakistan Horizon, Vol.XIII (i9 6 0),
p.12.
by a trade agreement and an air-transport agreement. 
The President of Pakistan visited the Soviet Union 
in 1965 and came back more than satisfied. The 
Shahinshah of Iran also visited the Soviet Union 
in June 1965. Their visits were preceeded by that 
of the Turkish Poreign Minister, who went to the 
Soviet Union in October 1964. It was the first 
visit of a Turkish Poreign Minister to Moscow since 
1939. These visits have been preceeded and followed 
up with talks, agreements and steps^for achieving 
greater practical cooperation between the Soviet 
Union and these three countries.
Today the three countries find themselves 
faced with the challenge of a completely different 
nature. With the Democrats continuing in power in 
the United States in the mid-1960s, the importance 
of Republican sponsored military pacts like CENTO 
lessened. Por Pakistan there could not have been a 
bigger American fault than to ignore years of solid 
alliance and rush military assistance to India, the 
country whose fear made Pakistan stick to the pacts.
The Sino-Russian conflict in 1964-65 and the 
'rapprochmenf between America and Russia had worried 
Turkey and Iran. With the new understanding the 
United States no longer seemed concerned by the 
threat from the Soviet side. The new focus was on 
the South East Asian threat of war. It would, there­
fore, have been absolutely wrong for Iran and Turkey 
to have not made necessary shifts in their inter­
national relations in accordance with the dictates 
of the new situation.
As in Pakistan, there is great dissatisfaction 
in Iran and in Turkey, against the Western policies. 
Turkey feels let down by the West on Cyprus. So 
strong are the anti-West feelings in Turkey that 
there has been a repdrt of a non-aggression pact 
with the Soviet Union. Iran too has responded 
towards Moscow, and has come out with generous 
offers of economic assistance to these three 
countries '), without making an issue
of their still valid membership of pacts such as 
CENTO, SEATO and NATO.
Thus, though acting individually, the three 
RCD countries have been following a similar pattern 
of readjustments of their international alignments. 
Hence the RCD has in the fold, as in many others, 
become an expression of the dissatisfaction of these 
countries with the West. To all these three count­
ries the Soviet Union is a giant neighbour, it is 
the leader of the Socialist bloc, a counterbalance 
to United States political and military power. 
Improving relations with her, therefore, automatically 
signifies a fundamental shift in the policy of these 
countries - a shift from a one-sided alignment to a 
policy of friendship with all. One special feature 
of this shift in the thinking-again common to the 
three countries is that none of them is desirous of 
completely breaking off with the United States. If 
the United States suspended Pakistan’s aid in 1965, 
it was because of American reaction to Pakistan’s
policies. Pakistan on her part continued in CENTO 
and SEATO despite friendship with Peking and des­
pite the provocation of United States military 
build up in India.
During the Indo-Pakistan war of 1965 j China 
extended diplomatic support, and more recently, 
since the suspension of American military aid to 
Pakistan, she has helped her to fill her depleted 
armoury. But it would be wrong to conclude from 
this that Pakistan has irrevocably cast her lot 
with China. There is no ideological affinities 
between the two countries. Pakistan does not have 
a Communist Party, and her internal economic 
policies show an unmistakable bias towards the 
private sector. It is not always realized that, 
although the Sino-Indian war may have helped China 
and Pakistan to draw closer, their relations were 
consistently cordial even before that, and Pakistan 
was among the first few countries to establish 
diplomatic relations with Peking. Even when Pakistan 
joined 8EAT0, China, unlike the Soviet Union, did 
not become hostile towards her, or support India’s 
position on Kashmir. There is no likelihood of a 
clash of interests between the two countries in the 
foreseeable future, especially since there is no 
outstanding dispute between them, as for instance there 
is between Pakistan and India and Pakistan and Afghan­
istan.
Pakistan has heen trying hard in the past few 
years to normalise her relations with the Soviet 
Union. The first step in that direction was taken 
when she signed the Oil Agreement in July 1961,^ 
whereby a Russian five-year loan of technical assist­
ance was made available for oil exploration. But 
while Mr. Khrushchev was in power, it was difficult 
for her to make much headway. Since his overthrow 
the new leadership in the Soviet Union has been keen 
to win the goodwill of Pakistan. It induced Pakistan 
to attend the Tashkent Conference in January 1966,
2and later to consent to the Agreement reached there. 
Pakistan has currently explored the possibilities of 
an arms deal with the Soviet Union and sent a military 
delegation to Moscow in June 1965 for that purpose.
The freezing of American military aid has made the 
need for an alternative source quite urgent, espec­
ially to replace War losses. Pakistan is, therefore, 
keen to have continuing cordiality in her relations 
with the Soviet Union, and now that she has been 
playing down her membership of the SEATO and CENTO 
pacts and her alliance with the United States, her 
efforts are likely to be more fruitful. The Soviet 
Union, in turn, seems quite willing to reciprocate in 
order to contain China’s growing influence, and because
!• Pakistan News Digest, Karachi, September 1962, p.10.
2. Brines (R.), *The Indo-Pakistan Conflict’, Pall 
Mall Press, LoHdonri^7“primr^“ ---
of* India’s growing involvement with Washington, 
refeleted particularly in her economic policies.
Originally conceived during the Dulles - Eden
4era as a means of firming up the states of the 
"Northern Tier" against the threat of Soviet pene­
tration, CBNTO has declined in strategic importance 
since i9 6 0, as the inter-action of numerous factors 
significantly altered the premises and world 
situation against which it was conceived.
The thaw in the Cold War was a basic factor 
in this process. It brought a significant decline 
in the hostility and suspicion with which the United 
States and the Soviet Union up to then had regarded 
one another.
New developments in v/eaponary, such as the 
long-range ballistic missile and the nuclear-powered 
submarine, reduced the importance, for the West, of 
overseas bases. At the same time, these factors ■ 
gave countries like Iran and Pakistan a great deal of 
room to manoeuvre in the field of foreign policy.
In Iran, the effect of these developments was
reflected in a rapproehment with the Soviet Union
beginning in 1962. In November of that year, the
government gave the Soviet Union verbal and written
assurances that it would not allow Iran to be used as
a base for aggression against the Soviet Union or
permit missiles of a foreign power to be based on 
1Iranian soil.
-*-* ? 19 62, published by the Echo of
Iran,’ Tehran, p.226.
238
In the wake of this, Iran and the U.8*S*R* 
signed a series of agreements under which the 
Russians extended to Iran a 036 million credit for 
the construction of a joint hydro-electric dam 
across the .Aras River, the border waterway between 
the two countries; the development of Iranian 
fisheries by Soviet exports, and the construction, 
with Russian help, of a string of grain silos across 
the country*
In the aftermath, U*S.3.R. President, Mr* Brezhnev 
visited Iran and His Imperial Majesty visited the 
Soviet Union in 1963 (the first time in nine years) 
and the two counti’ies capped their new era of good 
feelings with the now famous steel-for-gas deal, 
under which the Russians undertook to help Iran 
build a steel mill in exchange for Iranian natural 
gas •
Iran’s expansion of trade relations with the 
Soviet Union and the East bloc has been followed by 
a similar development, although on a smaller scale, 
by the other two regional members of CENTO ~ Turkey 
and Pakistan* In all three countries, economic 
considerations - the need to expand trade to finance 
intexmal development - has acted to encourage trade 
exchanges with the Communist bloc*
In addition, the thaw in the Cold V/ar has 
permitted each of the regional countries to pay 
more attention to immediate foreign policy problems 
closer to home* For Iran, the focus of attention has 
been on the Persian Gulf, for Pakistan on Kashmir,
and for Turkey on Qyprus.
Thus, in recent years, regional CENTO members 
have been more concerned with questions particular 
to each single country rather than with a commonly 
shared threat.
4\ n
The 1965 Indo-Pakistan war was one sign that 
regional politics - having been pushed into the 
background during the Cold War era - were once more 
assuming prominence. From the point of view of 
CENTO, the Mwar,f was something of a watershed.
Pakistan felt that CENTO’s non-regional assoc­
iates, Britain and the United States, should have 
come to its assistance. The two powers not only 
refused to get involved in a local war, the U.S. 
placed an embargo on weapons and spare parts deliver­
ies to the combatants, thus virtually terminating the 
progress of the war.
To Pakistan, this was an indication that CENTO 
could not be used in the pursuit of foreign policy 
aims unconnected with the general East-West struggle. 
Later statements by the Shahinshah indicated that
■j
Iran had drawn similar conclusions from the incident.
Countries like Iran had, moreover, experienced 
difficulties in securing the weapons they felt they 
should have within the CENTO framework. The United 
States had never become a full member of the organisation.
!• ..Quarterly Economic Review, Iran, The Economist 
Intelligence Unit,*”no.i7 , 1968, p.3.
And in any case, each of the three regional members 
of RCD was allied to the United States through 
other agreements.
Turkey depended for her defence needs mor^ on 
her membership in NATO than in CENTO. Pakistan 
and Iran have relied on their bilateral defence 
agreements with the United States.
In‘the last three or four years, therefore, 
regional members have more or less openly indicated 
their declining interest in the Organisation.
Beginning in 1965? Pakistan has refrained from 
sending a Minister to the Council sessions. The 
Shahinshah has described CENTO as an organisation 
which ” never really had any teeth from the beginning’*. 
Besides, he has said ’*fortunately the threat which 
instigated us to join CENTO is no more ”.
Even the economic importance of the Organisation 
has been down-graded in recent years by the establish­
ment ’’outside the CENTO framework”, of the Regional 
Cooperation for Development by Iran, Turkey and 
Pakistan in 1963*
If the importance of CENTO has declined consider­
ably in the last few years, there are also reasons 
why it has not gone out of existence altogether.
It is still a vehicle for the joint economic develop­
ment of the three regional countries. The CENTO 
microwave link and the rail link ups are concrete 
evidence of this.
1. Iran Almanac and Book of Pacts, 1968, Echo of 
Iran', 'Tehrani p.2307“
CENTO permits both regional and non-regional 
members to exchange views on the defence needs of 
the region and to use the organisation as a vehicle 
through which to gain support for their foreign 
policy positions.
The Regional Countries in CENTO have established 
new relations with the East bloc, and that each of 
these countries had made economic progress (see 
Chapter 7), The problems these countries now face 
are not all of the same kind. Mr. Eahadi, the 
Iranian Poreign Minister, stated that ”CENT0 should 
move beyond the concept of a strict anti-Communist 
alliance and direct itself more to the problems 
of concern to the regional states .!l The invasion 
of Czechoslovakia stressed the need for continuing 
vigilance.
1. Sixteenth CENTO Ministerial Council Meeting, 
held in Tehran, May 26th, 1969,
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CHAPTER 7. CONCLUSION
The Future Role a M  Importance of R.C.D. 
in the Middle East
7*1 Economic Development and Trade 
7*1 1. Industry
Co-operation in the field of Industry constitutes a 
vital aspect of Regional Cooperation for Development* Al­
though the implementation of Joint Purpose Enterprises scheme 
is essentially a slow process, there has been considerable 
progress in this field since the lastj&ummit conference in 
December 19684
The number of approved and/or approved in principle 
Joint Purpose Enterprises is fifty five at present. The R.C.D. 
Council have recently proposed the approval of a new Joint 
Purpose Enterprise on the manufacture of Tetracycline.
Out of the fifty five approved in principle joint pur­
pose enterprises, thirteen projects have already gone into 
production. This is a fair record of industrial planning 
on a regional basis and the materialisation of cooperative 
efforts in this field is expected to have a significant 
impact both on the expansion of intra-regio#al trade and the 
economics of the three R.C.D. countries.
The thirteen projects which had already gone into pro­
duction are namely - 1. Bank-Note paper, 2. Machine Tools,
3. Gear Boxes and Differential Systems, b. Glycerine,
5. Machinery for the Tea Industry$ 6. Tungsten Carbide,
7* Borax and Boric Acid, 8. Centrifugal and Special Filters 
for Chemical Industry, 9- Locomotives Diesel Engines,
10* Polystyrene, 11. Methanol, 12* Urea Formaldehyde and<3. 
Glycerine. The Council further noted that four projects, 
namely Ultramarine Blue, Jute Mills, Ball Bearings and Shock 
Absorbers would go into production by 1971#
The most significant project in the field of petroleum 
and petro-chemicals, namely construction of a pipeline from 
Iran to a Mediterranean port in Turkey, has made considerable 
headway. The supply of crude oil from Iranian sources to 
the Izmir oil refinery Is closely linked with the pipeline 
project.
The Iskenderun Pipeline will reduce Iran's dependence on 
the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean route for the export of 
its crude oil to Central and Eastern Europe. As long as the 
Suez Canal remains closed Iran would immensely benefit from 
an outlet to the Mediterranean. In a few years time, Iran 
will need both the Persian Gulf outlet and the Mediterranean 
to export its crude oil expected to reach 6 million barrels 
per day.
It has been confirmed by the Council that further bids
have been made by member oil companies within the Iranian Oil
1
Consortium for part capacity of the 800,000 b/d line. A 
consortium of construction companies including Bechtel (U.S.) 
Entrepos (France^, William Bros. (U.K.), Mannesman, Thyssan 
(both W. Germany) and plans to pipe Iranian crude oil to 
Turkey's Mediterranean port of Iskenderum; besides by-passing 
the Gulf and Suez, would assure Turkey useful passage rights 
as well as a regular supply of Crude for its refineries.
7.1 2. Trade
The extent and nature of mutual benefits from economic 
cooperation between the R.C.D. countries will largely depend 
on the character and the stages of their respective economies, 
which determine their present and future competitiveness.
1. Q.E.R. Turkey. Annual Supplement, 1970, p.1*, E.I.U.
The existing volume of inter-regional trade is very- 
limited* In 1962 imports from the member countries con­
stituted 0*7 per oent of Iran*s total commodity purchases 
abroad whereas her sales to the area constituted per cent 
of hdr total exports. In the case of Pakistan, the respective 
percentages were b per cent and 0.3 per cent in 1963. In the 
case of Turkey- the percentage of imports was 2.2 per cent 
and that of exports was negligible. The trade of Turkey with 
the other members, especially with Pakistan, is the least 
developed, whereas Pakistan and Iran have closer trade re­
lationships. Though data on the detailed composition of intra- 
regional trade is scanty, it is clear that all but a small 
proportion of it consists of trade in agricultural goods.
The countries sell to each other those products which, on 
account of favourable physical and climatic conditions, they 
are particularly well-suited to produce.
The scope for the future expansion of intra-regional 
trade may be properly evaluated in the context of an analysis 
of the existing composition of total as well as intra-regional 
trade. The largest single import commodity group in the three 
member countries is machinery and equipment, which consitutes 
about 35 per cent, *+0 per cent and 33 per cent of the total 
imports of Pakistan, Turkey and Iran respectively. The next 
important category of imports is constituted by intermediate 
goods - semi finished manufactures - which serve as inputs 
for the local industries. The major Exports of the R.C.D. 
countries are not competitive. Pakistan's major exports 
are raw jute, jute manufactures, fish, rice, raw cotton and 
cotton manufactures, constituting together around 80 per cent 
of that country's trade. Iran's major export commodities 
are petroleum and petroleum products - about 88 per cent of 
her exports, whereas Turkey's major sales abroad involve
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cotton, tobacco, fresh and dried fruits and sugar represent­
ing together 70 per cent of her total exports. These major 
exports find their main markets in countries outside the 
R.C.D* group, mainly in the advanced countries. Only in raw 
cotton are Pakistan and Turkey competitive, but they are 
both marginal suppliers in the world market. There is already 
some trade between the member countries in these commodities, 
but despite the complementarity of exports, it is clear that 
insofar as exports of primary products constitute the main 
source of foreign exchange for the R.C.D. countries, it 
will not be in their interest to direct trade away from the 
advanced countries from where they obtain their much-needed 
capital goods. Exports of manufactured goods are as yet 
very limited, and are based on the availability of specific 
raw materials, such as wool for carpets in Iran, pig-iron 
in Turkey, and leather in Pakistan.
There exists at present bilaterial trade agreements bet­
ween Pakistan and Turkey, between Pakistan and Iran, and 
between Iran and Turkey. These agreements provide the partners 
with most-favoured national treatment and transit facilities 
for trade and restrict the re-export of goods imported from 
partner countries. The Iran-Pakistan agreement goes a step 
further, and includes a list of commodities in which an
expansion of trade is considered desirable by the signatory 
1
countries.
The lists of commodities in which an expansion of intra- 
regional trade is sought may be compared with the present
1. Text of the trade agreement between the Governments of
Iran and the Republic Government of Turkey, Shahriv.er,
3, 19lK3, quoted in Bank Markesi Iran Bulletin, Vol.3,
Ho.17, Jan.-Feb. 1965, p*752.
composition of intra-regional trade in the total exports 
and imports of these items* In absence of data on the share 
of R.C.D. trade in each member country’s total trade, an 
analysis has been made only of Pakistan*s trade with the 
R.C.D. countries vis-a-vis her total trade. This reveals that 
the majority of the commodities in which a further expansion 
of imports from the R.C.D* countries into Pakistan constitute 
a small fraction of her total or global imports of these 
commodities.
Pakistan*s exports to R.C.D. countries amounted to
06,080,508 during the first ten months of the year 1968-69,
as compared with^g,9^1,909 during the same period in 1967*
Export receipts increased from this region from 0338,983 in
March 1969 to 06l*+, M)7 during April 1969. Out of the total
earnings Iran accounted for S .«A»/(.*yswhile Turkey* s
, . 1 
share was ' s4jjB*3> 3ty8
In order to implement the removal of barriers to regional 
trade, first a multilateral payments agreement was already 
working on a tripartite basis which itself ensured the devel­
opment of intra-regional trade with great facility, up to a
2
level of about 06 m. per annum. A substantial increase in 
trade is in fact already visible as a consequence of this 
agreement. Secondly, it is noted that when the,.80 or more 
large joint enterprises are completed, their output will give 
regional trade a very big and sudden upward boost, because 
the three partners are committed to meeting all their require­
ments of these items from their jointly owned industries*
1. Export receipts, State Bank of Pakistan, Department of 
Statistics, April 1969* P* (viii).
2. R.C.D. News, The Bulletin of R.C.D*, Vol.5* No.32, Jan.- 
Feb, 1969, p.TO;
7*1 3* Comnmnic at ions
The R.C.D. countries have cooperated in or have plans 
to develop further communication links which id 11 be mutually 
advantageous. One of the most important projects is the 
international highway between the three countries. The 
Tehran-Turkey border highway 898 Km, has been completed and 
is already under traffic.
On the Tehran-Kerman-Pakistan border highway sector, 
the portion connecting Tehran-Esfahan-Naeiv, 59*+ Km. has been 
completed and is already under traffic. Another portion from 
Ne&iv to Kerman (571 Km) is being reconstructed and will be 
completed during the Fourth National Plan of Iran. The portion 
connecting Kerman, Zahedan and Miraaveh (Pakistan border)
637 Km. is a grave* road ind is under regular maintenance 
by the highway departments and some portions which fall below 
the R.C.D. standards are being improved.
The total lengths of the R.C.D. highway in Pakistan is 
1,317 Km. This is divided into three categories as followss-
1. Completed asphalt road according to R.C.D. standards,
= 120 Km.
2. Asphalt road below R.C.D. standard = *t06 Km.
3. Grand road below R.C.D. standards = 752 Km.
As for the rail link, Pakistan Railway system extends 
up to the Iranian city of Zahedan. The railway link between 
Tehran and Kashan is already in operation and the section 
from Kashan to Yazd and Kerman is expected to be completed 
shortly. The section from Kerman to Zahedan has been included 
in the Fourth National Plan of Iran. The Tehran-Ankara 
railway link became fully operative at the end of 1969* 
Shipping was one of the fields of commerce which 
attracted early attention in R.C.D. All three R.C.D. members
have direct access to the high seas and conduct the bulk of 
their trade by sea, and yet none of them could be called a 
maritime power# Of the three Pakistan necessarily had the 
largest merchant fleet and longest experience# Turkey came 
next, with relatively large and advanced shipping lines carry­
ing both cargo and passengers between Turkey and the Medit­
erranean and Atlantic ports* Iran, once a great sea power 
of the world, had neglected its merchant marine in the 
recent past.
It were these considerations which led to the formation 
of an R.C.D. Joint Shipping Service. The head office of the 
three Shipping Service Company was established in Istanbul.
The shipping service has been carrying cargo in the following 
proportions: Pakistan, $0 per cent, Turkey 35 per cent, and
Iran 15 per cent. The ships of the service not only connect 
regional ports, but also operate on the U.S. route. Prior to 
the commencement of R.C.D. Service there was no direct shipping 
link between Pakistan and Turkey. The caroges were trans­
shipped at Port Said entailing delays.
7.2 Future Economic Development in relation to the Middle East
For the future,prospects of the development plans will 
to a considerable extent, depend on historical, economic and 
political background of the member countries. We shall have 
to take into consideration not only the internal social and 
political set up of the member countries, but also their 
relation to and position in the comity of nations. The 
external strings and pressures from friendly nations other 
than those of R.C.D., as well as the exigencies that may arise 
from time to time, will have to be taken into account. All 
this is bound to have its impact on the member countries of
R.C.D.j and consequently on the progress and development of 
joint projects in the region. It is possible that some 
other countries like Afghanistan, which at present is not a 
member, yet after a few years may be compelled or pursuaded 
by its geographical location, economic conditions, or political 
reasons to join the R.C.D. Thus if it ever happens, will widen 
the scope of the activities of R.C.D. besides strengthensing 
the non-Arab Muslim States extending over a vast stretch of 
land from Europe to South East Asia.
An approach to regional planning in the R.C.D. countries 
is initially different from that to national planning. National 
planning aims at achieving social and economic objectives 
within the framework of national resources. Regional planning 
involves the pooling together of all the resources of the 
member countries and exploring the possibilities of how to 
utilize them to the maximum mutual benefits of all the part­
icipants.
So far the three member countries have been developing 
their own resources separately. It is likely that each nation 
will be more advanced than the other two in certain fields.
For example, Pakistan is superior in aviation, and Turkey in 
shipping. Under normal arrangements it is likely that these 
partners with superior technical expertise and facilities 
would assert this supremacy in an authoritative way, leading 
to friction. Now that the R.C.D. countries have entered into 
a pact to develop the region jointly, it will be expedient 
that the various Committees for different development pro­
grammes should function on a cooperative rather than an 
authoritative basis.
No doubt a thorough study is being made of the surplus
goods for mutual exchange among the member countries but 
there is every likelihood that there may still be in one 
country certain surplus goods which may not be needed in 
other member: icountries. For example Pakistani jute surplus 
might be processed advantageously in Turkey and Iran, where 
the homqfaarket could serve as well as some export.
Turkey has iron in surplus which if exchanged on barter 
system will save foreign exchange to Pakistan where a steel 
industry is of viable use if ore be available at a low cost. 
Meanwhile the U.S.S.R. have set up in Iran a steel industry 
for which Turkey can come to her aid by exchanging Iron ore 
for Iranian oil.
Pakistan possesses plants for the assemblage of vehicles 
and produces trucks. But in spite of these facilities a large 
amount of Pakistani exchange is spent on the purchase of 
vehicles from outside. It is the same in Iran.
With respect to the manufacture of locomotives it is 
suggested that the two countries, viz. Pakistan and Iran, 
should invest capital jointly in Turkey where the prospects 
of manufacturing locomotives are very bright, so that these 
could be made available to Pakistan and Iran at relatively 
lower prices.
Cement is a vital commodity and is required in large 
quantities in Pakistan. At present it is imported from 
countries other than the B.C.D. block. The shortage is very 
acute in East Pakistan. Turkey and Iran can satisfy the 
needs of Pakistan. Turkey produces clove oil of a superior 
quality which sells at a lower market price than that produced 
in France. Pakistan imports its requirements of clove oil 
from France, which she might advantageously purchase from 
Turkey.
While there are numbers of difficulties involved in the 
economic field of Regional Cooperation f.or- Development, there 
are also a number of opportunities for economic gains that 
could be derived therefrom. Such integration could result 
in the creation of a wider market for R.C.D. industrial 
products, affect a greater and more economic utilisation of 
regional resources for regional purposes, and lead to a larger 
flow of capital into the region and to additional markets for 
products outside the region. As a group R.C.D. countries could 
create a wider market for the products of the developing 
countries, and that such a market could better enable these 
countries to establish diversified and economically viable 
industrial structures and thereby accelerate theipfrate of 
economic growth.
Hence, in attributing opportunities for economic gains 
to the tripartite countries cooperation, one must also con­
sider the effects that such cooperation could have on the 
trade and economic relations of the R.C.D. countries with the 
Middle East countries. There could be two principal effects 
that cooperation could have on such relations. First, by 
negotiating as an economic entity, the R.C.D. countries could 
strengthen their bargaining position in trade and economic 
negotiations with the Middle East countries. Second, bjr 
creating a larger single market, undertaking a programme of 
regional development and coordinating and functioning as a 
regional economic entity, they could place themselves in a 
position to receive larger sums of economic aid from private 
and public resources and could encourage the investment $£ 
larger sums within the region by private companies. The tri­
partite countries would be in much better positions to obtain
their objectives in multilateral and bilateral negotiations 
with the industrialized countries of the Middle East if they 
were to negotiate as a group rather than as separate entities. 
Likewise in international trade and commerce they could assume 
a much more important position.
The geographical proximity and the ethnic and social 
factors that these countries have in common, including simil­
arities in religion, language and culture - have not been 
sufficient to supply the impetus. The political and economic 
factors have been the controlling factors, and although at 
times these factors have been such that the E.C.D. countries 
have been willing to pay more than lip service to regional 
cooperation, they have not been such that these countries have 
been willing to pursue a course of action to effect it. It 
remains to be seen whether the vested domestic interests and 
political and economic differences within the R.C.D. countries 
will tend to proliferate and solidify so as to further impede 
economic cooperation, or whether future political and economic 
developments will facilitate or create an impetus for such 
cooperation.
7*3 External Relations and Security
Strategically, the R.C.D. region is an extremely well-placed 
unit* In his will, Peter the Great advised: 11 Approach as near 
as possible to Constantinople and India. Whoever governs them 
will be true sovereign of the world ... Establish dockyards
on the Black Sea ... Penetrate as far as the Persian Gulf ...
1
Advance as far as India.11 The Soviet Union1 s policies in
1. Sykes, Sir Percy : op. cit. p. 2M+.
the region are in consenance with this directive of Peter 
the Great.
Sir Olaf Caroe finds this confederation extending from
Istanbul to Karachi in the area of the overlap of four theatres
of world powers, name ly Europe, West of Russia, the Eurasian
landmass of South Russia, the Indian Ocean and Africa. He
points out that this area of the overlap stretches in a rough
arc from Kashmir, westward across the North-West Frontier,
Afghanistan, Iran - a curve embracing the Persian Gulf as
closely and neatly as the Turkish crescent embraces the star.
This region according to him, contains in this age of political
gravity, exercising an attractive force, the greater by reason
of its location and its possession of natural resources of
1
inestimable value.
Arnold Toynbee looks at this region from another angle.
He writes: “In an air age, the locus of the centre of gravity
of human affairs may be determined not by physical but by human
geography. Among these human factors, the weight of numbers
may eventually come to count for more than its influence in
the past ... Their gravitational pull may draw the centre-
point of human affairs in some locus approximately equidistant
from the western pole of the world1s population in Europe and
North America and the eastern pole in China and India and this
2
would indicate a site in the neighbourhood of Babylon*11 From 
this viewpoint, R.C.D. countries together are more strategic­
ally important as they lie in the areas defined as the centre 
of the world. It has access to the seas and can influence 
events both in the east and the west; in all the theatres of
1. See Caroe, Sir Olaf, Wells of Power. London, 1951*
2. Toynbee, A, Civilization on Trial. New York, 19M-8. p*88.
world power.
In view of the present developments in war weapons, tech­
niques and strategies, Central Asia is no longer the Heartland 
of Eurasia. It is not immune from air attacks. Being land- 
bound, the forces there are less mobile. The region enjoys 
all the advantages of the Heartland and is free from its 
handicaps. Collectively these countries have immense human 
and vital material resources. The spiritual force of Islam 
can be activated by unifying the people. It has access to 
the seas and is situated on the land and air routes of the 
world. In fact the R.C.D. region and not Central Asia occupies 
the Heartland of the world.
The tripartite countries are apparently alive to the 
demands of defence strategy. In CENTO they have evolved a 
sort of infra-structure of defence. Common strategies for 
national security and integrity inevitably lead to common 
foreign policies. This in turn affects economic and other 
home policies. Cooperation in the field of defence thus auto­
matically leads to the formulation of similar policies over a 
wide range. It is such factors which have created a sentiment 
in favour of regional cooperation for development.
The slowly evolving patterns of the expansion of Soviet 
power and influence to the south is getting clearer. The 
expansion of Russian navies in the Mediterranean, round the 
periphery of the CENTO area and the Indian Ocean is often 
pointed to as a sign that the Soviet Union is preparing to 
dig itself in militarily in the Middle East and neighbouring 
areas.
It is possible that the area of confrontation between 
the United States and the Soviet Union may be moving away 
from the Middle East towards the Indian Ocean, or at any rate
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that both the super powers are aware of this as a possibility
and are making their plans accordingly. It is in this area
that we can see a new balance of power shaping. It is going
to be in Indo-Pakistan sub-continent that the confrontation
between the triumvirate of power - the Soviet Union, the United
States, and China- is likely to be resolved* The drive to
the south is one of the traditional directions of Russian
foreign policy; with the ‘retreat1 of the West, the Middle
Bast has become a power vacuum,and the emergence of China
as a great power, hostile to the Soviet Union, has given
additional impetus to Soviet activities there and in the
1
Indo-Pakistan sub-continentt
The opportunities opened to Russia in the Persian Gulf 
after an interval of more than five decades were wider: i than 
those before it is no longer merely a question of access
to warm waters and bringing pressure to bear on the British. 
With the extension of the Soviet sphere of interest into East 
Africa and South East Asia, the Persian Gulf acquired new 
importance as a bridgehead. At the same time renewed Russian 
interest in the Indian Ocean was probably not unconnected 
with the fear of China, and the idea that the Indian Oceqn 
could mark the beginning of a line to contain China. “For over 
a century Russia had leaned on one side of the Middle East 
door to the Indian Ocean and Britain on the other.”
In January 1968 Mr. Eugene Rostow expressed the hope that 
Iran, Turkey,Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait would form a 
nucleus around which security arrangements could in future be 
built. It is a foregone conclusion that the Soviet Union will
1. LaqueurfW], The Struggle for the Middle East. London, 
1969, P*/f3>
be drawn even more into the Persian Gulf, and the return of 
Soviet influence as one of the central factors in Gulf politics 
does not come as a surprise. Gulf oil will have a great deal 
of attraction for years to come, and those who own it hope 
that they will be able to play the Soviet bloc against the 
West, and gice versa, as Iran has done for many years with 
considerable success*
Looking ahead rather optimistically, it might be added 
that R.C.D. as a group would definitely help Pakistan’s solid­
arity. A Pakistan as part of a unified bloc might bbiing 
about a change in Indian attitude that would make possible a 
peaceful solution of issues which have strained the relations 
between the two states. If India could somehow be brought to 
understand that anything that weakens Pakistan or Afghanistan 
as well is ultimately detrimental to India, she might throw 
her weight in support of, rather than in opposition to, her 
north-western neighbours* No development would be more likely 
to promote desirable political advances, which up to the present, 
have been unattainable because of the atmosphere of mutual fear 
and suspicion. India may come to realise that in matters of 
world politics and the balance between the major power blocs, 
what happens to Iran or Pakistan will ultimately affect India.
In past history India has always shared the fate of her north­
western neighbours. If India should become Communist, which 
is democratically very possible as the Second strongest party 
in the country is Communist, it would drastically effect the 
neighbouring countries. The importance of India to Asian 
affairs is that in some respects she is more susceptible to 
communism than her neighbours.
Although a full-scale outcome of political cooperation 
between the tripartite countries may be difficult to achieve
in the face of so many conflicting interests, there is no 
reason why steps should not be carried on towards economic 
cooperation*
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